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  vChapter 1 
1  The Economics of Education in 
Developing Countries 
 
“Literacy is a bridge from misery to hope. It is a tool for daily life in modern society. It is 
a bulwark against poverty, and a building block of development, an essential complement 
to investments in roads, dams, clinics and factories. […] For everyone, everywhere, 
literacy is, along with education in general, a basic human right. Literacy is, finally, the 
road to human progress and the means through which every man, woman and child can 
realize his or her full potential.”  
Kofi Annan 
 
“We must go on fighting for basic education for all, but also emphasize the 
importance of the content of education.”  
Amartya Sen 
 
This dissertation presents four empirical essays that offer findings at the interface 
of two disciplines within economics: the economics of education on the one hand and 
development economics on the other. The economics of education employs economic 
analysis to examine both the determinants of education and education’s impact on 
individuals and on the economies which they inhabit. Development economics employs 
economic analysis to examine the development process in low- and middle-income Chapter 1 : The Economics of Education in Developing Countries 
countries. Taken together, the disciplines reveal important insights for development 
policymakers.  
We have known for a long time that education is a crucial driver in the formation 
of individual and societal well-being. At the micro level, Mincer (1974) popularized the 
concept of rates of return to schooling, i.e., the earnings premium that is associated with 
an additional year or level of schooling. These returns have been estimated with micro 
data in countless studies ever since.1 The relation between education and earnings also 
translates to the macro level: higher intra-national education equality results in higher 
earnings equality (Katz, Autor 2005) and higher levels of education lead to higher growth 
levels cross-nationally (Hanushek, Wößmann 2008). 
Many development economists and policymakers regard education as the most 
powerful instrument of the poor to escape poverty. It now ranks among the foremost 
goals on the international development agenda: the UNESCO Education for All (EFA) 
Initiative and the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) both aim to 
improve education in developing countries comprehensively by 2015, primarily by 
achieving universal primary education and gender equality at all education levels. The 
emphasis on education is not solely motivated by education's direct positive effects on 
individuals' earnings. Broader and more equitable education appears to have positive 
external effects on society and contributes to the improvement in non-monetary poverty 
dimensions as well.2 For example, research has associated higher education levels with 
increased labor productivity and mobility, better resource management and faster 
diffusion of information and technologies (Porter 1998). Furthermore, we may expect 
particularly strong effects of education on the level of health within a country's population 
(Grossman, Kaestner 1997). Education, particularly of women, in developing countries is 
associated with family planning and reduced fertility, lower infant and maternal mortality, 
immunizations and better nutrition (World Bank 1993, 2001). Also, more primary 
education and gender equality in the educational system appears to be correlated with 
higher levels of democracy (Barro 1999). Ultimately, education enables people to escape 
                                                 
1 Studies estimating these so-called “Mincer returns to schooling” have consistently shown the explanatory 
power of education in wage determination at the individual level, even though this is often not equivalent to the 
actual causal return from additional schooling (Heckman, Lochner, Todd 2006). 
2 For more comprehensive surveys see, for example, Grossman (2006) or McMahon (2004). 
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poverty by building up “human capabilities” (Sen 1999), i.e., the capabilities to function as 
members of society.  
Yet, the state of education in many developing countries is still far below an 
acceptable level. Researchers measure the state of education with quantitative indicators, 
such as school enrollment and primary completion rates, or qualitative indicators, such as 
standardized test scores, which provide an indication of cognitive capabilities. Primary 
enrollment and completion rates have risen substantially in the past two decades in 
developing countries. Between 1991 and 2005, the net enrolment ratio3 in the developing 
world rose from 79 to 86 percent (UNESCO 2007). At the same time, the global average 
primary completion rate4 rose from 72 to 77 percent (World Bank 2003). This process has 
not been uniform, however, with deteriorating figures for some sub-populations, regions 
and countries. Also, developing countries suffer from educational inefficiency, i.e., 
children repeating grades and dropping out of school before completing the educational 
cycle. UNESCO (1998) estimates that the public cost of educational wastage in the 
world’s less developed regions was around 16 percent of public current expenditure in 
1995. The rate of survival to the last primary school grade5 was less than 80 percent in 
developing countries in 2004 (UNESCO 2007). Many countries will thus fail to achieve 
the educational MDGs at the current pace (World Bank 2008). In addition, these 
quantitative measures of education still underestimate the actual gap between the 
knowledge and skills of children in industrialized and developing countries. Hanushek and 
Wößmann (2008) estimate that in 14 developing countries with sufficient data on the 
quantity and quality of schooling, fewer than one third of 15- to 19-year-olds have 
reached basic literacy in cognitive skills, even though a substantial share of these students 
has finished the 9th grade.   
                                                 
3 The net enrolment ratio expresses enrolment of the official age group for a certain level of education as a 
percentage of the population in that age group. 
4 The primary completion rate measures the share of all children of official graduation age who complete 
primary school in a given year. 
5 The survival rate is the percentage of a cohort of students who are enrolled in the first grade of an education 
cycle in a given school year and are expected to reach a specified grade, regardless of repetition. 
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 Figure 1-1. State of Education in Peru, 2000 
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Source: Panel A-C: calculations by Filmer (2008), based on the Peru Demographic and Health Survey 2000. 
Panel D adapted from Hanushek, Wößmann (2008). 
A poignant example of this pattern can be found in Peru. The first three chapters 
in this dissertation deal with determinants of Peruvian schooling outcomes. The country 
is a good case for examining questions of educational policy because it combines the basic 
characteristics of many developing countries with the above mentioned patterns of 
quantity and quality of schooling. Peru is typical for a developing country in that it has 
heterogeneous geographic regions and ethnic groups, a divide between developed urban 
and sparsely populated rural areas, and persistent poverty (52 percent in 2004) despite 
positive and stable macroeconomic performance in recent years (World Bank 2005). Peru 
spends about 3 percent of GDP on education (World Bank 2007). Figure 1-1 displays 
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schooling figures for Peru in 2000. Panel A shows that 90 percent of 15- to 19-year-olds 
have finished the 6 grades of primary education, but that there is a sharp drop afterwards, 
especially in rural areas. Consequently, only 60 percent of students finish 9 grades of 
schooling. There are two primary reasons for this: first, many students, both urban and 
rural, remain in primary school after age 11 although the primary cycle should be 
completed between age 6 and 11 (see panel B). For example, at age 14, almost 30 percent 
of children are still in primary school – this does not count those who have dropped out 
prematurely. Second, enrollment figures drop sharply after age 11, especially in rural 
zones (see panel C). While enrollment is close to 95 percent from ages 7 to 11 for both 
rural and urban areas, it reaches 86 percent at age 14. Taken together, the data imply that 
the Peruvian school system is very inefficient due to high grade repetition, overage and 
early drop-out. Not surprisingly, results from the Programme for International Student 
Assessment (PISA) in 2001 confirm that educational inefficiency in Peru correlates with 
overall weak educational quality. Hanushek and Wößmann (2008) find that in 2000, only 
one in five Peruvian students aged 15 to 19 that had finished 9th grade is functionally 
literate (see panel D). Since only 60 percent of this student cohort had completed 9 
grades, only 12 percent of the entire cohort is adequately literate. 
Given the low level of education in developing countries, positive externalities can 
justify policy interventions to reduce private underinvestment in education.6 Although 
economists hotly debate the appropriateness of financing education publicly, the rationale 
for public interventions is strongest in developing countries because externalities are likely 
to be very large at low levels of literacy (Hanushek 2002). Policy interventions can be 
made on two related fronts: in-school and out-of-school (Randall, Anderson 1999). In-
school factors relate directly to the educational system and the local schooling 
environment; out-of-school factors originate in the political, economic or social 
environment.  
The case for addressing in-school factors by increasing the quantity of school inputs 
is much stronger for developing than developed countries. Educational researchers have 
traditionally addressed in-school determinants of educational outcomes by focusing on 
                                                 
6 Other common justifications for public intervention in education are „economies of scale, market failures in 
general, and redistributive motives“ (Hanushek 2002, p. 2064). 
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quantitative measures of educational inputs (Hanushek 2003). Behind this focus is the 
belief that educational spending and quality are closely related. As the importance of 
teachers for students’ learning is undisputed, much of the political and academic debate 
has centered on the influence of the quantity of teachers, i.e., the student-teacher ratios or 
class sizes. Estimates of class size effects for both the developed and developing world 
display a great amount of inconsistency, and do not generally confirm that smaller class 
sizes have cost-effective economic impacts. If at all, there is more support for this effect 
in developing countries. This phenomenon may indicate that there are heterogeneous 
effects at different levels of overall spending or diminishing returns to reducing class size 
(Hanushek 2003). 
Overall, econometric problems plague many of the estimates on the student-
teacher ratio given that experimental evidence is rare. The use of different non-
experimental evaluation strategies like exploiting rule-induced discontinuities (cf. Angrist, 
Lavy 1999), while necessary, prevents internationally comparable results for developing 
countries. Economists thus have to derive estimates on a case-by-case basis, depending 
on data availability and the institutional settings. Even though input-based policies seem 
to have failed largely, “It does not mean that money and resources never  matter” 
(Hanushek 2003, p. F89). Particularly in developing countries, where resources are 
sometimes very low, some quantitative inputs appear to matter, such as physical facilities 
(cf. Hanushek 1995), blackboards (Glewwe, Jacoby 1994) or flipcharts (Glewwe et al. 
2004). 
In addition, we have reason to believe that the quality of inputs is a crucial in-school 
determinant of educational success. We know from U.S. evidence that schools and 
teachers vary greatly in quality, as measured by the variability in learning that they induce 
among children across classrooms. For example, Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain (2005) 
estimate that the difference between an average teacher and one at the 85th percentile of 
the teacher quality distribution results in a difference of more than 4 percentile rankings in 
the student test score distribution in a given year. Hanushek (1992) concludes that the 
difference between a teacher at the 5th and one at the 95th percentile of the teacher quality 
distribution in a given year is the equivalent of an entire year of learning. 
  6Chapter 1 : The Economics of Education in Developing Countries 
The existing body of research has been unable to explain this heterogeneity using 
easily observable quantitative measures of inputs, such as class size. Input quality may be a 
more important determinant of the currently observed achievement differences. 
Nevertheless, there is little evidence that teacher characteristics that are commonly used as 
criteria in hiring and compensation policies, such as education, experience or credentials, 
matter a great deal (Hanushek, Rivkin 2006). There may thus be scope for identifying the 
effect of more important components of teacher quality, such as teacher academic skills 
(Eide et al. 2004), which could lead to better human resource policies. Rice (2003) 
suggests that teacher academic skills may be particularly important for at-risk students. 
This is an important finding for developing countries where both teachers and students 
may have very low academic skills.  
In addition to in-school factors, out-of-school factors play an important role for 
educational outcomes, particularly in developing countries. One of these factors is health: 
not only is there a causal effect of education on health, but healthy and well-nourished 
children are also more efficient producers of human capital (Grossman, Kaestner 1997). 
Well-identified academic studies have shown the positive effects of early childhood 
nutritional status as measured by height-for-age on timely enrollment in school, reduced 
grade repetition, learning outcomes, and school attainment. Similarly, there is strong 
evidence for positive effects of health interventions such as iron supplementation, 
deworming treatments and food supplementation on various educational outcomes.7 
Another important out-of-school determinant of education is the economic situation of 
the household. Income is strongly associated with schooling in the developing world 
(Filmer, Pritchett 1999). Poorer households tend to have lower preferences for education 
and lower means to acquire goods that facilitate educational progress, such as textbooks. 
Also, there is a large body of literature suggesting that income volatility and shocks 
contribute to child labor, which in turn has strong detrimental effects on grade repetition, 
drop-out behavior and learning outcomes (cf. Edmonds 2007). 
All of this evidence illustrates the importance of well-identified findings from 
education economics to policymakers in developing countries. Developing countries are 
poor by definition. To determine whether these countries are using their scarce resources 
                                                 
7 Compare Glewwe, Miguel (2007) for a review of the studies. 
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as effectively and efficiently as possible, it is imperative to examine whether current 
policies produce the intended results. Such an understanding would then help 
policymakers to identify opportunities for increasing the effectiveness of the educational 
system. Analyzing the drivers of education outcomes and to develop policy 
recommendations from these findings is particularly important as part of this process.  
One method for developing such policy recommendations is a careful impact 
evaluation of factors which influence educational outcomes. Impact evaluation is a 
method of analysis and policy tool that detects the causal effect of an event, program or 
input on indicators of interest, the so-called treatment effect on the treated (cf. Ravallion 
2007). In theory, this effect is identified by comparing the outcome in presence of the 
intervention with the outcome in absence of the intervention; in practice, the same unit of 
observation cannot be observed in these two states of nature at the same time. Thus there 
needs to be some comparison between the treated group and an adequate untreated 
control group. In most cases, a simple comparison between these two groups without 
further assumptions yields biased results of this effect. Only in experimental studies, 
where placement of the program is randomized, does a simple comparison reveal the 
desired effect magnitude. As a consequence, it is desirable to set up interventions with 
randomizations and proper control groups ex-ante. As experiments in educational systems 
are still rare, researchers often resort to non-experimental methods in order to produce 
analyses ex-post.8  
Consequently, chapters 2 to 4 of this dissertation employ retrospective data to 
estimate causal impacts of events or educational inputs on schooling outcomes in Peru. 
The analyses employ various techniques to overcome the usual problems of endogeneity, 
i.e., simultaneity and omitted variables. Each of these three chapters addresses one 
determinant of education outcomes within the areas mentioned above, respectively: the 
quantity of teachers, the quality of teachers, and the impact of out-of-school factors.  
CHAPTER 2 contributes to the debate on input quantities by examining the effect 
of lower student-teacher ratios in rural Peru where more than one in five enrolled primary 
students fails class every year. This problem of educational inefficiency in Peru is pressing 
but poorly understood; we thus evaluate the impact of adding a second teacher to primary 
                                                 
8 Compare Glewwe and Kremer (2006) for some examples of educational experiments in developing countries. 
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single-teacher schools on enrollment and grade completion to assess lower class sizes as a 
potential remedy. Matched difference-in-difference analysis shows a positive enrollment 
effect of about 13 percent, mainly from reduced between-year drop-out before treatment, 
possibly in anticipation of improved schooling. Grade completion levels are increased after 
treatment due to the enrollment effect; the actual decrease in the student-teacher ratio of 
about 40 percent, however, does not lead to a further significant improvement in grade 
completion rates. Increasing teacher quantity is thus unlikely to solve Peru’s problem of 
educational inefficiency. 
CHAPTER 3 contributes to the debate on input quality by examining whether 
teacher academic skills determine teacher quality and improve student test scores. In 
contrast to the second and fourth chapter, we examine student learning instead of school 
progression as education outcomes since these findings could help to close a more general 
research gap, beyond the specific problems of Peru. We exploit a unique dataset that 
provides test scores in two subjects for both students and their teachers to estimate the 
causal effect of teacher subject knowledge on student achievement using within-teacher 
within-student variation. By including student- and teacher-fixed effects, our model 
circumvents biases from omitted variables and selection. The results indicate that a one 
standard-deviation increase in teacher test scores increases student test scores by about 4 
percent of a standard deviation, and by even more when correcting for measurement 
error. This finding is especially important for the developing world, where both students 
and teachers often have very low academic skills. 
CHAPTER 4 addresses out-of-school determinants of educational success: it 
contributes to the relatively new literature on the impact of climate change on schooling 
outcomes, a commonly overlooked aspect in assessing its economic impacts on poverty-
related outcomes. We estimate the effect of natural hazard damages to farmland on 
primary school grade non-completion rates in rural Peru. Since children were enrolled 
before the disasters occurred, this serves to learn about the costs of getting rural children 
through school despite changes in their economic environment. The results indicate that a 
damage of 42 hectares of average farmland, or 18 hectares of subsistence farmland, causes 
one schoolchild not to complete the grade he or she is enrolled in. The analysis thus 
predicts that natural hazards account for several hundred yearly cases of grade failure in 
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rural Peru, and that out-of-school factors can be important determinants of educational 
inefficiency.  
Finally, adding to the research on the economic consequences of education 
referred to at the beginning, CHAPTER 5 provides a perspective on the relation between 
changing skill premiums at the micro level and earnings inequality at the macro level in 
Argentina during the 1980s and 1990s. Largely due to the lack of evidence for competing 
explanations, skill-biased technical change is the most likely explanation for the increases 
in the returns to education that occurred in Argentina in the 1990s. Using a semi-
parametric re-weighting variance decomposition technique, the analysis shows that during 
the same period there was an increase in the returns to unobserved skill. This finding 
lends support to the hypothesis that skill-biased technical change may have been a driver 
of increases in inequality in Argentina. Additionally, the pattern of changes suggests that 
the growth in returns to unobserved skills may have been partly responsible for the 
relative deterioration of informal salaried wages during the 1990s. 
Even though the findings of chapters 2 to 4 cannot easily be generalized to all 
developing countries they do fall in line with the existing research surveyed above. In 
summary, there is not much support for the effectiveness of pure input-quantity based 
expenditure policies. While some quantitative inputs have been shown to matter 
selectively (cf. Glewwe, Kremer 2006), the effect in most cases is dubious, even in 
situations when expenditure levels are very low. In particular, the evidence for strong 
positive effects of decreased student-teacher ratios is meager (Hanushek 2003). 
Nevertheless, teacher salaries eat up most of the educational budget in developing 
countries (World Bank 2007). They are typically determined as a function of supposed 
teacher quality characteristics, such as education and experience. While we have no strong 
evidence for these to matter, we still know that teachers differ strongly in the knowledge 
they convey to children (Hanushek, Rivkin 2006). Teacher subject knowledge is one of 
the factors contributing to teacher quality in Peru. Furthermore, out-of-school factors, 
such as weather shocks, play a significant role in the cost-benefit calculation of 
households; economic hardship can turn them away from school and towards more basic 
needs of survival (Edmonds 2007). Educational policy alone cannot address this problem 
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because increases in the returns to education probably would have to be enormous to 
counterbalance the deterioration of economic situations. 
In conclusion, there are formidable problems to improving education in 
developing countries beyond providing access to all children. In a broad sense, most good 
development policies are good education policies since better economic conditions also 
allow larger shares of the population to benefit from education. But in a narrow sense, 
there is much scope to improve educational policy itself in developing countries. For 
example, introducing proper incentives can be one promising part of the solution in order 
to align the interests of the suppliers and consumers of education. For example, the 
World Bank (2001, p. 51) notes with respect to the teaching profession in Peru that there 
is “a lack of incentives in the system to encourage commitment, professional 
development, and higher performance, which could translate into better student 
achievement.” In contrast, we know that conditional cash transfer programs can improve 
school attainment and the economics of poor households by tying benefit payments to 
the attendance of children in school (cf. Rawlings, Rubio 2003). Teacher performance pay 
can have strong effects on learning outcomes (cf. Muralidharan, Sundararaman 2008) and 
possibly attract more productive teachers into the workforce (cf. Falk, Dohmen 2008). 
This is one promising area for more research, and decision makers need more solid and 
relevant evidence from impact evaluations of policies in developing countries to close the 
“evaluation gap” (Center for Global Development 2006) and channel funds towards their 
most productive use.  
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2  Does the Second Teacher Matter? 
Effects on Enrollment and Grade 
Completion in Primary Single-
Teacher Schools in Rural Peru 
 
2.1  Introduction 
In the process towards universal primary education – Millennium Development 
Goal No. 2 – many developing countries are scaling up their primary school coverage 
while the quality of the system deteriorates as educational expenditures do not increase 
alike. In international student achievement tests, some developing countries with high 
coverage perform dismally. As quality lags behind, the system becomes clogged by 
students that do not progress through school in time, a phenomenon often termed 
educational wastage (UNESCO 1998). Many students keep repeating the same grades 
because they are not promoted to higher grades, creating a vicious cycle: over-aged 
students become a drain on the remaining class by diverting scarce education materials 
and teacher attention away from others. Also, repeaters are more likely to drop out of 
school permanently with insufficient education. Peru is a poignant example of an 
economically advancing developing country with such problems in the education sector. 
Through steady enrollment increases, Peru has almost achieved universal primary school 
coverage. Nevertheless, educational inefficiency is very high – 18 percent of primary Chapter 2: Does The Second Teacher Matter?  
students failed to complete the grade in 2004, and only 73 percent of 12 to 15 year olds 
had completed the 6-year cycle of primary education in 2003 (MINEDU 2005). 
This paper analyses the effect of a reduction in the student-teacher ratio in primary 
single-teacher schools in rural Peru when a second instructor is added. The effectiveness 
of teachers should be under close scrutiny since they consume most of the small 
educational budgets in developing countries. Particularly, researchers still controversially 
and inconclusively debate about the importance of the student-teacher ratio, i.e., the 
average number of teachers per student. At the same time, changes in this ratio have huge 
budgetary consequences and can bind or free up resources for other educational inputs. 
For example, the World Bank (2007) estimates that in 2005, Peru spent 83 percent of 
current and 75 percent of total educational expenditure on wages and salaries. Also, it 
maintains a student-teacher ratio of about 24 which is close to the average of Latin 
America while its GDP per capita is considerably lower than the Latin American average. 
The World Bank concludes that Peru’s student-teacher ratio may be too low, considering 
that there is little proof of the effectiveness of more teachers on student outcomes.  
Since indicators of enrollment, learning achievement and grade completion are 
lowest in poor rural communities of developing countries, more teachers may be most 
effective in such a context, if at all. In sparsely populated rural areas, children often 
acquire education in small multi-grade schools where teachers teach multiple grades at a 
time. In the extreme, only one teacher is responsible for the whole school. In these single-
teacher schools, the addition of a second teacher reduces multi-grade teaching and class 
size and may thus be a strong driver of improvement. Theory implies that increases in 
school inputs have a non-decreasing effect on the level of enrollment and an ambiguous 
effect on grade completion levels and rates if they improve school quality. Findings on the 
impact of changes in the student-teacher ratio in schools at the bottom of the quality 
distribution can inform policymakers on the trade-off between teacher quantity and other 
educational inputs. While much empirical work has addressed the effect of school inputs 
on cognitive educational achievement (cf. Hanushek 2003), less effort has been devoted 
to the equally important questions of their impact on enrollment and school progression.  
In order to inform about the effect of lower student-teacher ratios, I employ 
matched difference-in-difference estimates using a unique longitudinal school census data 
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set from Peru. Difference-in-difference estimation allows understanding the addition of a 
second teacher as a treatment to single-teacher schools and calculating its effect on 
educational outcome variables. Before estimating, I employ propensity score matching to 
mitigate possible bias of results by creating an appropriate control group in observational 
data.  
Matched difference-in-difference estimates show a positive treatment effect on 
enrollment of about 13 percent which translates into increased grade completion levels. 
The analysis suggests that most of the enrollment effect is caused by lower between-year 
drop-out before introducing the second teacher in treated schools, possibly in anticipation 
of improved schooling conditions. Via increased enrollment, treated schools produce 
significantly more grade completers. Nevertheless, the analysis also shows that there is no 
significant after-treatment effect on grade completion rates despite a roughly 40 percent 
improvement in the mean student-teacher ratio.  
There are several possible reasons why the analysis does not show an after-
treatment impact on grade completion rates: first, treatment keeps more students in 
school who would have dropped out in the absence of smaller classes and have high 
propensities to fail. Second, additional teachers willing to teach in remote areas may be 
from the bottom of the teacher quality distribution such that teacher training, e.g., on 
multigrade teaching, may be more effective than reducing class sizes. Indeed, I find that 
second teachers have relatively more non-permanent positions and work fewer hours 
even though this may be unrelated to teacher quality. Third, out of school factors rooted 
in the economic and social environment of children may play a predominant role in poor 
rural areas, such as low and volatile household incomes. These factors may be unrelated 
to educational policy and thus harder to address. In summary, increasing teacher quantity 
is thus unlikely to solve Peru’s problem of educational inefficiency. 
2.2  Background 
2.2.1  Inefficiency in Primary Education in Peru 
The Peruvian school system is divided into pre-primary, primary, secondary and 
higher education. Primary education consists of 6 grades and starts at age 6. In principle, 
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primary and secondary education in Peru is free and compulsory, but households face 
substantial costs of education9 and enforcement of attending school is hard in remote 
areas.  
There are three categories of primary school according to the relative number of 
teachers present: complete, multi-grade, and single-teacher schools. In the first case, the 
number of teachers equals or exceeds the number of classes. In the second case, at least 
two teachers are present in school, however, there are more grade levels than teachers 
thus resulting in grouping of classes. In the last case, there is also multi-grade teaching but 
only one teacher exists for all students of all grades, typically teaching them altogether in 
one classroom. Sparsely populated regions, especially in the Andes and the Amazon basin, 
inhibit appropriate schooling conditions for many students in those remote places. As a 
result, multi-grade schools are wide-spread (Hargreaves et al. 2001). 
Table 2-1 summarizes school characteristics in 2004 by types of public schools, 
adding private schools as an additional category. Single-teacher and multi-grade schools 
account for about two thirds of the school universe in Peru and host about one third of 
students. They are predominantly rural and more than 60 percent of all schools are 
located in the poorest quintile of districts.10 Almost all urban schools are complete 
schools, and more than 90 percent of private schools are urban. All public school types 
have similar average student-teacher ratios, between 24 and 25, but single-teacher schools 
have the highest variance: at the 5th percentile there are 10 students per teacher, at the 95th 
percentile there are 50. Even though the Ministry of Finance has intended an average 
student-teacher ratio of 35 in urban and 20 in rural areas, with some variations by level 
and for remote areas11, both urban and rural schools have close to 25 students per teacher 
(not shown). 
                                                 
9 See Saavedra and Suárez (2002). 
10 Poverty was calculated based on the Peruvian census 2005 using a district deficiency index which includes 
share of illiterate women, children under 12, undernourished people, and households without access to water, 
electricity, sanitation.  
11 See World Bank (2001). 
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Enrollment 24.9 (13.0) 69.5 (45.1) 245.0 (208.3) 95.9 (113.7)
Teachers 1.00 (0.00) 2.89 (1.28) 10.37 (6.48) 7.27 (5.52)
Student-Teacher Ratio 24.90 (12.97) 23.86 (8.72) 24.73 (6.81) 12.48 (8.51)
Lowest Community Quintile 0.66 (0.48) 0.61 (0.49) 0.36 (0.48) 0.05 (0.21)
Rural 0.99 (0.09) 0.96 (0.21) 0.52 (0.50) 0.07 (0.26)
N









8182 12622 5367 5896
0.255 0.394 0.167 0.184
 
Source: Own estimates based on school census data 2004. Note: Means in the left column, standard deviations in 
brackets. 
 
Peru has made significant progress in the expansion of primary school coverage 
for its population. Based on calculations from the national household survey ENAHO, 
according to the Ministry of Education (MINEDU 2005), in 2003, 96 percent of all 
children between 6 and 11 years old were enrolled in school. This figure distributes evenly 
between boys and girls, with a bias towards urban versus rural areas (98 to 93 percent). 
While among the non-poor, 99 percent of children were enrolled in school, this figure 
drops to 97 percent for poor children and 93 percent among the extremely poor.  
Along with high coverage, educational inefficiency due to drop-out or grade 
repetition is pervasive in Peru. In 2003 approximately 91 percent of 15- to 17-year-olds 
had completed primary education, but only 73 percent of 12- to 15-year-olds (MINEDU 
2005). Taking into account that primary school can be completed at age 11, many 
students finish with significant delay. Among the extremely poor, figures are even more 
drastic, with 54 percent of the population between age 12 and 14, and 78 percent between 
age 15 and 17, having completed six grades of primary education.  
Peru’s educational inefficiency resides strongly in high grade non-completion rates 
(see Figure 2-1). The non-promotion rate refers to the share of students enrolled and 
showing sufficient attendance but failing the grade due to non-promotion by decision of 
the teacher. The withdrawal rate denotes the share of students enrolled but failing the 
grade due to within-year drop-out or insufficient attendance. The sum of non-promotion 
and withdrawal rate, i.e., the total share of students not completing the grade, is the failure 
or non-completion rate. In single-teacher and multi-grade schools, more than 20 percent 
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of all students each year fail to complete the grade. Withdrawal and non-promotion 
contribute almost equally to grade failure. This compares to around 14 percent grade 
failure in complete multi-grade schools, and 5 percent in private schools. Due to a 
national average failure rate of 18 percent, schools host many over-aged repeaters and by 
grade 6, public school students who have not dropped out are on average 1.3 to 1.4 years 
too old (not shown). 
 


























Source: Own estimates based on school census data 2004. 
 
There are obvious economic reasons why one should care about drop-out and 
grade repetition: costs. UNESCO (1998) estimates that in developing countries, between 
10 and 40 percent of total public current expenditure on education are spent on wastage 
before grade 5. Repeaters use more resources such as teaching time, space, textbooks or 
school meals which may be saved or used for other children, and create a heterogeneity in 
class that distorts normal instruction. Educational inefficiency puts a burden onto the 
whole economy, in the form of reduced growth perspectives. In developing countries, this 
is especially true for rural regions. Drop-out and grade repetition also result in costs at the 
individual level, e.g., by causing low self-esteem, negative attitudes towards school and 
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higher propensity for criminality. Droppers often relapse into illiteracy. Furthermore, 
there tends to be a reinforcement of discrimination as children from poorer households 
often remain uneducated.  
2.2.2  School Quality, Inputs, Enrollment and Grade Non-completion 
Generally, two causes for school inefficiency can be distinguished: those rooted in 
economic and social environment of children, out-of-school reasons, and those rooted in the 
school system, in-school reasons (Randall, Anderson 1999). This paper concentrates on the 
latter, specifically teachers as school inputs and their effect on student enrollment and 
grade completion.  
Enrollment 
In a simple utility calculation without school choice a student weighs the benefits 
and costs of completing an additional grade in school (see for example Gertler, Glewwe 
1990). Enrollment occurs if the value added from an additional year of schooling is 
positive, i.e., the benefits of schooling exceed the costs. Benefits of education typically 
include intrinsic valuation of schooling and the wage return after completing the 
additional year both of which depend on the quality of education in the respective grade. 
The costs of an additional year of schooling can be direct, such as school fees, 
transportation costs, or costs of learning materials, and indirect opportunity costs. A 
household sending its child to school faces an opportunity cost from losing a worker in 
the household or labor market. This cost increases in household deprivation and the wage 
equivalent for the student from not going to school. 
Withdrawal 
Why would children enroll for school and subsequently withdraw? One possibility 
is that parameters in the utility calculation change during the year, e.g., with the 
occurrence of shocks to household wealth, the labor market or school quality. 
Furthermore, there may be uncertainty about the parameters necessary to decide on the 
additional year of schooling at the time of the enrollment choice. Students may enroll if 
their expected value of schooling was positive before enrollment and withdraw during the 
year if uncertainty is resolved and the resulting utility outcome has turned negative. The 
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quality of schooling may be one of these parameters for which uncertainty resolves after 
enrollment.12 If increases in quality trigger increased enrollment, withdrawal rates may rise 
if the marginal students’ propensity to withdraw is higher than that of previous students. 
Non-promotion 
As for students who do show sufficient attendance for possible promotion to the 
next grade, probability of promotion should be a non-decreasing function of the student’s 
learning achievement. Learning achievement will weakly increase in educational quality 
and the student’s ability, effort and attendance. Nevertheless, in an attempt to optimize 
their use of time between leisure, studying and work, students may scale back studying 
effort as a response to an increase in educational inputs. Also, the decision of being 
promoted depends on the teacher’s assessment of the student’s achievement at the end of 
the grade which may have a non-meritocratic component attached to it.13 Increases in 
educational quality thus do not necessarily increase promotion probabilities among 
students. 
A simple theory (cf. Manski 1989) predicts that increases in school quality should 
increase the returns to schooling and thus have a non-decreasing effect on enrollment. 
The effect on failure levels and rates is ambiguous because of quality effects on previous 
students, who would also have enrolled under the old quality level, and newly attracted 
students: if newly attracted students have some positive probability of failing, failure levels 
and rates may rise if they are not offset by decreased failure levels and rates of the 
previous students.14 As a consequence, increases in quality may increase enrollment and 
change failure levels and rates in any direction.  
School Inputs and School Quality 
The quality of an educational system is often measured by its inputs since output is 
harder to quantify. This neglects the complex process which transforms these educational 
inputs into outputs. But even by doing so, it is hard to establish a causal relationship 
                                                 
12 This does not consider the case of a positive probability of failing the school year. Also, there is no distinction 
of school children according to their ability.  
13 For example, evidence for discrimination based on social background and previous grade repetition has been 
found for Honduras (Marshall 2003, McGinn et al 1992). 
14 If school quality deteriorates through higher enrollment and this decrease more than offsets the original 
increase in quality, failure levels may even increase among students who would have enrolled under the old 
quality level. 
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between inputs and outputs since outputs may also affect the inputs into the system. For 
example, UNESCO (1998) correlates average student-teacher ratios in primary education 
by country with school efficiency as an outcome variable. The coefficient of correlation is 
-0.65, suggesting a strong influence of the input onto the output. Low school efficiency, 
however, also influences educational inputs – in this example via the channel of repeating 
students who clog the system and take up inputs, such as teacher time, away from others. 
Although school resources are known to be poor measures of school quality 
(Hanushek 1995, 2003) the number of teachers is an interesting educational input to 
study. The student-teacher ratio is a measure of average class size or real resources 
devoted to schools, and has been used as its proxy in the literature (e.g. Case, Deaton 
1999). The amount of teachers per student translates directly into current expenditures on 
education. Measuring the effect of this crucial input would allow improving their 
allocation in the context of developing countries with scarce budgetary resources. 
Teachers are among the most important determinants of children’s education and even 
though teacher quality has been shown to affect outcomes more than teacher quantity 
(Rivkin et al. 2005), quantity is more easily observable and measurable.  
In poor and sparsely populated regions of developing countries, enrollment, class-
size and the student-teacher ratio often coincide when the entire student body is taught in 
one classroom by one teacher. Changes in the number of teachers in this setting can 
reasonably be assumed to be big changes in school quality: not only does the student-
teacher ratio halve with an additional teacher, but students also gain from sharing their 
teacher with fewer other grades, creating more homogeneous classrooms. In this paper, I 
thus approximate a change in school quality by the addition of a second teacher to a 
single-teacher school.  
2.2.3  Literature Review 
Few analyses on enrollment and grade completion in developing countries 
examine in-school rather than out-of-school determinants. On the one hand, most of 
such analyses are performed at the individual level and examine individual, household and 
community factors, but usually not school characteristics, which drive school progression 
(e.g., Duryea, et al. 2007 on income risk; Evans, Miguel 2007 on parent death; Pal 2004 on 
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various factors; Meekers, Ahmed 1999 on pregnancy). On the other hand, analyses at the 
school or class level are often focused on learning achievement, not school progression 
(e.g., Krishnan et al. 2005 on teacher absence, McEwan 2003 on peer effects; Kingdon 
1996 on teacher and school characteristics). For example, international student 
assessments of learning achievement that sometimes include developing countries, such as 
PISA, collect tremendous information on individual, classroom and school characteristics 
at one point in time but not over time for the same observational units. One contrary 
example of an analysis on school progression using both individual and school-level data 
over time is Hanushek et al. (2006) who estimate a behavioral model of primary school 
drop-out behavior. They find that students act on differences in school quality measured 
as expected achievement improvements, and are more likely to drop out of low quality 
schools because of relatively lower labor market returns compared to high quality schools.  
An additional hindrance to analyses on in-school determinants of enrollment and 
school progression, such as possibly the student-teacher ratio, is the endogeneity problem 
due to omitted variable bias and reverse causality. For example, low class-size schools 
could be high-quality according to many characteristics, of which some are not measured. 
Also, bureaucrats may react to the output of schools, either by specifically allocating 
resources to high- or low-efficiency institutions. There are thus only few convincing 
attempts to estimate the effect of the student-teacher ratio on educational outcomes in 
developing countries that use particularities of the respective countries’ institutions. For 
example, Case and Deaton (1999) exploit student-teacher ratio differences before the end 
of Apartheid in South Africa and find strong significant effects on enrollment, attainment 
and test scores. Angrist and Lavy (1999) exploit discontinuities in class sizes induced by 
Maimonides’ rule in Israel and find significant effects on test scores, but only in some 
grades. The evidence, however, is far from conclusive.  
This paper thus contributes to the aforementioned strand of literature: it provides 
new evidence on student-teacher ratio effects on indicators of school progression in a 
developing country using panel data. 
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2.3  Empirical Implementation 
2.3.1  Data 
The Peruvian school census is collected on a yearly basis by the statistical unit of 
the Peruvian Ministry of Education. It covers all Peruvian educational institutions over 
time with questionnaires specific to the type and level of institution. Information is self-
reported to reflect present school registers at the date of May 30. Only information on 
end-of-year results, such as grade completion, is collected for the previous school year. 
Thus, one needs to combine the census information of two consecutive years to build a 
profile of the end-of-year results for students covered in the first year. The analysis uses 
census information from 2004, 2005 and 2006 to fully cover the years 2004 and 2005 of 
formal non-adult primary schools.  
The information does not allow for individual student profiles but aggregation at 
the grade and school level. For example, information contains the grade structure of 
students according to gender, age, native language and repeater status but it is not possible 
to follow who exactly is failing the grade. Teacher information is collected at the school 
level for primary schools. School infrastructure information is also available but due to a 
change in questionnaire not comparable between 2004 and 2005.  
By use of district identifiers, the school census data is complemented by a data set 
from 2005 containing district population information and proxy variables for poverty 
status of the communities, such as the share of households without water access or 
electricity.  
2.3.2  Estimation Strategy and Analytical Framework 
Given the difficulties to identify exogenous changes in class size or the student-
teacher ratio, I use a quasi-experimental setting outlined in Figure 2-2 focusing on 
changes in the number of teachers as input changes. These changes, however, may also be 
prone to result from previous period outcomes, e.g., if additional teachers are allocated to 
particularly bad schools. This issue is addressed using retrospective data. Although 
experimental data are often considered more reliable, a retrospective setting does not 
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suffer from a potential “Hawthorne” effect where participants are aware of being in an 
experiment and thus do not behave naturally (cf. Krueger 1999). 
 
Figure 2-2. Time Line and Treatment Setup 




















(but potential anticipation*) 
Post-treatment
period











* The possible anticipation of treatment is discussed in the appendix. 
First, in order to exploit changes in the number of teachers in Peruvian primary 
schools, I only consider the sub-sample of schools with a single teacher in the first period, 
2004, in rural areas. The schools employ one teacher who is responsible for teaching up 
to six grades simultaneously with class sizes between a few and several dozen students. 
This situation is typical for rural poor regions in developing countries which perform 
worst in enrollment rates, grade completion and learning outcomes and are thus the most 
interesting unit of analysis. Also, these schools are located in sparsely populated areas 
characterized by lack of school choice which mitigates concerns of interaction with 
neighboring schools (Hargreaves et al. 2001, Urquiola 2006). 
Second, I consider the addition of a second teacher to rural single-teacher schools 
as a treatment for which I calculate the average treatment effect on the treated by 
difference-in-difference estimation. The considered outcomes are enrollment, promotion 
and failure levels and rates. The reason for analyzing the effect of the second teacher is 
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that an additional teacher promises highest outcome changes in the considered single-
teacher schools. Not only is the student-teacher ratio halved, students also enjoy the 
benefit of sharing their teacher with fewer other grades such that relevant teacher time is 
more than doubled. The effect of further teachers is likely to be non-linear and decreasing 
in more teachers. One more teacher in the schools with worst outcomes has thus the least 
budgetary consequences but the highest possible effect.  
The idea of difference-in-difference estimation is to estimate the mean impact of 
treatment by calculating the difference between changes over time for the treatment and 
control group. The key assumption concerning selection bias is that the unobserved 
difference in mean counterfactual outcomes between treated and untreated units is 
constant over time. If so, outcome changes of the control group disclose the 
counterfactual outcome changes of the treated units. The assumption may be problematic 
if treatment units have been specifically selected on the promise of yielding different rates 
of outcome change than untreated units.  
Consequently, we need to understand the process of teacher allocation to schools 
and the important determinants of this process which may also influence our outcome 
variables of interest. The budgeting process in the education system is quite fragmented in 
Peru. Every year in May, one to two months after the beginning of the school year, 
schools present budget requests for January of the following year to Educational Service 
Units. They consolidate them for the Regional Directorates, which forward aggregated 
budgets to Transitional Councils of Regional Administration, which are again 
consolidated by the Ministry of the Presidency and then presented to the Ministry of 
Finance (MoF).  
For the MoF, the foremost budgetary priority is to cover teacher salaries and 
pensions before recurrent expenditures may be granted to Regional Directorates for other 
basic services. The loose formula for allocating teachers to the regions is based on a 
desired student-teacher ratio of 20 in rural areas and 35 in urban areas. Other educational 
materials, such as textbooks, are generally bought by the MoF and distributed to Regional 
Directorates. Afterwards, the Regional Directorates have discretionary power over 
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allocating teachers, budget and materials to the schools before April (World Bank 2001).15 
Alcazar et al. (2002) found that this discretion is used in ways that are non-transparent 
and cannot necessarily be anticipated by schools, for example by not allocating requested 
teachers, or allocating teachers beyond what was requested. 
If treatment is dependent on first applying for a second teacher and then being 
allocated sufficient funds by the Regional Directorates, schools which end up with an 
additional teacher may differ from those which remain single-teacher schools along 
important dimensions. These dimensions are relevant as long as they influence both 
treatment allocation and educational outcomes. In order to mitigate the potential bias 
arising from this selectivity, I employ propensity score matching of single-teacher schools 
(in 2004) which do and do not receive treatment (in 2005) to construct an appropriate 
control group along dimensions which may matter both for treatment and outcome. For 
example, personal connections or distance of the school to the next Regional Directorate 
may positively influence the probability to receive a second teacher but are probably 
irrelevant for the success of students. Previous year success of students, however, may 
influence both, the probability for treatment and outcomes this year. Matching reduces 
the bias in double-difference estimates by eliminating initial heterogeneity of observables 
between the treatment and comparison group. The method is superior to propensity 
score matching which assumes conditional exogeneity of unobservables with respect to 
treatment status conditional on observables and is prone to suffer from selection bias 
based on latent variables (Ravallion 2007). 
On the matched and pooled sample, I estimate the difference-in-difference OLS 
equation (1) where the null hypothesis states that treatment does not have an effect on 
outcome.16 Outcomes can be the level of enrollment, the level of grade completers and 
failers as well as the share of completers and failers. The equation is of the form  
(1) Yst = β0 + β1 Ts + β2 Pt + β3 Ts * Pt + β4 Xst + est  
where the outcome (Y) in school (s) and year (t) is a function of being in the 
teacher-treatment group (T), a post-treatment dummy for the year 2005 (P), the 
                                                 
15 As school registers are reported at May 30, they incorporate the number of teachers for the whole year; even 
though I cannot exclude with certainty that no more teachers are added after May, this is highly implausible.  
16 As a robustness check, I estimate the difference-in-difference equation by tobit since the dependent variable is 
censored between 0 and 1 (see appendix). 
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interaction effect between being in the treatment group and being in the second year (T * 
P), a vector of control variables (X) which are mostly also used for matching, and a 
random error term (e). β3 is the main coefficient of interest, the average treatment effect on the 
treated (ATT).  
2.3.3  Propensity Score Matching 
Table 2-2 summarizes the variables used for propensity score matching between 
the single-teacher schools in 2004 that do and do not receive an additional teacher in 
2005, i.e., the raw treatment and control group. On average, treated schools are 
significantly larger and thus more likely to receive an additional teacher. A t-test of mean 
comparison also reveals that treatment and control group differ along other dimensions at 
the 10 percent significance level, such as teacher gender, withdrawal share, age 
heterogeneity of students, existence of a parent committee, and the district share of 
households with sanitation.  
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Table 2-2. Summary Statistics – Unmatched Treatment and Control Groups 




Enrollment 39.095 (15.36) 23.861 (11.15) 0.000
Teacher w/ Permanent Contract 0.774 (0.42) 0.753 (0.43) 0.380
Teacher Male 0.580 (0.49) 0.522 (0.50) 0.031
Teacher Hours 38.011 (4.00) 38.343 (3.78) 0.106
Teacher w/ Teaching Degree 0.815 (0.39) 0.816 (0.39) 0.953
Non-Promotion Share (lagged) 0.129 (0.10) 0.125 (0.11) 0.497
Withdrawal Share (lagged) 0.127 (0.12) 0.126 (0.12) 0.935
Non-Promotion Share 0.123 (0.10) 0.120 (0.11) 0.692
Withdrawal Share  0.105 (0.10) 0.117 (0.12) 0.059
Share Repeaters in Class 0.051 (0.08) 0.055 (0.09) 0.420
Share Reentrants in Class 0.123 (0.11) 0.121 (0.12) 0.794
S.D. Age Distribution 2.421 (0.48) 2.289 (0.53) 0.000
Share Working 0.137 (0.34) 0.127 (0.32) 0.598
Share Not First Language 0.164 (0.35) 0.185 (0.36) 0.269
Share Male 0.508 (0.08) 0.516 (0.12) 0.263
Morning Classes 0.793 (0.41) 0.816 (0.39) 0.277
Food Program 0.736 (0.44) 0.697 (0.46) 0.114
Health Service 0.144 (0.35) 0.153 (0.36) 0.658
Language Other Native 0.071 (0.26) 0.062 (0.24) 0.486
Language Quechua 0.057 (0.23) 0.060 (0.24) 0.817
Bilingual School 0.128 (0.34) 0.143 (0.35) 0.441
Parents Committee 0.173 (0.38) 0.212 (0.41) 0.077
Rural 1.000 (0.00) 1.000 (0.00) .
Share No Water (D) 0.557 (0.25) 0.541 (0.25) 0.251
Share No Sanitation (D) 0.411 (0.23) 0.455 (0.24) 0.001
Share No Electricity (D) 0.671 (0.24) 0.661 (0.25) 0.451
Share Illiterate Women (D) 0.252 (0.14) 0.262 (0.14) 0.208
Share Children 0-12 (D) 0.332 (0.05) 0.333 (0.05) 0.686






367 5183  
 
Source: Own estimates based on school census data 2004 only for schools with full set of 
control variables available. Note: Means in the left column, standard deviations in brackets. (D) 
denotes variables measured at the district level. 
 
Table 2-3 shows the results of a probit analysis of treatment on the vector of 
observed control variables. In line with the MoF budgeting rules, enrollment has the 
biggest influence on the probability of being allocated a second teacher. Additionally, the 
following characteristics are significantly correlated with receiving a second teacher: 
having a lower withdrawal share, having a lower share of repeaters, having a higher age 
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heterogeneity of students, offering school meals, being a native Quechua school, and 
being located in a district with higher rates of illiteracy among women and higher shares 
of children. 
 
Table 2-3. Probit Regression of School Treatment  
 
S.E.
Enrollment 0.048 *** (0.002)
Teacher w/ Permanent Contract 0.119 (0.076)
Teacher Male 0.069 (0.063)
Teacher Hours -0.001 (0.008)
Teacher w/ Teaching Degree 0.051 (0.086)
Non-Promotion Share (lagged) -0.096 (0.427)
Withdrawal Share (lagged) 0.433 (0.326)
Non-Promotion Share -0.484 (0.316)
Withdrawal Share  -1.173 *** (0.327)
Share Repeaters in Class -0.909 ** (0.459)
Share Reentrants in Class -0.097 (0.403)
S.D. Age Distribution 0.185 *** (0.063)
Share Working 0.005 (0.094)
Share Not First Language 0.126 (0.094)
Share Male -0.479 (0.301)
Morning Classes 0.007 (0.083)
Food Program 0.131 * (0.073)
Health Service -0.020 (0.086)
Language Other Native 0.091 (0.148)
Language Quechua 0.333 ** (0.144)
Bilingual School -0.045 (0.109)
Parents Committee -0.076 (0.080)
Share No Water (D) 0.051 (0.155)
Share No Sanitation (D) 0.076 (0.158)
Share No Electricity (D) 0.194 (0.170)
Share Illiterate Women (D) -1.047 *** (0.364)
Share Children 0-12 (D) -5.027 *** (0.975)
Share Malnutrition '99 (D) 0.214 (0.392)






Source: Own estimates based on school census data 2004. Note: 
Robust standard errors in brackets, significance levels: * p<0.10, ** 
p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
If additional teachers are placed where outcomes are higher to begin with, or 
where the district has higher shares of literate women and lower fertility, there might be 
bias in difference-in-difference estimates, arising from the fact that the targeted schools 
may be able to show higher rates of productivity growth than their peers. As far as 
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observable characteristics are concerned, this worry is taken care of by finding an 
appropriate control group via propensity score matching and making sure that covariates 
are balanced between the groups. A remaining concern to identification is heterogeneity 
between treatment and control group with respect to unobservables that induce different 
rates of outcome growth over time, conditional on treatment. 
 
Figure 2-3. Distribution of Propensity Score by Treatment Status 
 



















Source: Own estimates based on school census data 2004. 
 
Figure 2-3 shows the distribution of the estimated propensity score by treatment 
status. Non-treated schools are concentrated heavily in the lowest score quintile with a 
median of 0.03. However, due to the large number of non-treated schools, close matches 
for treated schools can even be found in high-score regions. Table 2-4 shows the resulting 
treatment and control group after performing nearest neighbor matching with 5 
neighbors and replacement. The treatment group reduces to 348 schools after eliminating 
observations off the common support and those without an appropriate neighbor within 
a caliper of 0.01. The control group consists of 1071 schools using some more than once 
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as an appropriate match. T-tests can never reject equality of weighted means between 
treatment and control group variables at the 10 percent significance level.17 For an 
elaboration of the characteristics of new compared to old teachers, see the appendix.  
 





Enrollment 38.198 (13.90) 38.622 (15.06) 0.657
Teacher w/ Permanent Contract 0.787 (0.41) 0.765 (0.42) 0.419
Teacher Male 0.583 (0.49) 0.568 (0.50) 0.627
Teacher Hours 38.046 (3.97) 38.072 (3.95) 0.921
Teacher w/ Teaching Degree 0.816 (0.39) 0.825 (0.38) 0.723
Non-Promotion Share (lagged) 0.129 (0.10) 0.133 (0.11) 0.590
Withdrawal Share (lagged) 0.127 (0.12) 0.134 (0.11) 0.381
Non-Promotion Share 0.123 (0.10) 0.123 (0.10) 0.979
Withdrawal Share  0.104 (0.10) 0.108 (0.10) 0.523
Share Repeaters in Class 0.051 (0.08) 0.055 (0.08) 0.493
Share Reentrants in Class 0.126 (0.11) 0.130 (0.11) 0.537
S.D. Age Distribution 2.429 (0.48) 2.444 (0.47) 0.639
Share Working 0.138 (0.34) 0.157 (0.35) 0.411
Share Not First Language 0.161 (0.35) 0.176 (0.36) 0.526
Share Male 0.507 (0.08) 0.506 (0.09) 0.790
Morning Classes 0.793 (0.41) 0.785 (0.41) 0.749
Food Program 0.753 (0.43) 0.766 (0.42) 0.640
Health Service 0.149 (0.36) 0.167 (0.37) 0.465
Language Other Native 0.069 (0.25) 0.081 (0.27) 0.484
Language Quechua 0.060 (0.24) 0.064 (0.25) 0.823
Bilingual School 0.129 (0.34) 0.148 (0.36) 0.425
Parents Committee 0.178 (0.38) 0.173 (0.38) 0.851
Rural 1.000 (0.00) 1.000 (0.00) .
Share No Water (D) 0.554 (0.25) 0.556 (0.25) 0.899
Share No Sanitation (D) 0.412 (0.23) 0.417 (0.25) 0.736
Share No Electricity (D) 0.673 (0.24) 0.676 (0.25) 0.853
Share Illiterate Women (D) 0.254 (0.14) 0.263 (0.14) 0.309
Share Children 0-12 (D) 0.332 (0.05) 0.335 (0.05) 0.425
Share Malnutrition '99 (D) 0.441 (0.13) 0.447 (0.13) 0.493
N








Source: Own estimates based on school census data 2005. Note: Means in the left column, 
standard deviations in brackets. (D) denotes variables measured at the district level. 
                                                 
17 Estimation results in the next section are qualitatively very similar when using nearest-neighbor matching with 
1 neighbor or kernel matching. Results are available from author upon request. 
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One could argue that end-of-year results from 2004 should not be included in the 
matching procedure since they may be potentially influenced by the anticipation of 
receiving a second teacher, given that the budgeting process for the 2005 starts mid-2004. 
An extended discussion of this issue and further estimation results are presented in the 
appendix. 
2.4  Results 
Table 2-5 to Table 2-9 show the results of estimating equation (1), i.e., difference-
in-difference estimates with robust standard errors on the pooled sample of schools on 
different measures of outcome: enrollment, the student-teacher ratio, completion, failure, 
non-promotion and withdrawal levels and rates at the school level.18
 
Table 2-5. Matched Difference-in-Difference Estimates: Treatment Effect on 
Enrollment and the Student-teacher Ratio 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Dependent Variable
Treatment*2005 4.728*** 4.780*** -15.635*** -15.592***
(1.419) (1.284) (1.221) (1.111)
Treatment Group -0.424 -0.008 -0.424 -0.042
(0.955) (0.860) (0.955) (0.860)
Year 2005 -2.200** -2.193*** -2.200** -2.182***
(0.873) (0.776) (0.873) (0.779)
Controls No Yes No Yes
Adj.R-Squared 0.009 0.217 0.241 0.399




Source: Own estimates based on school census data. Note: Robust standard errors in brackets, 
significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Table 2-5 shows an important finding: the addition of a second teacher to rural 
single-teacher schools increases enrollment significantly: on average by 4.7 students 
(column 1). At 38.2 students before treatment this represents an enrollment increase of 
                                                 
18 Control variables are used as follows: regressions on enrollment and outcome levels include school and district 
variables; regressions on outcome shares include student, school and district variables. Student level: standard 
deviation of age distribution, share working, share with other first language than school language; School level 
binary variables: morning classes, food program, health service, language Quechua, language other native, 
bilingual school, parents committee; District level: share households without water, without sanitation, without 
electricity, share of illiterate women, share of children age 0-12, share of malnourished children in 1999.  
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about 13 percent. The effect is almost the same (4.8 students) when including the set of 
control variables (column 2). At the same time, the student-teacher ratio drops 
considerably – the treatment effect of -15.6 students per teacher (columns 3 and 4) is 
equivalent to a decrease of roughly 40 percent. 
There are several possibilities why enrollment increases in treated schools: (i) 
schools are allocated a second teacher when there is a large cohort one year before 
enrollment in first grade, (ii) treated schools attract students from other schools, (iii) 
treated schools attract formerly not enrolled students, and (iv) treated schools have lower 
drop-out rates between 2004 and 2005.  
(i) Table 2-6 shows that treatment is not allocated in anticipation of a large new 
cohort in grade 1. The dependent variable is enrollment in grades 1 to 6 (columns 1 to 6). 
If (i) was the case we would observe most of the treatment effect in grade 1. Instead, we 
observe that the enrollment effect is spread out over 5 of 6 grades.  
 
Table 2-6. Matched Difference-in-Difference Estimates: Treatment Effect on Enrollment  
in Grades 1 to 6 
 
Enrollment in grades 1-6 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Treatment*2005 1.194*** 1.012** 0.134 0.785*** 0.769** 0.886***
(0.421) (0.417) (0.342) (0.303) (0.303) (0.256)
Treatment Group -0.082 -0.391 0.212 0.132 0.279 -0.158
(0.297) (0.283) (0.241) (0.208) (0.210) (0.175)
Year 2005 -1.212*** -0.448 -0.286 -0.096 -0.101 -0.050
(0.270) (0.277) (0.192) (0.178) (0.180) (0.156)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj.R-Squared 0.122 0.183 0.165 0.116 0.089 0.090
Observations 2838 2838 2838 2838 2838 2838
 
Source: Own estimates based on school census data. Note: Robust standard errors in brackets, significance 
levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
(ii) Table 2-7 indicates that the enrollment effect is not merely due to attracting 
students from other schools. The dependent variable is enrollment, split up into different 
student categories: students that were promoted from a lower grade or enter grade 1 for 
the first time (column 1), students that repeat last year’s grade due to non-promotion 
(column 2) or withdrawal (column 3) or that were reincorporated after not being enrolled 
(column 4) the year before. Panel A shows students coming from a different school, panel 
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B those coming from the same school. The sum of effects in panel A shows that 
treatment attracts only about 0.7 students from other schools on average. The bulk of 
increasingly enrolled students is thus not just pulled away from other schools. This is 
reasonable as the sampled rural schools can be considered monopolistic entities, far away 
from other schools.  
 
Table 2-7. Matched Difference-in-Difference Estimates: Enrollment Effects by 
Student Status  
 
Panel A: Students from Different School 
 






Treatment*2005 0.535* 0.048 0.071 0.029
(0.279) (0.094) (0.100) (0.047)
Treatment Group 0.150 0.036 0.036 0.024
(0.193) (0.074) (0.051) (0.036)
Year 2005 -0.289** -0.103* -0.077** -0.036**
(0.125) (0.053) (0.035) (0.016)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj.R-Squared 0.030 0.013 0.006 0.005
Observations 2838 2838 2838 2838  
 
Panel B: Students from Same School 
 






Treatment*2005 2.457** 0.977** 0.510* 0.095
(1.076) (0.420) (0.300) (0.084)
Treatment Group 0.592 -0.189 -0.299 -0.080
(0.728) (0.301) (0.227) (0.072)
Year 2005 0.110 -0.785*** -0.392* -0.157***
(0.656) (0.255) (0.201) (0.057)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj.R-Squared 0.174 0.140 0.050 0.011
Observations 2838 2838 2838 2838  
 
Source: Own estimates based on school census data. Note: Robust standard errors in brackets, 
significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The category “promoted within same 
school” also contains first graders who enter for the first time. 
  
(iii) Also, the treatment effect does not work by attracting students that were 
previously not enrolled. The effects of column 4 in panel A and B are close to zero and 
insignificant.  
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(iv) Instead, most of the increased enrollment effect is found in columns 1 to 3 of 
panel B, i.e., enrollment is increased by students of the treated school that were promoted 
in the year before (2.5) or that repeat the grade due to non-promotion (1.0) or withdrawal 
(0.5). Increased enrollment in treated school thus results from fewer students dropping 
out between 2004 and 2005 compared to untreated schools, possibly in anticipation of 
increased school quality. Note that some of these students would have dropped out 
without treatment anticipation even though they had completed the previous grade. 
 
Table 2-8. Matched Difference-in-Difference Estimates: Completion and 
Failure Levels 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4]




Treatment*2005 4.100*** 0.680 -0.136 0.798*
(1.050) (0.629) (0.421) (0.413)
Treatment 0.124 -0.131 0.191 -0.313
(0.713) (0.448) (0.305) (0.289)
Year 2005 -2.013*** -0.180 0.088 -0.263
(0.643) (0.400) (0.264) (0.252)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj.R-Squared 0.159 0.154 0.194 0.065
Observations 2838 2838 2838 2838  
 
Source: Own estimates based on school census data. Note: Robust standard errors in brackets, 
significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
  
Table 2-8 shows the results for levels of grade completion (column 1), failure 
(column 2), non-promotion (column 3) and withdrawal (column 4) with control variables. 
Treatment effects from column 1 and 2 add up to the enrollment effect of column 2, 
Table 2-5.19 Increased enrollment levels due to treatment thus translate into increased 
grade completion and failure levels. Column 1 shows that the treatment interaction is 
positive and significant, i.e., there is an estimated effect of 4.1 additional grade completers 
after treatment according to the specification including control variables. Similarly, there 
are an estimated 0.7 additional grade failers after treatment who seem to have a higher 
tendency for withdrawal than non-promotion. Figure 2-4 decomposes the enrollment 
                                                 
19 The treatment effects on non-promoted and withdrawn students (columns 3 and 4) do not exactly add up to 
the treatment effect on failed students (column 2) due to a small number of deceased students who fail the grade 
but are neither considered non-promoted nor withdrawers. 
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effect graphically; panel A displays the origin of ‘additional’ students, panel B displays the 
end-of-year results resulting from the treatment effect on enrollment. 
 
Figure 2-4. Decomposition of Enrollment Effect 
 






















































Source: Own estimates based on school census data. Note: Robust standard errors in brackets, significance 
levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The category “promoted within same school” also contains first 
graders who enter for the first time. 
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Table 2-9 documents the effects of treatment on grade completion and failure 
shares. Contrary to the treatment interaction effect on completion levels, the effect on the 
completion share is insignificant. Point estimates indicate that the effect of receiving a 
second teacher is a 1.8 percentage point increase in the completion share. Given standard 
errors, we can reject with 95 percent confidence that the improvement of the completion 
rate due to treatment is larger than about 4.2 percentage points or, in other words, less 
than a fifth of the effect needed to close the gap towards 100 percent completion rate. 
  
Table 2-9. Matched Difference-in-Difference Estimates: Completion and 
Failure Shares 
 










Treatment*2005 0.018 -0.018 -0.015* -0.003
(0.012) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009)
Treatment 0.001 -0.001 0.003 -0.003
(0.009) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006)
Year 2005 -0.015** 0.015** 0.008 0.007
(0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj.R-Squared 0.092 0.092 0.126 0.055
Observations 2838 2838 2838 2838  
 
Source: Own estimates based on school census data. Note: Robust standard errors in brackets, 
significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2-8 and Table 2-9 indicate that there may have been a 
small shift from non-promotion to withdrawal due to treatment. This could be support 
for the hypothesis that there may be uncertainty about a possible change in the quality of 
education due to a second teacher. This uncertainty may induce children to enroll and 
subsequently drop out if the quality is insufficient to provide positive utility.  
Note that the treatment effect is most probably not a strictly causal effect from 
reduced class sizes due to a second teacher. After treatment, there are two presumably 
counteracting effects: First, we presume a positive effect through class size reduction. 
Second, there may be a negative side effect in that more students are in school who would 
not have enrolled in absence of treatment and who may thus be more likely to fail than 
their peers given lower ability or utility from schooling. Since this latter variable cannot be 
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observed, it may partly be reflected in the treatment effect. The net impact of these two 
effects shows up insignificantly in the after-treatment effect on completion shares.20 
Nevertheless, this is precisely the effect we are interested in. If the policy objective is to 
close the gap towards universal primary completion, exactly those children with lowest 
utility from schooling need to be drawn into school and incentivized to stay there. We 
thus want to know if this can be achieved by class reductions, and the results do not 
support this conjecture.  
2.5  Conclusion 
A matched difference-in-difference analysis presented in this paper shows that the 
addition of a second teacher to rural primary single-teacher schools in Peru increases 
enrollment by about 14 percent mainly because of fewer between-year drop-outs in 
treated schools, possibly in anticipation of higher future school quality. Consequently, 
completion levels in the second period are significantly increased after treatment due to 
this enrollment effect. 
Nevertheless, the analysis also shows that there is no additional significant after-
treatment effect on completion rates. This disappointing result is a net effect of decreasing 
the student-teacher ratio on average by about 40 percent and inducing more students to 
enroll who would not have remained in school in the absence of smaller classes and are 
thus the first ones to fail. Unfortunately, we cannot say how strong these effects are 
respectively.  
Since rural single-teacher schools tend to lay in the poorest areas improvements in 
school quality decrease drop-out and thus increase enrollment among those groups of the 
population where it is lowest. In-school factors thus seem to matter for those parts of the 
population that are so far excluded from the educational system. This finding is partly 
along the lines of Hanushek et al. (2006): increased school quality keeps children in school 
longer; even though in this case input quantity is raised, not output quality. Nevertheless, 
the finding implies that increases in quality would have to be even more significant and 
costly to close the gap towards universal primary education. Even though this could not 
                                                 
20 For this reason, it is not possible to use the treatment interaction as an instrument for the student-teacher 
ratio to estimate an actual student-teacher ratio effect (instead of a treatment effect) using two stage least squares. 
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be explicitly tested in the paper, it may be a more promising avenue to invest in teacher 
quality rather than quantity, such as training specifically designed to deal with multi-grade 
teaching.  
Furthermore, the results also suggest that out-of-school reasons may be significant 
determinants of grade non-completion rates in poor rural areas in developing countries. 
Households with financial constraints or volatile income flows face high opportunity 
costs of sending their children to school permanently. These constraints may be lifted by 
programs such as conditional cash transfers, which support the poorest families 
financially conditional on sending their children to school. Estimating the impact of such 
measures on educational inefficiency remains an imperative area for future research. 
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Appendix 2 
Appendix 2.1 Comparison of New and Old Teacher Characteristics 
Could it be possible that the new teachers are different from old teachers, for 
example because only teachers of the lowest quality go to remote rural areas? Table 2-10 
addresses this issue by comparing average observable teacher characteristics – gender, 
contract and education – between treatment and control group before and after 
treatment. The upper panel A shows that characteristics before treatment are balanced 
due to trimming of the treatment group and selection of appropriate control schools via 
propensity score matching.  
 





Teacher Male 0.583 (0.49) 0.568 (0.50) 0.627
Teacher Female  0.417 (0.49) 0.432 (0.50) 0.627
Teacher with Teaching Degree 0.816 (0.39) 0.825 (0.38) 0.723
Teacher without Teaching Degree 0.184 (0.39) 0.175 (0.38) 0.723
Teacher with Permanent Contract 0.787 (0.41) 0.765 (0.42) 0.419
Teacher with Fixed Term 0.213 (0.41) 0.235 (0.42) 0.419
Teacher Hours 38.046 (3.97) 38.072 (3.95) 0.921
B. After Treatment
Teacher Male 0.500 (0.39) 0.554 (0.50) 0.054
Teacher Female  0.500 (0.39) 0.446 (0.50) 0.054
Teacher with Teaching Degree 0.839 (0.30) 0.844 (0.36) 0.795
Teacher without Teaching Degree 0.161 (0.30) 0.156 (0.36) 0.795
Teacher with Permanent Contract 0.632 (0.36) 0.729 (0.45) 0.000
Teacher with Fixed Term 0.368 (0.36) 0.271 (0.45) 0.000






Source: Own estimates based on school census data. Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. 
 
About 58 percent of teachers are male, more than 80 percent have obtained a 
teaching degree and almost 80 percent of teachers have a permanent contract. Also, most 
teachers work the maximum of 40 hours.  In contrast, panel B suggests that second 
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teachers are more predominantly female and work on fixed rather than permanent 
contracts. Also, additional teachers work fewer hours than their colleagues such that the 
treatment effect on the number of students per teacher hour is less the effect on the student-
teacher ratio.21 While teacher education does not significantly differ after treatment 
between treated and control schools, fixed term contracts may have a different 
motivational effect than permanent appointments. It is unknown if these differences 
indicate lower teacher quality of second teachers which could explain the lack of clear 
positive effects on grade completion rates. 
Appendix 2.2 Tobit Estimates 
Since completion and failure shares are censored between 0 and 1, OLS estimation 
is similar to specifying a linear probability model, including its well-known shortcomings, 
such as predictions below 0 or above 1 (cf. Wooldridge 2002). As a robustness check, I 
thus estimate a tobit model with censoring at 0 and 1. The results in Table 2-11 are very 
close to OLS results (Table 2-9) and indicate that OLS results seem to be an appropriate 
approximation for the problem at hand. 
 
Table 2-11. Matched Difference-in-Difference Tobit Estimates: Completion 
and Failure Shares 
 










Treatment*2005 0.019 -0.019 -0.016 -0.003
(0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.012)
Treatment Group -0.005 0.005 0.014* 0.008
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
Year 2005 -0.016** 0.016** 0.009 0.007
(0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj.R-Squared -0.241 -0.241 -0.288 -0.228
Observations 2838 2838 2838 2838  
 
Source: Own estimates based on school census data. Note: Robust standard errors in brackets, 
significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
                                                 
21 World Bank (2001), however, notes that this distinction in contracted working hours is largely artificial.  
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Appendix 2.3 Considering Treatment Anticipation Effects 
One of the concerns for the consistency of treatment effects estimated in this 
paper is anticipation of treatment. Considering the timeline of events outlined in Figure 
2-2, schools file a budget proposal, possibly requesting a second teacher, in May. If the 
students can anticipate that they will receive a second teacher in the next year this may 
already influence end-of-year outcomes in December of the present school year; 
treatment anticipation could influence their perception of school quality and increase their 
willingness to complete. It is in this case inappropriate to include 2004 end-of-year 
outcomes in the matching procedure.  
Table 2-12 shows the results for a matched difference-in-difference estimation for 
completion and failure shares, equivalent to Table 2-9; the only difference is the exclusion 
of the withdrawal and non-promotion share in 2004 among matching variables. In this 
scenario, it is possible to see a treatment group effect, i.e., a significant estimate of β2 in 
equation (1). 
 
Table 2-12. Difference-in-Difference Estimates for Alternative Matching Procedure 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]







Treatment*2005 5.378*** 3.704*** -0.009 -0.006 0.014
(1.318) (1.072) (0.012) (0.009) (0.010)
Treatment Group 0.030 1.004 0.027*** -0.004 -0.023***
(0.902) (0.757) (0.009) (0.006) (0.007)
Year 2005 -2.896*** -1.697** 0.012 -0.001 -0.010*
(0.810) (0.659) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj.R-Squared 0.200 0.149 0.099 0.111 0.075
Observations 2846 2846 2846 2846 2846
 
Note: p.p. stands for percentage points. 
 
Column 1 shows that the enrollment effect is similar to the baseline results in the 
main section. There is a positive and strongly significant treatment effect on enrollment in 
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the second year, stemming from reduced between-year dropout in treated schools.22 This 
also results in a higher level of completion in the second year, induced by treatment 
(column 2). In contrast to the previous matching procedure, however, columns 2 and 3 
indicate that there is indeed a treatment group effect. Given similar enrollment levels and 
lagged end-of-year outcomes, treated schools have a higher completion rate of about 2.7 
percentage points already in 2004 (column 3); this is equivalent to about one more 
successful student. This effect stems mainly from fewer withdrawers before treatment, as 
indicated in column 5. Comparably to before, we still cannot reject the hypothesis that 
there is a significant after-treatment effect on the completion rate in the second year. 
Here, the effect is even slightly negative. Standard errors are not large in the estimates: an 
after-treatment effect of about 2.4 percentage points, i.e., about one more completed 
student, would be significant. 
There are several possible explanations for this phenomenon. It is indeed possible 
that the treatment group effect represents an anticipation effect of receiving an additional 
teacher in treated schools, such that students may be less inclined to leave school. 
Possibly, they perceive that a quality increase will raise their utility from schooling, e.g., 
through higher labor market returns from education. Treatment anticipation would thus 
increase the share of grade completers even before treatment, especially via reduced 
withdrawal. One possible explanation for this is that the anticipation of treatment does 
not increase learning achievement itself and thus the probability to be promoted. Instead, 
it may increase expected future school quality and thus induce fewer children to leave 
presently. This would partly be in line with Hanushek at al. (2006) who find that high-
quality schools keep students in school longer, even though in this case input quantity is 
raised, not output quality. 
Nevertheless, a competing explanation is that this matching procedure does not 
properly account for the heterogeneity between treated and untreated schools which 
affects both treatment allocation and educational outcomes at the school level. At least 
two examples are realistic: First, treated and untreated schools could be on a different 
trajectory already before treatment. For instance, a new director may be responsible in 
                                                 
22 All of the supplementary tables (not displayed) show the same patterns as for the results in the main section. 
The enrollment effect is spread out over all grades and stems mainly from keeping more students within the 
same school between years. 
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2004 both for applying for a new teacher as well as pushing more students to complete 
the grade. Second, the end-of-year outcomes of 2004 may influence the decision of 
whether or not an additional teacher is allocated to the single-teacher schools. In both 
cases, the observed treatment group effect would not result from treatment anticipation 
but be an artifact of inappropriate matching. 
Even though it cannot be resolved which of the explanations is true, they do not 
change the main finding: a significant reduction in the student-teacher ration in rural 
single-teacher schools in Peru does not induce significantly higher completion rates. 
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3  The Impact of Teacher Subject 
Knowledge on Student 
Achievement:  
Evidence from Within-Teacher 
Within-Student Variation 
 
3.1  Introduction 
One of the biggest puzzles in educational production today is that while there is 
clear evidence that teacher quality is a key determinant of student learning, little is known 
about which specific observable characteristics of teachers can account for this impact 
(e.g., Rockoff 2004; Rivkin et al. 2005).23 In particular, there is little evidence to suggest 
that those characteristics most often used in hiring and salary decisions, namely teachers’ 
education and experience, are crucial for teacher quality. Virtually the only characteristic 
that has been shown to be more frequently significantly correlated with student 
achievement is teachers’ academic skills measured by scores on achievement tests (for 
reviews, cf. Wayne, Youngs 2003; Eide et al. 2004; Hanushek, Rivkin 2006). The problem 
with the latter evidence, however, is that issues of omitted variables and selection bias are 
intricately hard to address when it comes to estimating causal effects of teacher 
                                                 
23 This chapter is based on joint work with Ludger Wößmann. Chapter 3: The Impact of Teacher Subject Knowledge on Student Achievement 
characteristics. Ask any parent about their children’s teachers’ quality, and it is 
immediately obvious that most are well aware of who is a good or bad teacher based on 
traits that generally remain unobserved by researchers. It is thus all but random which 
parents manage to get their children into the classrooms with the best teachers, both 
across and within schools.  
In this paper, we provide estimates of the impact of teachers’ academic skills on 
students’ academic achievement that circumvent problems from unobserved teacher traits 
and non-random sorting of students to teachers using a unique data set from Peru. It 
contains test scores in two different academic subjects not only for each student, but also 
for each teacher. This allows us to identify the impact of teachers’ academic performance 
in a specific subject on students’ academic performance in the subject, while at the same 
time holding constant any student characteristics and any teacher characteristics that are 
constant across subjects. We can observe whether the same student taught by the same 
teacher in two different academic subjects performs better in one of the subjects if the 
teacher’s knowledge is relatively better in this subject. Thus, our models can identify the 
effect based on within-teacher within-student variation by controlling for student fixed 
effects, teacher fixed effects, and subject fixed effects. We can additionally restrict our 
analysis to small schools with at most one teacher per grade, excluding any remaining 
possibility that parents may have chosen a specific teacher for their students in both 
subjects based on the teacher’s specific knowledge in one subject.  
Our identification strategy for effects of teacher characteristics is an extension of 
the within-student comparisons in two different subjects proposed by Dee (2005; 2007) 
which are capable of holding constant any student characteristics. His approach, however, 
is deemed to use variation across different teachers because the teacher characteristics 
that he analyses – gender, race, and ethnicity – do not vary within teachers. As a 
consequence, the identifying variation may still be related to issues of selection and 
unobserved teacher characteristics. By contrast, we are able to extend his identification 
strategy to use variation not only within individual students but also within individual 
teachers, because subject knowledge does vary within individual teachers and because our 
dataset allows us to observe teachers’ knowledge in two different subjects. The teacher 
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test results were evaluated using Rasch modeling and are thus convincing proxies of actual 
teacher knowledge in the subject. 
We find that a one standard deviation increase in teacher test scores increases 
student test scores by about 4 percent of a standard deviation. Due to measurement error 
in test scores our result is attenuated downwards. A sensitivity analysis with plausible 
teacher test reliability measures shows that the effect is easily much larger, for example 
about 7 percent of a standard deviation when applying the student person separation 
reliability measures. Extended analysis using different sub-samples and quantile 
regressions does not indicate that there are strong patterns of non-linearity in the impact. 
We also find that the main result holds for the Peruvian 6th grade student population at 
large. The results should be understood in a developing country context of overall low 
schooling quality and very heterogeneous student and teacher skills. The analysis implies 
that in a developing country teacher subject knowledge is a key determinant of student 
learning and that teacher training should be high on the educational policy agenda.  
3.2  Background and Literature Review 
Our contribution is to provide a well-identified estimate of the impact of teacher 
subject knowledge on student achievement, employing a comprehensive measure of 
teacher subject knowledge while at the same time circumventing problems of selection 
and omitted variable bias. The following literature review details the context in which this 
study should be seen. 
The empirical literature on the determinants of student learning has been tackling 
the issue of the impact of teachers from two sides: measuring the impact of teacher 
quality as a whole versus measuring the impact of distinct teacher characteristics. While 
the importance of teachers in the process of students’ skill formation is undisputed it is 
econometrically challenging to isolate this effect. 
Due to recent breakthroughs in the first stream of literature, researchers have 
firmly established that overall teacher quality is very heterogeneous, i.e., that teachers vary 
strongly in their impact on student outcomes (cf. Rivkin et al. 2005; Rockoff 2004). The 
key papers estimate total teacher quality effects focusing on changes in student 
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achievement. It is only recently that there exist longitudinal data sources rich enough to 
allow convincing estimates. Rockoff (2004, pp. 247–248) concludes for the US school 
system that a “one-standard-deviation increase in teacher quality raises test scores by 
approximately 0.1 standard deviations in reading and math on nationally standardized 
distributions of achievement.” A similar effect magnitude is found by Rivkin et al (2005). 
The second stream of literature examines which specific teacher characteristics are 
responsible for these big effects and thus constitute the unobserved bundle of overall 
teacher quality associated with a certain person. Answers to this question are important 
for educational policy making since they could change the way we think about tying hiring 
policies and compensation schemes to specific teacher characteristics. The literature on 
educational production functions and attempts to resolve these questions dates back to 
the US government study “Equality of Educational Opportunity” (Coleman et al. 1966). 
Since then, several hundred studies have estimated traditional parametric educational 
production functions to calculate the effects of teacher characteristics and other 
educational inputs on student achievement.  
In the empirical examination of different teacher attributes like teacher education, 
experience, salaries, test scores and certification, only teacher knowledge measured by 
teacher test scores has more consistently been associated with positive student outcomes. 
Already Coleman et al. (1966) found that verbal skills of teachers were associated with 
higher student learning. Synthesizing a growing amount of scientific literature on the 
issue, Hanushek (1986, p. 1164) concludes that “[t]he closest thing to a consistent finding 
among the studies is that ‘smarter’ teachers, ones who perform well on verbal ability tests, 
do better in the classroom, but even for that the evidence is not very strong.” A decade 
later, Hanushek counts a total of 41 estimates of the effect of teacher test scores and finds 
that “[o]f all the explicit measures [of teachers and schools] that lend themselves to 
tabulation, stronger teacher test scores are most consistently related to higher student 
achievement, even though only 37% provide positive and statistically significant effects.” 
(Hanushek 1997, p. 144). Eide et al. (2004, p. 233) suggest that “a stronger case can be 
made for measures of teachers' academic performance or skill as predictors of teachers' 
effectiveness.” 
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Nevertheless, on all of these teacher characteristics, including teacher test scores, 
the evidence is far from conclusive, and many studies lack persuasiveness due to 
insufficient econometric methods (cf. Hanushek, Rivkin 2006). In the absence of high-
quality data sets on matched student-teacher pairs over time, results have been largely 
plagued by econometric problems: omitted variables, sorting of students with different 
levels of knowledge between schools of different quality, and sorting within schools into 
classrooms with peers and teachers of differing quality. They can only be solved with 
comprehensive data and/or clever identification strategies. In their survey, Hanushek and 
Rivkin (2006) separate high and low-quality studies that estimate the association between 
teachers’ scores on different tests of academic achievement and the gains in student 
achievement.24 They note that “while the evidence is stronger than that for other explicit 
teacher characteristics, it is far from overwhelming” (p. 1064). Also, teacher academic 
skills can only explain a small portion of the overall variation in teacher impact on student 
achievement. 
Our knowledge from teacher test score studies is hard to evaluate, not only 
because of the mentioned econometric problems but also because the form and scope of 
tested skills varies greatly. The types of employed scores are mostly verbal ability, or a 
mixture of different subjects from college entrance or teacher licensure examination 
scores. What is common among the studies is that the tested teacher skills can only be 
weakly tied to the academic knowledge in the subject in which student achievement is 
examined. The test score may be measured with considerable measurement error, e.g., 
when using the result from one single math question as an indicator of math skills (cf. 
Rowan, Chiang, Miller 1997). Furthermore, the examined skill may not be subject-
specific, such as verbal ability (cf. Coleman et al. 1966). Also, the test scores may reflect 
an aggregate of different skills, such as verbal and pedagogic ability, English, math and 
science knowledge and other components used in the U.S. National Teacher Examination 
(cf. Summers, Wolfe 1977). While results from these tests are clearly interesting they 
cannot distinguish between subject-specific cognitive and general non-cognitive teacher 
skills.  
                                                 
24 Important studies estimating the association of teacher test scores with student achievement gains include 
Hanushek (1971; 1992), Summers and Wolfe (1977), Murnane and Phillips (1981), Ehrenberg and Brewer 
(1995), Ferguson and Ladd (1996), Rowan, Chiang, and Miller (1997), and Ferguson (1998); see Hanushek 
(1997), Wayne and Youngs (2003), and Eide, Goldhaber, and Brewer (2004) for reviews. 
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To our knowledge, no study so far uses subject-specific teacher academic skill 
scores to explain student performance in the same subject while controlling for student 
and teacher fixed effects. The credibility of our estimates is enhanced as teacher subject 
knowledge distributions in two subjects are generated using scientific Rasch modeling.  
3.3  Empirical Identification  
3.3.1  Estimation Strategy 
We specify an educational production function (1) with an explicit focus on 
teacher characteristics: 
(1) yis = cs + α Zi + λ Xis + β Tis + γ Mi + εis 
where test score y of student i in subject s is a function of  
  a subject-specific constant c,  
  non subject-specific student, classroom and school characteristics Z, 
  subject-specific student, classroom and school characteristics Xs, including 
previous student subject knowledge,  
  subject-specific teacher characteristics Ts, such as subject knowledge,  
  non subject-specific teacher characteristics M, such as motivation, and  
  a mean-zero error term εs.   
The coefficient vectors β and γ characterize the impact of all subject-specific and 
non subject-specific teacher characteristics which constitute the overall teacher quality 
effect as estimated by Rivkin et al. (2005) and Rockoff (2004). Estimating this equation 
directly in order to characterize the impact magnitude of teacher subject knowledge would 
suffer from endogeneity problems due to unobserved factors, e.g., if previous student 
subject knowledge is not observed and teachers are non-randomly allocated to students 
according to previous subject knowledge.  
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A possible solution to get rid of fixed effects are within-student comparisons in 
two different subjects proposed by Dee (2005; 2007) which are capable of holding 
constant any student characteristics. The differenced equation reads  
(2)   Δyi = Δc + λ ΔXis + β ΔTis + Δεi  
where Δ denotes the difference between subject-specific variables in two subjects, 
in our case mathematics and reading. Such equations were introduced by Dee (2005, 
2007) and similarly estimated for example by Ammermüller, Dolton (2006) and Clotfelter, 
Ladd and Vigdor (2007) to determine if specific teacher attributes such as gender, 
ethnicity or credentials and their interaction with student characteristics would have an 
effect on student performance and teacher perceptions.  
The remaining problem of this approach is a possible bias if teacher assignment is 
non-random with respect to the students’ subject-specific propensity for achievement. 
This is the case if students are allocated to different classrooms for every subject 
according to their subject-specific knowledge status, and teachers are assigned according 
to their subject-specific capabilities, with different teachers for different classrooms. A 
possible solution to this problem would be to examine only the sub-sample of students 
with the same teacher in both subjects. However, this will eliminate all teacher effects if 
there is no variation in subject-specific attributes within the same teacher.  
Our data set is unique to the extent that it provides exactly that: within-teacher 
variation for the same teacher in subject-specific knowledge. Teachers in the EN 2004 
took tests on the same subjects in which students were tested, so that there is a measure 
of cognitive skills which varies by subject. For the sub-sample of students that are taught 
by the same teacher in both subjects, we can isolate the effect of subject-specific teacher 
knowledge by differencing out all attributes that do not vary by subject, e.g., motivation. 
We call this reduced sample “same-teacher sample”.  
The Peruvian setting allows us to additionally restrict our analysis to small schools 
with at most one teacher per grade, which can further exclude any remaining possibility 
that parents may have chosen a specific teacher for their students in both subjects based 
on the teacher’s specific knowledge in one subject. We call this twice reduced sample 
“same-teacher one-classroom (STOC) sample”.  
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When estimating (2), we can get consistent estimates of β, the causal impact of 
teacher subject knowledge on student subject knowledge (independent of the subject) 
under the following assumptions: 
1.  Subject-specific student, teacher, classroom and school characteristics have 
the same effect in math (M) and reading (R), i.e., λM = λR = λ and βM = βR = β  
2.  Non-specific student, teacher, classroom and school characteristics have the 
same effect in both subjects, i.e., αM = αR = α and γM = γR = γ . 
3.  Zero correlation of ΔTis and the error term, i.e., E(ΔTis’Δεi)=0. 
4.  No measurement error in included variables.  
Please refer to Appendix 3.1 for a discussion of the assumptions including 
estimation results for an alternative specification. Refer to Appendix 3.2 for a discussion 
of possibly non-linear effects of teacher knowledge on student knowledge, and according 
estimation results using quantile regressions. 
3.3.2  Measurement Error Correction 
We expect our teacher test score estimates to be smaller than the true effect 
because of attenuation bias since teacher test scores are measured with error.25 If we 
assume classical measurement error in teacher test scores we can postulate Tis = Tis* + eis, 
where Ts is the observed test score in subject s, Ts* is the true test score, and es is an 
additive white noise measurement error with E(es)=0 and E(Ts*,es)=0 for all subjects s 
and individuals i. In a level regression of student test score in one subject on teacher test 
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  is often called reliability ratio. 
                                                 
25 As we only identify the effect of current, not accumulated, teacher subject knowledge on test scores this will 
further understate the effect we estimate. 
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As teacher test scores are correlated across subjects first differencing will reduce 
the signal-to-noise ratio and attenuate the estimated test score effect even more. The 
reliability ratio becomes 
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In order to present a sensitivity analysis of the magnitude of attenuation bias in 
our estimates we need to assess the size of (3). It is reasonable to assume that test-taking 
measurement error in two unrelated subjects is random such that there is no correlation 
of errors across subjects, , or correlation between observed test score and 
measurement error across subjects, = =0. Yet, if teachers tend to 
be either knowledgeable or not, we expect positive correlation of true teacher test scores. 
Given these assumptions,  
0 ) , ( = R M e e Cov
) , ( R M e T Cov ) , ( R M T e Cov
) , (
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=  –   –   +  =    ) , ( R M T T Cov ) , ( R M e T Cov ) , ( R M T e Cov ) , ( R M e e Cov ) , ( R M T T Cov
We can thus approximate the size of attenuation bias if we estimate the variance of 
true test scores, the variance of measurement error, and the covariance of observed test 
scores. We can get an idea of these numbers with help of reliability measures of EN 2004.  
3.3.3  Data  
This paper uses data from the 2004 Peruvian national evaluation of student 
achievement, the “Evaluación nacional del rendimiento estudiantil” (EN 2004). The 
sample of 6th graders covers more than 12,000 students from more than 800 randomly 
sampled primary schools. The sample is representative at the national level and for 
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comparisons of urban versus rural areas, public versus private, and complete versus multi-
grade26 schools.  
We use test data from EN 2004 in two subjects, reading and mathematics, which 
are separately taught subjects in the students’ curriculum. As a unique feature of EN 2004, 
not only students but also teachers were required to take tests in their respective subject. 
Both sets of cognitive skill tests were evaluated by the unit for quality measurement 
(UMC) of the Peruvian ministry of education (MINEDU) using Rasch modeling.  
We focus our analysis on students who are served by the same teacher in math and 
reading, and particularly those in schools with only one classroom in 6th grade. This 
combination is quite frequent as the Peruvian school system is characterized by many 
small, remote schools to serve the dispersed population. Table 3-1 summarizes student 
test scores scaled to a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1 for this sub-group. 
Table 3-1. Summary Statistics Student Test Scores – Same-Teacher One-Classroom Sample 
 
Share N
Same Teacher & One Classroom 1.000 0.00 (1.00) 0.00 (1.00) 4302
Urban Area 0.398 0.55 (0.92) 0.59 (0.89) 2295
Rural Area 0.602 -0.36 (0.88) -0.39 (0.87) 2007
Public School 0.917 -0.10 (0.94) -0.10 (0.96) 3728
Private School 0.083 1.14 (0.88) 1.08 (0.82) 574
Multigrade School 0.551 -0.37 (0.87) -0.39 (0.86) 2003
Complete School 0.449 0.46 (0.96) 0.48 (0.94) 2299
Student 1st Language: Spanish 0.835 0.16 (0.95) 0.15 (0.96) 3735
Student 1st Language: Native 0.161 -0.78 (0.83) -0.76 (0.83) 537
Male Student 0.512 0.09 (1.00) 0.02 (0.97) 2232







Note: Summary statistics calculated using sampling weights from EN 2004. Means in left columns, standard 
deviations in brackets.  
 
                                                 
26 Multi-grade schools are a distinct feature of many developing countries where parts of the population live in 
sparsely populated areas. For example, the remoteness of communities in the Andes and the Amazon basin 
makes it difficult to appropriately serve many students in rural Peru. Such places suffer from a small supply of 
qualified teachers and lack of critical student mass. As a result, multi-grade schools are a wide-spread 
phenomenon where several grades are served in the same class by the same teacher (cf. Hargreaves et al. 2001). 
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The “same-teacher one-classroom” (STOC) sub-sample still contains more than 
4000 observations. Boys and girls score very similarly in reading while boys seem to fare 
better in math (0.09 compared to -0.10). All other subdivisions in groups produce 
apparently more different results between groups in both subjects: students achieve 
higher scores in rural compared to urban schools, in private compared to public schools 
and in complete compared to multi-grade schools. Spanish-speaking students fare 
significantly better than native Peruvians.  
Table 3-2 summarizes teacher characteristics in the STOC sample. While male and 
female teachers score similarly in math tests, male teachers are much worse in reading 
than female teachers (-0.19 compared to 0.28). The quality of staff reflects the same 
pattern as the quality of students from Table 3-1. Teachers are better on average in both 
subjects in urban compared to rural areas, in private compared to public schools and in 
complete compared to multi-grade schools. Teachers with a university degree, compared 
to an institute, score worse in math (-0.36 compared to 0.10) and better in reading (0.10 
compared to -0.02). Teachers in their first year with a class are worse in reading but not in 
math than those with more years with the same class.  
Table 3-2. Summary Statistics Teacher Test Scores – Same-Teacher One-Classroom Sample 
 
Same Teacher & One Classroom 1.000 0.00 (1.00) 0.00 (1.00) 335
Male Teacher 0.577 0.01 (0.99) -0.19 (0.92) 163
Female Teacher 0.423 0.03 (0.99) 0.28 (1.04) 149
Urban Area 0.408 0.20 (0.88) 0.23 (0.91) 121
Rural Area 0.592 -0.14 (1.06) -0.15 (1.03) 214
Public School 0.914 -0.04 (0.99) -0.03 (0.98) 299
Private School 0.086 0.42 (1.02) 0.35 (1.15) 36
Multigrade School 0.544 -0.14 (1.03) -0.19 (0.94) 228
Complete School 0.456 0.17 (0.94) 0.23 (1.03) 107
Teacher Degree: University 0.239 -0.36 (0.99) 0.10 (1.24) 91
Teacher Degree: Institute 0.761 0.10 (0.98) -0.02 (0.92) 237
Teacher 1 Year with Class 0.408 0.04 (1.00) -0.14 (0.89) 127
Teacher 2 Years with Class 0.318 0.03 (1.00) 0.18 (1.11) 90








Note: Summary statistics calculated using sampling weights from EN 2004. Means in left columns, standard 
deviations in brackets. The number of observations of collectively exhaustive sub-samples does not always add 
up to the full sample due to missing information in the sub-group characteristics. 
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Table 3-3 summarizes subject-specific control variables in estimating equation (1). 
They account for motivational differences of the student between subjects, differences in 
teaching hours and differences in curriculum design by the teacher.27 These differences 
may be problematic if they are systematically correlated with the difference in teacher 
subject knowledge between subjects. For example, students may be more motivated in 
subjects with more knowledgeable teachers, or teachers may prefer to teach subjects in 
which they are more knowledgeable. In all respects, there are no systematic differences 
between subjects. 
 
Table 3-3. Summary Statistics Control Variables – Same-Teacher One-Classroom Sample 
 
NN
Motivation Index 4.27 (0.84) 4302 3.72 (1.06) 4302
Teaching Hours 5.91 (1.60) 3855 5.92 (1.63) 3822
Curriculum Design: Subject-specific Books 0.69 (0.47) 4140 0.62 (0.49) 4213
Curriculum Design: Student Working Books 0.52 (0.50) 4140 0.49 (0.50) 4213
Curriculum Design: Local School Guidelines 0.56 (0.50) 4140 0.57 (0.50) 4213
Curriculum Design: Institutional Guidelines 0.24 (0.43) 4140 0.31 (0.46) 4213
Curriculum Design: Regional Guidelines 0.02 (0.14) 4140 0.01 (0.12) 4213
Curriculum Design: National Guidelines 0.80 (0.40) 4140 0.80 (0.40) 4213
Curriculum Design: Adj. Curriculum Guidelines 0.34 (0.48) 4140 0.33 (0.47) 4213
Curriculum Design: Others 0.16 (0.37) 4140 0.14 (0.35) 4213






Note: Summary statistics calculated using sampling weights from EN 2004. Means in left columns, standard 
deviations in brackets. 
 
The same-teacher one-classroom sample is not a representative sample of the 
Peruvian student population: predominantly multi-grade schools, rural schools and public 
schools employ only one teacher in 6th grade to teach both math and reading to the same 
classroom. Appendix 3.3 summarizes the characteristics of the full student sample. Also, 
                                                 
27 The student motivation index from 0-5 for both subjects is calculated from 5 survey questions corresponding 
to each subject such as “I like to read in my free time” (reading) or “I have fun solving mathematical problems” 
(math) in which students can decide between disagree/sometimes true/agree. The resulting answer is coded as 0 
for the answer which displays low motivation for the subject, 0.5 for medium motivation, and 1 for high 
motivation. 
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it contains extended results which support the argument that estimation results obtained 
for the STOC sub-sample are representative for the Peruvian student population at large. 
3.4  Results  
3.4.1  Main Results 
Table 3-4 presents the results from estimating specifications (1) and (2) without 
control variables.28 All estimates are calculated using robust standard errors clustered at 
the classroom level. The first column contains results from naïve OLS estimation in the 
full EN 2004 sample with pooled subjects which contains around 40 percent students 
with different teachers in math and reading. The estimated coefficient of teacher test 
score is significantly positive at 0.24 and reflects the strong bias from between-school 
student sorting. Column 2 estimates the same specification including student fixed effects. 
The teacher test score coefficient drops to an insignificant small effect and also reflects 
biases. For example, weaker students may be allocated to better teachers which could 
mitigate or completely cancel a positive teacher test score effect.  
 
Table 3-4. Regression Results – Introducing Fixed Effects 
 





Teacher Score 0.235*** 0.012 0.037*** 0.045***
(0.021) (0.009) (0.012) (0.014)
Student Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes
Teacher Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes
Adj.R-Squared 0.058 0.000 0.002 0.004
F-Statistic 121.0 1.9 8.9 10.9
Observations (Students) 12165 12165 6819 4302  
 
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets, observations clustered at classroom level; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, 
*** p<0.01. 
 
                                                 
28 All regression models are fitted without sampling weights since we want to estimate a structural relationship 
and because our weights were determined due to stratification with respect to independent variables (cf. 
Winship, Radbill 1994). We thus fit all models with a constant because the unweighted differenced student test 
score is not zero.  
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Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3-4 show the results of estimating the first differenced 
equation (2) which implicitly includes student fixed effects. By restricting the student 
sample to those with the same teacher, we reduce possible bias stemming from within-
school sorting and implicitly take care of teacher fixed effects. In both cases there is a 
positive and highly significant effect of teacher subject knowledge on student 
achievement. The third column displays estimates for the same-teacher sample: an 
increase in teacher test scores of one standard deviation increases student test scores by 
about 3.7 percent of a standard deviation. The fourth column shows the result for 
estimation in the same-teacher one-classroom (STOC) sample which excludes any 
remaining possible bias from sorting of students within the grade. The coefficient 
magnitude is very similar at 4.5 percent of a standard deviation and statistically not 
distinguishable from the third column.   
Table 3-5 presents the key results from specification (2) using the same-teacher 
and the same-teacher one-classroom sample and subsequently adding several control 
variables. The first columns repeat the main findings from column 3 and 4 of Table 3-4. 
 
Table 3-5. First Differencing Results with Control Variables 
 
Panel A. Same Teacher Sample 
Dep. Var. Student Score Difference M-R [1] [2] [3] [4]
Teacher Score Difference M-R 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.031** 0.027*
(0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014)
Student Motivation Difference 0.021** 0.020** 0.019**
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Teaching Hours Difference 0.031*** 0.029***
(0.011) (0.010)
Constant -0.040*** -0.053*** -0.048*** -0.051***
(0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016)
Controls Teaching Method Difference No No No Yes
Adj.R-Squared 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.003
F-Statistic 8.9 7.1 5.9 1.9
Observations 6819 6819 6010 5769  
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Panel B. STOC Sample 
Dep. Var. Student Score Difference M-R [1] [2] [3] [4]
Teacher Score Difference M-R 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.037** 0.031**
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015)
Student Motivation Difference 0.013 0.012 0.011
(0.011) (0.012) (0.013)
Teaching Hours Difference 0.026** 0.033***
(0.012) (0.013)
Constant -0.029* -0.036** -0.031 -0.031
(0.016) (0.017) (0.019) (0.019)
Controls Teaching Method Difference No No No Yes
Adj.R-Squared 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.002
F-Statistic 10.9 6.0 4.2 1.4
Observations 4302 4302 3745 3592
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets, observations clustered at teacher level; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, 
*** p<0.01 
 
The second column introduces student motivation as an additional regressor 
which may partly be a result of the quality of teaching in the respective subject. 
Controlling for this effect does not reduce the magnitude of the teacher test score impact 
in either sample.  
The third column introduces weekly teaching hours in mathematics and reading as 
an additional regressor to control for the possibility that teachers may prefer to teach 
more in the subject they know better, or get to know the subject better which they teach 
more. The effect of teaching hours is positive and significant. Increasing teaching time by 
one weekly hour increases student test scores by about 3 percent of a standard deviation. 
Apparently, the coefficient magnitude of teacher test scores is reduced. However, this 
effect comes fully from reducing the sample by several hundred observations which do 
not have teaching hour information.29 This evidence is not suggestive of the fact that 
teachers who are better in one subject may spend more time and effort in that subject 
relative to the other one. 
The same is true for the fourth column. Introducing controls for differences in the 
subject curriculum30 apparently reduces the teacher test score effect. Again the reduction 
                                                 
29 In Table 3-5, panel A, the estimated teacher test score effect using the specification of column [1] on the 
sample of column [3] is 0.031**; in panel B it is 0.036**. 
30 EN 2004 asks teachers to describe which items they use to design the subject curriculum: working books, 
school curriculum, institutional educational projects, regional educational projects, 3rd cycle basic curriculum 
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comes from reducing the sample by several hundred observation compared to column 
1.31 As we do not know the process which caused these missing observations we confide 
in our original estimates. We thus consider the effect magnitude of 0.037 and 0.045 robust 
to adding relevant control variables which may be correlated with teacher test scores. 
3.4.2  Measurement Error Correction 
In order to approximate the size of attenuation bias we need the covariance of 
observed test scores, the variance of unobserved true test scores and the variance of 
measurement error. The first can be observed (0.44 in the STOC sample), the second or 
third needs to be assessed to calculate the remaining figure. EN 2004 data provides 
estimates of psychometric properties, however, only of student test scores. The provided 
measure is person separation reliability, the proportion of observed sample variance that is 
not attributable to measurement error (Wright, Masters 1982) which measures how 
reliably test-takers of high and low ability can be distinguished. The definition 
corresponds to the reliability measure  
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that attenuates the regression results. Knowing teacher test reliability would thus 
allow calculating the size of attenuation bias. 6th grade student test reliability is 0.72 for 
reading and 0.85 for math. Person separation reliability increases with the length of the 
test and the ability range within the sample. Since teachers took a shorter test than 
students but their ability range is possibly larger we cannot predict their test reliability 
compared to student test reliability and thus present a sensitivity analysis of attenuation 
bias size depending on reliability measures. 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
structure and/or readjusted curricular programs. When using each of them as differenced dummy in the 
regression only one becomes weakly significant and they are jointly insignificant. 
31 In table 5a the estimated teacher test score effect using the specification of column [1] on the sample of 
column [4] is 0.028*, in table 5b it is 0.032**. 
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Assumed Reliability - Math 1.00 0.85 0.90 0.80 0.70 0.60 0.50
Assumed Reliability - Reading 1.00 0.72 0.90 0.80 0.70 0.60 0.50
Resulting Attenuation Factor 1.000 0.616 0.821 0.643 0.464 0.286 0.107
Corrected Teacher Test Score Effect 0.045 0.073 0.055 0.070 0.097 0.158 0.420
Range of Plausible Reliabilities
Assumption about Person Separation Reliabilities in Teacher Tests 
 
Note: Results calculated for the STOC sample, i.e., a covariance of observed teacher test scores of 0.44 and first 
differencing estimation result of 0.045. Since test scores are scaled to standard deviation and variance of 1, 
reliabilities correspond to true test score variances, and, given white noise error assumptions, error variances to 1 
minus reliability.  
 
Table 3-6 presents corrected Teacher Test Score Effects for different values of 
teacher test reliability when plugged into (3). The first column presents the results in 
absence of measurement error for the STOC sample, i.e., as if teacher subject knowledge 
was measured accurately by the test. The second column presents estimates as if the 
teacher test had the same reliability as the student test. For student reliability measures of 
0.72 and 0.85 the teacher test score effect is attenuated by a factor of 0.62; the real effect 
would thus be 7.3 percent student test score increase of a standard deviation for a one 
standard deviation increase in teacher test score. The right panel presents a range of other 
plausible reliability estimates. For example, for a reliability of 0.7 in both tests, the teacher 
test score effect would be almost 10 percent. 
3.4.3  Effects in Different Sub-Samples 
Dividing the full sample into collectively exhaustive sub-samples shows the effect 
of teacher test scores on student achievement in different settings (see Table 3-7). 
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Table 3-7. Regression Results for Sub-Samples 
 
Sample Beta Rob. S.E. N Beta Rob. S.E. N
All 0.0371 (0.0125) 6819 0.0446 (0.0135) 4302
Urban Area 0.0314 (0.0162) 4666 0.0397 (0.0194) 2295
Rural Area 0.0482 (0.0182) 2153 0.0504 (0.0184) 2007
Public School 0.0373 (0.0120) 6054 0.0500 (0.0135) 3728
Private School 0.0377 (0.0580) 765 0.0024 (0.0498) 574
Multigrade School 0.0426 (0.0219) 2149 0.0523 (0.0217) 2003
Complete School 0.0334 (0.0153) 4670 0.0384 (0.0177) 2299
Student 1st Language: Spanish 0.0331 (0.0133) 6121 0.0400 (0.0147) 3735
Student 1st Language: Native 0.0714 (0.0356) 652 0.0777 (0.0370) 537
Male Student 0.0274 (0.0150) 3471 0.0395 (0.0169) 2232
Female Student 0.0415 (0.0169) 3348 0.0485 (0.0186) 2070
Male Teacher 0.0239 (0.0196) 2791 0.0185 (0.0217) 1942
Female Teacher 0.0339 (0.0176) 3623 0.0461 (0.0188) 2115
Student-Teacher Same Gender 0.0595 (0.0172) 3294 0.0724 (0.0187) 2022
Student-Teacher Diff. Gender 0.0138 (0.0162) 3120 0.0198 (0.0182) 2035
Teacher 1 Year with Class 0.0482 (0.0217) 2069 0.0655 (0.0236) 1478
Teacher 2 Years with Class 0.0541 (0.0219) 2355 0.0357 (0.0234) 1442
Teacher 3-6 Years with Class 0.0532 (0.0269) 1651 0.0953 (0.0303) 886
Teacher Degree: University 0.0399 (0.0221) 1810 0.0250 (0.0210) 1182





Note: Robust standard errors in brackets, observations clustered at teacher level.. Regression results for 
specification without control variables. Measurement error correction with reliability factor of 0.62 
 
Even though the sample size reduces considerably in the different sub-groups, a 
positive, statistically and economically significant effect appears in almost all sub-samples. 
In the same teacher sample (left panel) it mostly varies between about 0.03 and 0.04, in 
the STOC sample (right panel) between about 0.04 and 0.05 when measurement error is 
not corrected for. The effect is small and statistically weak or insignificant in private 
schools, for student-teacher different gender pairs, male teachers and teachers with 
university degree.  
We cannot reject the hypothesis that there is no effect of teacher test scores in 
private schools. Possible reasons are the small sample size of private school students, 
different learning transmission mechanisms in private than public schools or non-
linearities in the teacher test score effect as private student tend to be in the high range of 
test scores in both subjects. 
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Comparing the results for students whose mother tongue is Spanish and native the 
point estimates suggest that there may be a bigger effect for native (0.071) than Spanish 
(0.033) students.  
The most drastic difference between the effect estimate for two categories is 
between student teacher pairs of the same gender and those with different genders. While 
for the same-gender case the effect is estimated to be 0.073 and highly significant, the 
effect is 0.02 and insignificant for the different-gender case in the STOC sample. Only in 
this case can the effect in two mutually exclusive subsets be statistically distinguished.32 
This finding may suggest that in order for the teacher to transmit knowledge to students 
there must be some connection between the two which may be facilitated by sharing the 
same gender. 
Extended results are presented in the appendices 1, 2 and 3. We estimate and 
discuss results which allow for subject-specific impacts of teacher knowledge (Appendix 
3.1). We conclude that teacher test score effects cannot be consistently estimated without 
the assumption that effects do not vary between subjects. We also consider a possible 
non-linearity of effects by estimating quantile regressions (Appendix 3.2). Overall, the 
evidence from OLS regressions in different sub-samples and quantile regressions is not 
suggestive of the fact that there are strong non-linearities in the impact of teacher subject 
knowledge on student subject knowledge. Furthermore, we discuss the generalizability of 
results to the Peruvian student population at large (Appendix 3.3). Even though the same-
teacher sample on which the main estimations are performed is not a representative sub-
sample of the Peruvian student population, the results from a matching procedure 
indicate that the estimated teacher test score effects hold for the Peruvian student 
population at large. 
3.5  Conclusion 
We believe that this paper has presented a well-identified estimate of teacher 
academic skills on student achievement by exploiting within-teacher within-student 
                                                 
32 Equality of coefficients was tested by regressing the difference in student test scores on dummy variables for 
the sub-sample (e.g., urban and rural) and interaction effects between sub-sample dummy variables and teacher 
test score difference. Afterwards, a t-test was conducted to test the equality of interaction effects. 
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variation in test scores. We find that a one standard deviation increase in teacher subject 
knowledge increases student achievement by around 4 percent of a standard deviation, 
and by more when correcting for measurement error attenuation. This effect is robust to 
most sub-samples of the data and representative for the Peruvian 6th grade population at 
large. It should be interpreted as an effect in a developing country setting of low academic 
standards overall. 
Unfortunately, the data does not permit to calculate a credible output-based total 
teacher quality distribution. Thus we cannot answer the question what share of the total 
teacher quality effect is due to teachers’ subject knowledge. 
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Appendix 3 
Appendix 3.1 Subject-specific Teacher Effects 
In section 3.3.1, we specify an educational production function  
(1) yis = cs + α Zi + λ Xis + β Tis + γ Mi + εis 
and it first-differenced version 
(2)   Δyi = Δc + λ ΔXis + β ΔTis + Δεi . 
We name three functional assumptions in order to get consistent estimates of β, 
the causal impact of teacher subject knowledge on student subject knowledge 
(independent of the subject): 
1.   Subject-specific student, teacher, classroom and school characteristics have 
the same effect in math (M) and reading (R), i.e., λM = λR = λ and βM = βR = 
β . 
2.   Non-specific student, teacher, classroom and school characteristics have the 
same effect in both subjects, i.e., αM = αR = α and γM = γR = γ . 
3.   Zero correlation of ΔTis and the error term, i.e., E(ΔTis’Δεi)=0. 
An example in which assumptions 1 and 2 do not hold would be if reading skills 
are mainly acquired at home, and mathematics skills mainly in school. As a consequence, 
school inputs such as teacher subject knowledge or non-specific teacher fixed effects (e.g. 
a teacher’s overall motivation to teach or pedagogic ability) may have different impacts in 
different subjects. The correct specification of the differenced educational production 
function may thus be  
(3)  Δyi = Δc + βMTiM + βR (– TiR) + (γM – γR) Mi + Δεi   where 
(γM – γR) Mi + Δεi = νi 
Since Mi is unobserved this relates to the question if the third assumption holds. 
Even if there are left out subject-specific effects they will only harm the consistency of the 
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estimated teacher knowledge effects under certain conditions. (i) To calculate β in (2) and 
βM  and  βR in (3) consistently there must be no systematic correlation between the 
difference in subject-specific unobservables and in subject-specific teacher test scores, i.e., 
E(ΔTis’Δεi) = 0. A concern for this could be the unobserved difference of prior 
achievement of students in the respective subjects. (ii) Additionally, in the case of (3), it 
must hold that E(TiM’(γM–γR)Mi)=0 and E(–TiR’(γM–γR)Mi)=0. A concern for this could be 
subject-specific effects of non-specific teacher skills.  
i.  A non-zero correlation of ΔTis and Δei is possible if within one grade students 
are allocated on grounds of within-student performance differences between 
the subjects to appropriate teachers, i.e., students and teachers have correlated 
within-person knowledge differences. The possibility of this bias is eliminated 
when reducing the sample to those schools with only one class in grade 6 
since in these schools student sorting is impossible. Thus, even if our data 
does not contain previous student subject test scores which are essential for 
cumulative educational production functions in non-differenced 
specifications, we are confident to eliminate any bias arising from lack of this 
information. 
ii.  If the impact of non-cognitive teacher skills varies by subject the regression 
error contains the term (γM – γR)Mi . Without loss of generality assume that 
γM>γR. It is likely that Mi is positively correlated with TiM and negatively with 
(–TiR), i.e., that non subject-specific teacher skills, such as motivation, are 
correlated with subject-specific teacher skills. In this case, βM is biased upward 
and  βR downward. Thus, even if we observe different coefficients when 
estimating in (3), this may come from regression bias and not from subject-
specific effect sizes.  
If we believe that βM = βR = β but that γM ≠ γR , the critical assumption for 
consistency of β is E(ΔTis’Mi)=0 . There is no obvious reason to believe that 
the difference in subject-specific teacher skills is systematically related to the 
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level of non subject-specific teacher skills.33 The consistency of (2) is in this 
case not harmed even if γM  ≠  γR. As a consequence, we can consistently 
estimate (2) if assumption 2 fails but 1 holds, however, we cannot consistently 
estimate (3) if both assumptions 1 and 2 fail.  
Results Allowing for Subject-specific Effects 
Table 3-8 shows the results from estimating (3) in the same-teacher and STOC 
sample allowing for subject-specific teacher test score effects.  
 
Table 3-8. Regression Results – Subject-specific Impacts 
 




Teacher Test Score (M) 0.065*** 0.082***
(0.017) (0.021)






Observations 4302 3940  
 
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets, observations clustered at teacher level; 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
The estimated coefficients indicate that teacher mathematics knowledge may drive 
student test scores in mathematics much more than teacher reading knowledge drives 
student reading scores. The effects are statistically distinguishable. This may have two 
reasons: On the one hand, school inputs influence mathematics and reading differently, 
e.g., if the foundation for reading comprehension is laid out at home while mathematics is 
mainly taught in school. On the other hand, as argued in this appendix, teacher 
mathematics and reading scores separately may be correlated with other unobserved 
effects thus biasing estimated coefficients in the observed direction (mathematics biased 
                                                 
33 The same line of argument should hold for other factors with possibly different impacts, e.g. household 
characteristics. It is unclear why they should be correlated with the difference in teacher subject-specific teacher 
knowledge (ΔTis), but it is likely that they are correlated with overall teacher quality. 
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upwards, reading biased downwards). It is not possible to distinguish these two effects 
here.  
 
Appendix 3.2 Non-linear Teacher Effects 
Teacher academic skills may not uniformly matter to all students depending on 
their characteristics. For example, teacher knowledge may be especially important at very 
low levels of achievement, or contrarily, a minimum level of understanding may be 
necessary to gain from teacher knowledge. Hanushek and Rivkin (2006) note that 
“existing research gives no hints of whether there is any nonlinear impact of knowledge in 
different ranges.” Rice (2003) suggests that teacher test scores may be particularly 
important for at-risk students. 
When estimating (2), we impose a linearity assumption onto the relation between 
teacher knowledge and student achievement and estimate the rate of change in the mean 
of the student score distribution conditional on the teacher score. In order to allow for 
different effects in the different parts of the student test score distribution, it would be 
interesting to assess the structural relation by estimating quantile regressions, as proposed 
by Koenker and Bassett (1978). However, as quantiles are non-linear operators, contrarily 
to the expected value of OLS estimations, the interpretation of quantiles of the first 
difference is not directly transferable to quantile regressions in levels. We can estimate 
(4)   Δyi = Δcθ + βθΔTi + Δeθi 
where βθ is the vector of regression parameters associated with the θth percentile. 
However, the interpretation of the resulting parameters must be made in differences, i.e., 
results will only yield an explanation of the effect of differences in teacher subject 
knowledge on the conditional quantiles of the distribution of differences in student test 
scores between math and reading. 
Quantile Regression Results 
Table 3-9 shows the results for quantile regressions with bootstrapped standard 
errors of the differenced equation. As we mentioned above, the estimates thus refer to 
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effects of teacher test score difference in different conditional quantiles on student test 
score differences. We can reject the hypothesis that there is no effect between the 20th and 
90th percentile of the student score distribution. But even though the effect magnitude 
seems to vary in the different quantiles of the conditional distribution, standard errors do 
not allow us to reject the hypothesis that there is no difference in the effects in the 
different parts of the distribution. This means that there is no big difference between the 
impact of a teacher who scored relatively much higher in reading (lower quantiles) on his 
students’ relative reading skills than the impact of a relatively better math teacher (upper 
quantiles) on his students’ math skills.  
 
Table 3-9. Quantile Regression Results 
 
Percentile Beta S.E.      N Beta S.E.      N
10 0.0281 (0.0207) 6819 0.0327 (0.0231) 4302
20 0.0323 (0.0122) 6819 0.0373 (0.0130) 4302
30 0.0421 (0.0097) 6819 0.0449 (0.0115) 4302
40 0.0314 (0.0137) 6819 0.0467 (0.0124) 4302
50 0.0334 (0.0093) 6819 0.0442 (0.0117) 4302
60 0.0338 (0.0102) 6819 0.0471 (0.0117) 4302
70 0.0444 (0.0113) 6819 0.0541 (0.0104) 4302
80 0.0376 (0.0152) 6819 0.0590 (0.0170) 4302






Note: Standard errors in brackets, obtained by bootstrapping with 100 repetitions. 
 
Appendix 3.3 Generalizability of Results 
Table 3-10 shows how the same-teacher one-classroom sample is drawn from the 
whole school population: in comparison to the national average predominantly multi-
grade schools, rural schools and public schools employ the same teacher to teach both 
math and reading to the same classroom and are small enough to have one classroom in 
6th grade only.  
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Table 3-10. Share of Classrooms in and out of STOC Sample by Type of School 
 
Shares






Multigrade School 0.032 0.547 0.234
Rural Area 0.055 0.596 0.268
Public School 0.823 0.914 0.859
N 503 335 838  
 
Note: Summary statistics calculated using sampling weights from EN 2004. 
 
Since we pick the sub-sample of students with the same teacher in math and 
reading as our main sample for the analysis, you should keep in mind that this sample is 
predominantly drawn from schools which are disadvantaged in terms of the resources 
they can spend, and the pool of students and teachers from which they draw. Table 3-11 
shows summary statistics for student test scores in math and reading which are scaled to 
mean 0 and standard deviation 1 for the full sample. Students from same-teacher one-
classroom schools have significantly lower test scores in math and reading (-0.36 and -
0.40) than their peers from other schools (0.34 and 0.36). Also, students from urban, 
private, and complete schools have higher test scores than their respective peers. 
   
Table 3-11. Summary Statistics Student Test Scores – Full Sample 
 
Students Share N
All 1.000 0.00 (1.00) 0.00 (1.00) 12165
Same Teacher in M and R 0.622 -0.23 (0.96) -0.23 (0.98) 6819
Same Teacher & One Classroom 0.399 -0.36 (0.99) -0.40 (1.01) 4302
Different Teacher in M and R 0.378 0.34 (0.93) 0.36 (0.90) 4990
Male Student 0.509 0.06 (1.01) -0.02 (0.97) 6164
Female Student 0.491 -0.07 (0.99) 0.02 (1.03) 6001
Urban Area 0.729 0.23 (0.93) 0.26 (0.90) 9555
Rural Area 0.271 -0.63 (0.90) -0.69 (0.92) 2610
Public School 0.861 -0.16 (0.92) -0.15 (0.94) 9450
Private School 0.139 0.91 (0.95) 0.83 (0.87) 2359
Multigrade School 0.235 -0.63 (0.93) -0.70 (0.95) 2446







Note: Summary statistics calculated using sampling weights from EN 2004. Standardization of 
test scores on full sample. The observation number of collectively exhaustive sub-samples does 
not always add up to the full sample due to missing information in the sub-group characteristics. 
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Table 3-12 summarizes teacher test scores in math and reading also scaled to mean 
0 and standard deviation 1 for the full sample. The same patterns as for students hold: 
teachers lecturing both math and reading to the same students in one-classroom schools 
have considerably lower test scores than their specialized peers. Also, teachers of urban, 
private, and complete schools have higher subject knowledge than their respective peers. 
   
Table 3-12. Summary Statistics Teacher Test Scores – Full Sample 
 
Share N Share N
All 1.000 0.00 (1.00) 862 1.000 0.00 (1.00) 862
Same Teacher in M and R 0.625 -0.16 (0.94) 505 0.626 -0.13 (0.96) 505
Same Teacher & One Classroom 0.396 -0.18 (0.98) 335 0.398 -0.17 (1.00) 335
Different Teacher in M and R 0.375 0.24 (1.03) 333 0.374 0.20 (1.04) 333
Male Teacher 0.493 0.01 (1.01) 331 0.483 -0.17 (1.04) 292
Female Teacher 0.507 -0.01 (1.03) 380 0.517 0.17 (0.93) 385
Urban Area 0.734 0.11 (0.97) 606 0.732 0.11 (0.96) 606
Rural Area 0.266 -0.30 (1.03) 256 0.268 -0.31 (1.04) 256
Public School 0.859 -0.13 (0.92) 686 0.859 -0.10 (0.99) 686
Private School 0.141 0.76 (1.05) 152 0.141 0.54 (0.88) 152
Multigrade School 0.231 -0.28 (1.01) 263 0.234 -0.32 (0.94) 263





Note: Summary statistics calculated using sampling weights from EN 2004. Standardization of test scores on full 
sample. The number of observations of collectively exhaustive sub-samples does not always add up to the full 
sample due to missing information in the sub-group characteristics. 
 
All in all, it is obvious that the sample of same-teacher one-classroom schools is 
not representative of the national average but rather drawn from the lower part of the 
knowledge distribution. It is thus questionable if the effect presented in the results section 
does not only hold for this particular sub-sample. The general effect for the population 
may be smaller if predominantly worse students profit from teacher subject knowledge, or 
larger if a minimum amount of student knowledge is necessary as a basis for profiting 
from teacher subject knowledge.  
We address this issue by using a bootstrapping procedure: running regression (2) a 
large number of times in a sub-sample of the same-teacher one-classroom sample which 
is comparable to the whole population and extracting the estimated coefficients. This 
sample (STOC-pop) is constructed by drawing a random sample from the original EN 
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2004 population that is smaller than the STOC sample and using nearest neighbor 
propensity score matching to pick those observations from the STOC sample which are 
comparable to the initial population. The variables along which STOC-pop is made 
comparable to the initial population are student and teacher test scores in both subjects, 
and dummies for different school types (urban, public, multigrade). The chosen 
observations constitute the STOC-pop sample. After running regression (2) on STOC-
pop and extracting coefficients and standard errors this procedure is repeated a large 
number of times.  
For a nearest neighbor propensity score matching with caliper 0.01 and 1000 
repetitions of the procedure, the regression yields an average teacher test score effect of 
0.042 with an average standard error of 0.018 for an average number of 1904 
observations. We take this as evidence that the teacher test score effect calculated before 
is not an artifact of the STOC sample which we draw to identify our regression but that it 
holds in a similar magnitude in the Peruvian 6th grade student population at large. 
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4  The Impact of Natural Hazards on 
School Progression: Evidence from 
Rural Peru 
 
4.1  Introduction 
One commonly overlooked aspect in the evaluation of natural hazard damages is 
its effect on educational production. In order to assess the costs of climate change 
researchers need to account for all of its effects on determinants of economic 
development; educational production resides prominently among them. Nevertheless, the 
most influential studies on the impacts of climate change and extreme weather events, the 
Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change from 2006 and the Third Assessment 
Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) from 200134, do not 
mention this facet at all. Natural hazards, however, can affect human capital accumulation 
via a number of channels. Particularly, disasters can distress the health and economic 
situation of schoolchildren and their families which may result in lower attendance, lower 
learning and higher dropout; in the long run this will negatively influence economic 
development. 
This paper examines the impact of natural hazards on school progression in rural 
regions of Peru. The context of this paper is thus a developing country where particularly 
strong effects of extreme weather events to educational outcomes can be expected (IPCC 
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2001). First, developing countries are geographically more exposed to extreme weather 
events than developed countries. Peru is estimated to be the third most affected country 
by climate hazards worldwide (Brooks, Adger 2003). Second, developing countries employ 
large shares of the population in the agricultural sector, which is most exposed to weather 
conditions. Third, developing countries have lower means of protection and insurance 
against extreme weather events. Incomplete financial markets and borrowing constraints 
impede consumption smoothing for many poor people. An extensive literature has found 
evidence for a worsening of educational outcomes in the face of negative income shocks 
(see second section).  
The contribution of this paper is to extend this more general strand of literature 
on the effect of negative income shocks on educational outcomes in two respects. First, 
this paper considers natural hazards in rural regions of Peru as a specific type of negative 
shock. The effects of natural hazards in developing countries are interesting in their own 
respect. The third IPCC assessment stressed the vulnerability of poor countries which 
depend strongly on the primary sector to extreme weather shocks and their dire 
consequences for poverty reduction. However, we know little about the channels and 
magnitudes of these effects, which are important, for example to make cost-benefit 
calculations of climate change mitigation or to specify dynamic general equilibrium 
models.  
Second, most estimates in the literature on the impact of negative income shocks 
on educational outcomes are vulnerable to the endogeneity of income. This is problematic 
in the presence of unobserved time-varying variables which may violate the key 
assumption of strict exogeneity of the regressors. This paper circumvents the endogeneity 
problem by exploiting natural experiments: I use disaster damage as an exogenous 
explanatory variable.  
The analysis is based on a unique combination of longitudinal data bases at the 
district level in Peru. I combine information from a national disaster database, an 
agricultural census and the national school census. The main explanatory variable is the 
damage created by natural hazards in rural regions measured in hectares of damaged or 
destroyed farmland. The appeal of this variable is the exogenous nature of disasters which 
leads to a straight-forward identification strategy in fixed and random effects models. 
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Also, hectares of farmland is an easily understandable magnitude which can be compared 
across countries. The key educational outcome examined is the share of enrolled primary 
schoolchildren being promoted to the next grade in rural areas. Furthermore, I examine 
the opposite, the share of students failing the grade either due to early withdrawal from 
school or due to non-promotion by the teacher. This strategy allows distinguishing 
different channels by which disaster damage causes grade non-completion. Additionally, 
the analysis is done for boys and girls separately to examine if effects differ depending on 
gender. 
The results of the analysis suggest that damages to farmland caused by natural 
hazards such as floods, storms and fires have a pronounced impact on school progression 
in rural Peru. A disaster affecting one hectare of farmland per rural schoolchild decreases 
the rural district grade completion rate by an estimated 2.4 percentage points on average. 
Thus, for about 42 hectares of affected farmland one schoolchild is induced to fail the 
grade he or she is enrolled for. This average, however, understates the effect on small 
subsistence farmers with only up to 5 or 10 hectares of land. Further analysis suggests that 
a mean effect of up to one failing schoolchild per 13 hectares of affected farmland is 
possible if the whole district was owned by farmers with no more than 5 hectares of land 
each. Applying the mean prediction of estimates to the amount of disasters in Peru, the 
analysis accounts for about 1500 cases of grade failure in three years. Against common 
belief, withdrawal from school is not the only channel by which grade failure happens. A 
significant amount of children remains in school but is not promoted to the next grade – 
surprisingly, this effect is stronger when subsistence farmland dominates the area. 
Furthermore, the analysis suggests that there are no statistically significant differences 
between the effect on boys and girls when disasters occur. Due to large error bounds it is 
difficult to draw strong conclusions from these additional findings but they certainly 
represent an interesting area for future research. 
Climate change is predicted to produce more frequent and severe weather events 
thus increasing negative impacts on educational outcomes and long-term human capital 
formation in developing countries. For example, the Andean Community estimates that 
Peru will have a 4.4 percent lower GDP with than without climate change by 2025, 
among other reasons by having 10 percent lower relative agricultural production (CAN 
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2008). It is imperial to focus further research on this issue to gain a clearer understanding 
of the channels and magnitudes of weather effects on education.  
4.2  Background and Literature Review 
Developing countries will be particularly distressed by the consequences of 
changing climatic circumstances and the increased frequency and severity of extreme 
weather events. (cf. Stern 2007, IPCC 2001). At the micro level, examples of direct 
consequences of climate hazards are loss of life, livelihood, private assets and 
infrastructure. At the macro level this translates into reduced productivity of important 
economic sectors, especially agriculture. The reasons for these effects are geographic 
exposure, low incomes, and greater dependence on the most climate sensitive agricultural 
sector. Latin America in general and Peru in particular are no exception in this respect. 
Charvériat (2000, p. 94) concludes that “the risk of natural disasters in the Latin American 
and Caribbean poses a sizable threat to the preservation and continuation of the regional 
socio-economic development process.” Brooks and Adger (2003) from the Tyndall 
Centre for Climate Change Research conclude that Peru is the third most vulnerable 
country to climate-related natural disasters worldwide after Honduras and Bangladesh.  
As a consequence, extreme weather events severely endanger the livelihood of 
farmers in developing countries who constitute a considerable share of the total 
population and are dependent on steady income flows from agriculture. In Latin America, 
almost 20 percent of the total area are agricultural lands, contributing about 10 percent to 
the region’s GDP and providing occupation for up to 40 percent of the economically 
active population in some countries (IPPC, Chapter 14). The primary sector remains a key 
element of regional economies providing work and food security to many of the poorest 
people in rural regions. Especially subsistence farmers, who only produce for their own 
consumption, have little means to cope with unexpected shocks to small amounts of 
farmland as their primary sources of income and will be most affected by extreme weather 
conditions. 
Peru in particular is a country with an accentuated subsistence farming sector 
which is vulnerable to negative weather shocks. According to the national agricultural 
census from 1994, 85.3 percent of agricultural production units are in the hand of small 
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landholders with up to 10 hectares of land controlling about 49.4 percent of the total 
farmland. As a consequence, the largest share of agricultural workers is very exposed to 
extreme weather events. If a disaster damages farmland of such a small farmer the 
household is in danger of loosing the majority of income and would have to resort to 
coping strategies such as child labor. Nevertheless, disaster damage may also affect 
workers on industrial farms if their employers dismiss parts of the workforce in response 
to reduced arable surface.  
A broader strand of literature has already considered the connection between 
negative income shocks and educational outcomes in developing countries and has 
generally found negative impacts. The connection between negative income shocks and 
decreased schooling runs through an increase in the supply of child labor, especially when 
there are credit constraints.35 Such child labor is pervasive in Peru; Patrinos and 
Psacharopoulos (1997) find that rural children in Peru contribute on average 18 percent 
to family income. In general, Jacoby and Skoufias (1997) and Beegle, Dehejia, and Gatti 
(2006), among others, find that households significantly increase market work and 
decrease school attendance of children in response to anticipated and unanticipated 
income shocks. Yet, it is always difficult to address concerns of endogeneity of income 
even in a panel data setting. There may be unobserved time-varying variables correlated 
with income in different time periods, e.g. through investment decisions, which bias the 
estimated effect of income shocks.  
This work also documents that there are important differences between boys and 
girls. Overall, girls tend to work more than boys (Edmonds 2007), especially in the 
household. Domestic work needs to be taken into account when considering the 
schooling-work trade-off, and can be a primary deterrent to school attendance (cf. 
Levison and Moe 1998 for Peru). As boys tend to have a smaller work burden in the 
household than girls, they face fewer barriers to schooling than girls (cf. Assaad et al. 2005 
for Egyptian data).  
Even though the vulnerability of school attendance to different forms of shock in 
developing countries is well-established it has so far not entered studies on the analysis of 
climate change related costs, such as the Stern Review or the IPCC report. Indeed, natural 
                                                 
35 A great survey of child labor in general and its impact on school attendance is Edmonds (2007). 
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disasters can negatively affect educational outcomes via a number of channels on the 
demand and supply side of education. On the supply side, long periods of teaching may 
be lost due to adverse impacts of extreme weather events on the health and economic 
circumstances of instructors and the destruction or damaging of schools and relevant 
other infrastructure. On the demand side, schoolchildren and their families may also be 
affected in their health and economic situation which may result in lower attendance, 
lower learning and higher dropout. These channels, especially on the demand side, will be 
more accentuated in low-income countries. To my knowledge, Holmes (2002) is the only 
existing study which examines an effect of natural disasters on educational outcomes.36 
He analyses the effect of several hurricanes in North Carolina, USA, on student test score 
growth using a longitudinal school data set and finds a consistent negative effect.  
This paper thus contributes to the thin literature on the connection between 
weather conditions and educational outcomes in developing countries. First, I use 
damages caused by extreme weather events as a specific shock which is interesting in its 
own respect to assess the impact of climate change related events. Second, by the nature 
of this event, the econometric specification is straight-forward and I can circumvent many 
potential problems of endogeneity. Third, the impact expressed in hectares of affected 
farmland is an easily understandable magnitude which can be compared across countries.  
4.3  Empirical Implementation 
The focus of this paper is on the role of natural hazards in determining grade non-
completion. The grade completion probability of a student is a function of two groups of 
factors: out-of-school factors, such as family and student characteristics, and in-school 
factors, such as school quality.  
A household sending a child to school must have a positive expected value from 
enrollment. This value is determined by the difference between expected benefits of 
schooling for the child, such as future wages, and costs, such as fees and opportunity 
costs of not working in the household or labor market (see for example Gertler, Glewwe 
1990). 
                                                 
36 Porta and Laguna (2007) indicate that hurricane Mitch may be responsible for a reversal of declining drop-out 
figures in Guatemala which, however, is not substantiated by an analysis. 
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However, if a poor household is hit by a shock, the expected value from going to 
school may change for enrolled children who may have to start supporting the family or 
increase their effort in doing so. This could mean dropping school for the current year or 
spending less effort on school tasks resulting in higher failure probability.  
At an aggregate level, I specify the reduced form model  
(1)   ydt = c1 + γ1 Ddt + μd + δt + edt 
where grade completion rate y in district d at time t is influenced by a shock D 
which represents disaster damage relative to district size.37 Also, there are district-level 
fixed effects μ and time effects δ. 
If all students enrolled in school plan on finishing their current grade given current 
circumstances, e.g. family income, a negative shock to these circumstances may induce 
some of them to drop out or spend less effort on school, resulting in higher grade non-
completion rates in the respective area. In a correctly specified econometric model, I 
expect to estimate a negative effect of a disaster shock. 
The analysis aims to establish whether the hypothesis of non-zero disaster effects 
can be rejected by estimating the above postulated relationship (1). The variable of 
interest is shocks to irrigated farmland, measured as hectares of farmland damaged or 
destroyed by some incidence, such as flooding, drought, fire or similar. In practice, other 
explanatory variables are not needed in the regression under the assumption that natural 
hazards are exogenous and thus uncorrelated with factors such as school quality and 
district poverty.  
It is likely that the effect of disaster damage is not uniform across all units but may 
depend on local circumstances. In particular, a poor subsistence farming unit will be 
strongly affected by damaged farmland, whereas a large industrial production unit may be 
less so, especially for small amounts of damage. In (1), γ1 will thus represent an average 
effect over all districts independent of their agricultural production structure. It is, 
however, also reasonable to estimate 
                                                 
37 With grade completion expressed as a rate, district level variables need to be scaled in order to make them 
comparable across districts. My approach is to express disaster damage per student in the district, i.e., to chose the 
same denominator as for the dependent variable. The estimated result can thus be expressed as the number of 
hectares of affected farmland which induce one child less to complete the grade. 
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(2) ydt = c2 + γ2 Ddt + γ3 Ad + γ4 Ddt*Ad + μd + δt + εdt 
where disaster damage is interacted with a factor A that characterizes the 
heterogeneity of districts with respect to their vulnerability to disaster shocks. In practice, 
I express this factor as the share of farmland in the district worked on by small-scale 
subsistence farmers. 
It remains to be determined if (1) and (2) should be estimated by fixed effects or 
random effects regression. This leads to the question whether the observed shocks are 
truly uncorrelated with unobserved district fixed effects. If natural shocks are random 
only conditionally on an unobserved propensity for shocks, this problem can be solved 
via fixed effects regression.38 Through demeaning of equations at several points in time, 
the problematic fixed effects including regional propensity for shocks are removed, such 
that there is no remaining correlation of the incidence of shocks and unobserved time-
constant factors. If natural shocks are unconditionally random, both fixed and random 
effects estimation will be consistent but random effects will be efficient. The Hausman 
test can help to determine which specification to use.  
A remaining source of concern is the possibility of unobserved time-varying 
factors which violate the assumption of strict exogeneity of the shock variables. This 
could be the case if shocks have consequences which last for more than one period. For 
example, shocks may hit a community so hard that the poorest and possibly those 
students with lowest propensity to complete the grade drop out of school permanently. 
The unobserved overall ability of students may thus be higher in the next period, creating 
a correlation of ability and deviation from the mean shock. 
                                                 
38 Some areas are more likely to be hit by a shock than others, such as earthquake-prone areas, mountainous 
regions for droughts or wetlands for floods. If the resulting human conglomerations in this region evolve 
dependent on the area’s specificities then the area’s propensity for shocks is not exogenous in a cross-sectional 
regression. It may be correlated first of all with income and through this channel with other influential factors, 
such as vulnerability to shocks, school quality and individual ability, motivation and opportunity cost of 
schooling. 
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4.4  Data 
Different data sources are merged at the district level in order to enable 
estimation: data on 1) natural hazards, 2) on the distribution of farmland ownership and 
3) on school completion and failure rates.  
4.4.1  Natural Disaster Data 
Information on natural hazards is retrieved from the Peruvian internet platform 
SINPAD (Sistema Nacional de Información para la Prevención y Atención de Desastres) 
which is part of the larger National Civil Defense System run by the National Civil 
Defense Institute. It is an internet-reporting system of damages and needs due to natural 
and human-caused disasters. The tool is used for official disaster monitoring, prevention 
and reaction. It is a uniquely comprehensive database which permits registering every 
single disaster in the country since 1995. For example, in the period January 1st 2003 to 
December 31st 2005 it contained more than 12,000 incidences of disaster in Peru.  
Disasters contained in SINPAD are classified by phenomenon and linked to their 
respective damage, both in detailed categories. The types of phenomena contained are 
geodynamic, meteorological, biological or technological disasters. Also, the exact 
phenomenon is detailed, e.g., volcanic activity, earthquake, flooding, storm, landslide, 
drought, or fire. Furthermore, SINPAD registers the damages of disasters. These are 
classified into damages to life and health, buildings, ways of transport, agricultural 
infrastructure, farmland, crops and animals. In addition, the exact quantified damage is 
listed in the database, e.g., number of people deceased, hurt, affected, houses damaged 
and destroyed, or streets damaged and destroyed.  
This paper uses information on damages to farmland as the main explanatory 
variable to measure shocks to rural areas and households. Within the disaster 
quantifications, SINPAD reports hectares of damaged and destroyed farmland which I 
aggregate to affected farmland as my main explanatory variable. These damages are clearly 
confined to rural areas. Figure 4-1 shows the pattern of yearly reported hectares of 
destroyed farmland since 1995 and demonstrates that destruction of farmland by natural 
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hazards is not a stable process. Instead, destroyed farmland varies between less than 
10,000 and more than 100,000 annual hectares. 
 



























Table 4-1 shows the frequency and severity of disasters which affect farmland. 
Droughts are by far the most frequent and severe force in damaging and destroying 
farmland with 29 percent of incidences and 60 percent of affected farmland. Other high-
frequency disaster phenomena with more than twenty incidences per year are frost, 
flooding, rain, hail and storm. Together, they account for more than 90 percent of 
affected farmland. Landslides, infestations and high tides are also on the list of severe 
disasters with more than 100 affected hectares per incident. 
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Drought 303 29.2 339,234 60.45 1119.6
Frost 204 19.7 109,931 19.59 538.9
Flooding 172 16.6 58,643 10.45 340.9
Rain 103 9.9 19,088 3.40 185.3
Hail 74 7.1 7,778 1.39 105.1
Storm 60 5.8 7,203 1.28 120.1
Landslide 29 2.8 2,512 0.45 86.6
Fire 20 1.9 10,173 1.81 508.7
Flash Flood 20 1.9 680 0.12 34.0
Snow 14 1.4 681 0.12 48.6
High Tide 13 1.3 4,013 0.72 308.7
Alluvion 10 1.0 508 0.09 50.8
Collapse 6 0.6 301 0.05 50.2
Others (Ext. Geodynamic) 3 0.3 6 0.00 2.0
Others (Meteorologic) 2 0.2 57 0.01 28.5
Others (Int. Geodynamic) 2 0.2 14 0.00 7.0
Infestation 1 0.1 380 0.07 380.0
Earthquake 1 0.1 1 0.00 1.0
Total 1,037 100 561,203 100 541.2
 
Source: own calculations based on SINPAD. 
 
The database dates back to 1995. While early years may suffer from 
underreporting there is no reason to believe that this is the cause for recent years. Disaster 
reports which end up in SINPAD are filed by local civil defense committees which exist 
in all districts in Peru. The filing of disaster reports is linked to the reception of aid 
measures which are also contained in the database. There is thus no reason to believe that 
reporting is endogenous, e.g., that poorer districts may not report all of their disasters. 
Table 4-2 summarizes the frequency and severity of disasters affecting farmland 
that are relevant for the analysis. The sample of included districts and affected farmland 
figures is reduced in two ways compared to the whole population of disasters: excluding 
affected farmland in the months January to March and excluding districts which during 
those three years at some point of time reported a drought.  
Hectares of farmland damaged or destroyed are added up from April to December 
of the respective year because this is the period of time which the school year spans. As a 
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result, schoolchildren enrolled at the beginning of the school year in April will be affected 
by shocks to farmland from April on.  
 
Table 4-2. Summary Statistics for Affected Farmland April-December, 
Excluding Drought-districts 
 
Affected Farmland (Ha) 2003 2004 2005
All Districts
Observations 1407 1407 1407
Mean 6.8 9.2 5.8
S.D. 73.5 98.3 138.1
Affected Districts
Observations 49 64 32
Mean 193.8 202.2 252.8
S.D. 348.1 419.8 894.8
M a x 1 7 6 22 3 7 45 0 0 0
Total 9498 12939 8091
Affected Districts
(Ha/rural student)
Observations 49 64 32
Mean 0.14 0.19 0.23
S.D. 0.24 0.50 0.71
Max 1.05 3.43 3.82
 
 
Source: own calculations based on SINPAD. 
 
Drought-affected districts are excluded from analysis because droughts are longer 
term events and do not hit districts by surprise. For example, the department Tacna was 
reportedly in state of drought for more than two years during 2003 to 2005 while the 
incidence of drought was only reported once in the disaster database much later than the 
actual onset. The date of reporting thus cannot correspond to a day-specific realization of 
the disaster and cannot be congruently classified as before or after the start of the school 
year. This inaccuracy leads to the following problem: in case of reporting during the 
school year while the onset of the drought was before April, the drought will already have 
influenced the enrollment decision, an effect which I am not able to measure. Also, for 
droughts lasting longer than one year, the strict exogeneity assumption is less likely to be 
fulfilled. As a consequence, I find it most reasonable to exclude drought affected districts 
  90Chapter 4: The Impact of Natural Hazards on School Progression 
altogether even though they account by far for most of the damaged and destroyed 
farmland. However, it seems reasonable to believe that the estimated impact should be 
valid for all affected farmland independent of the disaster type which caused it, including 
droughts. 
The upper panel of Table 4-2 contains the disaster statistics measured in hectares 
of affected farmland for all districts including those which were not affected. The middle 
and lower panel show the disaster statistics only for affected districts – while the middle 
panel shows them in hectares of affected farmland the lower panel scales the statistics 
relative to the district primary school population, which is the relative measure later used 
in the regressions in order to make districts comparable in size. 
During 2003-2005, out of 1662 districts 1407 were never affected by a drought. In 
2003, 49 non-drought districts registered disaster-affected farmland, in 2004 64 districts, 
and in 2005 32 districts. Overall, 121 non-drought districts were at least once affected by a 
disaster-caused destruction or damaging of farmland. 
Note that there are enormous differences between the sum of disaster affected 
farmland in Table 4-2 and Table 4-3. The difference stems from two sources: first, most 
disasters in Peru happen during the months of January to March; about 90 percent of 
farmland was affected during those months, as we can see in Table 4-3. Second, drought-
affected districts are excluded from the regression sample. As a consequence, not only 
hectares of farmland damaged or destroyed by droughts are lost for the analysis but also 
all the remaining disasters in all three years of drought-affected districts.  
 
Table 4-3. Total of Disaster-Affected Farmland, by Time of Year 
 











Source: own calculations based on SINPAD. 
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4.4.2  Agricultural Production Structure Data 
In order to account for the structure of agricultural production in Peruvian 
districts, I use the Peruvian agricultural census (CENAGRO) from 1994 to approximate 
the share of land held by subsistence farmers in affected districts 2003 to 2005. 
The CENAGRO was carried out between October and November of 1994 by the 
National Institute of Statistics and Informatics (INEI) and covered the entire country, 
excluding totally urbanized areas. The focal statistical unit is the agricultural unit, defined 
as any piece of land consisting of one or more parcels, totally or partially used for 
agricultural production, carried out as an economic unit by the agricultural holder, without 
regard to size, tenure or legal status. Data on holding and holder characteristics, tenure, 
land use and livestock etc. were collected through direct interview. The data used for this 
analysis only refers to agriculturally used land, not total surface. 
 
Table 4-4. Total of Disaster-Affected Farmland, by Time of Year 
 





Districts 1662 177 121
All sizes
No. of units (in 1000s) 1671.22 234.15 170.72
Surface (in 1000 has) 5476.98 970.77 771.55
Average surface / unit (in has) 3.28 4.15 4.52
Units with <10 ha farmland
Share of units 0.853 0.756 0.704
Share of surface held 0.494 0.407 0.362
Units with <5 ha farmland
Share of units 0.710 0.579 0.511
Share of surface held 0.299 0.221 0.186
 
 
Source: own calculations based on CENAGRO. 
 
Table 4-4 displays an overview of agricultural units in 1994, nationally compared 
to disaster-affected districts (in 2003 to 2005). Peru has almost 1.7 million agricultural 
units holding almost 5.5 million hectares of farmland. The average size is 3.3 hectares, 
compared to 4.2 hectares for all disaster-affected districts and 4.5 for disaster-affected 
non-drought districts. Nationally, about 85 percent of units work on less than 10 hectares, 
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making up about 49 percent of the total farmland. In affected districts, 76 percent of units 
have less than 10 hectares and constitute 41 percent of total farmland. Typical subsistence 
farmers without production for market survive on 1 to 5 hectares of land (Plaza, 
Stromquist 2006) constituting 71 percent of units nationally and 30 percent of total 
surface. In affected districts, 58 percent of units work on less than 5 hectares, constituting 
22 percent of total surface. Disaster-affected districts seem to be slightly bigger and less 
small-scale than the national average. 
The numbers reveal that much of agricultural production in Peru is carried out on 
a very small scale, with the grand majority of farms working on less than 10 or 5 hectares 
of land. These farms and their workers can largely be considered subsistence farmers only 
producing for their own consumption. These production units are particularly exposed to 
extreme weather shocks due to lack of coping strategies.  
4.4.3  Grade Completion Data 
The third database used is the Peruvian school census 2004, 2005 and 2006 which 
covers all Peruvian educational institutions. It is collected on a yearly basis by the Ministry 
of Education via questionnaires specific to the type and level of institution. The survey 
information is self-reported by the schools. Schools are identified via a unique 
identification code and can thus be followed over time. Information is collected to reflect 
school registers at the date of May 30. The information collected does not allow for 
individual student profiles but aggregation at the grade and school level. For example, 
information contains the grade structure of students according to gender, age, native 
language and repeater status but it is not possible to follow who exactly is failing the 
grade.  
Information on grade completion is collected for the previous school year such 
that the resulting database covers the end of year results for the years 2003, 2004 and 
2005. The big advantage of the school census data is that it can be used to compare 
beginning of year enrollment with end of year results. Enrollment at the beginning of the 
year constitutes a revealed preference and signals positive utility from schooling. The 
panel setting with random effects allows using non-disaster affected districts as a control 
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group to identify the average year specific rate of non-completion in the absence of 
disaster treatment. 
In the school database, the enrollment and completion statistics are cleaned and 
added up to district figures only for schools in rural and marginal urban areas. Schools 
with inconsistent reporting or large enrollment changes over the years are excluded.39 The 
subset used for estimation is a cleaned sample of formal, non-adult primary schools which 
are observed in all three years. 
Table 4-5 summarizes the rural student population by year. In 2003, 81.5 percent 
of all rural primary schoolchildren completed the grade meaning that almost one in five 
children failed the grade. About 10 percent of children failed due to non-promotion while 
about 8 percent failed due to early withdrawal or low attendance. There is a small but 
steady upward trend in promotion rates between 2003 and 2005. 
 
Table 4-5. Summary Statistics Rural Student Population  
 
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Share Boys 0.511 (0.026) 0.511 (0.026) 0.510 (0.026)
All
Share Promoted 0.815 (0.074) 0.827 (0.071) 0.833 (0.071)
Share Not Promoted 0.102 (0.043) 0.097 (0.045) 0.093 (0.044)
Share Withdrawn 0.082 (0.041) 0.076 (0.036) 0.073 (0.036)
Boys
Share Promoted 0.815 (0.071) 0.825 (0.068) 0.831 (0.068)
Share Not Promoted 0.104 (0.043) 0.098 (0.044) 0.096 (0.043)
Share Withdrawn 0.081 (0.040) 0.076 (0.035) 0.073 (0.036)
Girls
Share Promoted 0.816 (0.081) 0.829 (0.077) 0.835 (0.077)
Share Not Promoted 0.101 (0.047) 0.095 (0.048) 0.091 (0.047)




Source: own calculations based on national school census, 2004-2006. 
                                                 
39 Large changes in enrollment between years can stem either from structural breaks or strong measurement 
error, bot of which should be avoided. For example, in a school losing a large share of students due to a natural 
hazard in the area the remaining children may reflect a very different socioeconomic and ability structure and 
level. The school will thus not be comparable anymore and the strict exogeneity assumption needed for 
consistent estimation is violated. As a consequence, I may underestimate the effect of natural hazards if schools 
which are most severely hit are dropped from the sample. 
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The table indicates that there is no gender discrimination in rural Peru which can 
be found in the school system of many other developing countries. First, boys and girls 
constitute almost equal shares in the student population. Second, completion, non-
promotion and withdrawal rates are equal among boys and girls in all years. 
4.5  Results 
Table 4-6 documents the main results of the paper from fixed (FE) and random 
effects (RE) estimation of specification (1), with and without year effects. The Breusch 
and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test (not shown in table) strongly suggest the existence of 
individual effects such that FE and RE models are appropriate. The dependent variable is 
the district-level share of students successfully completing the school year and being 
promoted to the next grade. The independent variable of interest is the district-level 
amount of disaster-affected (damaged plus destroyed) farmland in hectares per rural 
student. The scaling is done to make bigger and smaller districts comparable. The 
estimation is performed on all districts which had not registered any drought throughout 
the period 2003 – 2005. The Hausman test strongly rejects significant differences between 
results from the fixed and random effects specification. This supports the view that 
natural disasters are unconditionally random events. In the following discussion I thus 
only report random effects.  
 
 
Table 4-6. Disaster Impact on Grade Completion for Fixed and Random Effects Estimation
 
Dep. Variable: Share Completed FE RE FE RE
Farmland affected / rural schoolchild -0.0220** -0.0233** -0.0225*** -0.0237***
(0.0086) (0.0093) (0.0085) (0.0087)
Constant 0.8085*** 0.8084*** 0.7970*** 0.7969***
(0.0001) (0.0020) (0.0010) (0.0023)
Year Dummies No No Yes Yes
R^2 0.001 0.001 0.012 0.012
F (FE) / Chi2 (RE) 6.55 6.28 48.72 160.50
Observations 4221 4221 4221 4221
Hausman Test p-value 0.57 0.95
 
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. Significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Hausman test 
computed on regressions without robust standard errors which produce standard errors that never change the 
significance level of significant coefficients by more than 0.005 as compared to robust standard errors. 
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Both fixed and random effects results confirm a significant negative effect of 
disaster affected farmland on district grade promotion shares in rural primary schools. As 
the inclusion of year effects does not change the results (columns 3 and 4) we can be 
more confident about the exogenous nature of the explanatory variable. According to the 
results, a natural hazard damaging or destroying one hectare of farmland per rural 
schoolchild reduces the share of promoted students by 2.2 to 2.4 percentage points. In 
other words, for about 42 hectares of affected land, one schoolchild is not promoted to 
the next grade. Considering the total quantity of disaster-affected farmland between April 
and December 2003 to 2005, 62,364 hectares (Table 4-3), disasters forced about 1,500 
students to fail the grade according to the mean prediction, not including those who were 
deterred from enrolling. If we assume that the same effect magnitude holds for children 
that were deterred from enrolling by disaster damage of about 500,000 hectares between 
January and March during those three years, almost 12,000 children were prevented to 
enroll in school.  
Table 4-7 shows the results for random effects estimations according to 
specification (2), i.e., including affected farmland, a baseline effect for the share of small-
scale agricultural units in the district, and an interaction term between the two. In the left 
panel, small-scale agricultural units are defined as those with less than 10 hectares of 
farmland, in the right panel, those with less than 5 hectares of farmland. In each panel, 
the first column contains only the non-interacted variables, the second column adds the 
interaction effect, and the third column assumes that there is no average disaster effect 
independent of the interaction effect.  
  96Chapter 4: The Impact of Natural Hazards on School Progression 
Table 4-7. Disaster Impact on Grade Completion for Random Effects Estimation 
 
Dep. Variable: Share Completed [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Farmland affected / rural schoolchild -0.0218** -0.0165 -0.0223*** -0.0190*
(0.0086) (0.0155) (0.0086) (0.0113)
Share of subsistence farmland -0.0471*** -0.0466*** -0.0460*** -0.0568*** -0.0557*** -0.0548***
(0.0122) (0.0122) (0.0122) (0.0180) (0.0182) (0.0182)
Farmland affected / rural schoolchild -0.0176 -0.0546** -0.0238 -0.0755**
      x Share of subsistence farmland (0.0426) (0.0232) (0.0506) (0.0363)
Constant 0.7988*** 0.7987*** 0.7987*** 0.7983*** 0.7982*** 0.7982***
(0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R^2 0.019 0.020 0.019 0.017 0.017 0.017
Chi2 175.50 175.70 174.70 170.20 170.80 168.70
Observations 4221 4221 4221 4221 4221 4221
Subsistence farmland: < 10 has Subsistence farmland: < 5 has
 
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. Significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
For both definitions of small-scale farms, the results of column 1 and 4 do not 
change markedly compared to Table 4-6 in the presence of subsistence farmland share as 
an additional regressor. Interestingly, the share of subsistence farmland is significantly 
associated with lower grade completion rates, possibly due to correlation with district-
wide effects such as higher poverty or lower school quality. In columns 2 and 4, which 
include the interaction effect, affected farmland looses in magnitude and significance, 
dropping to -0.017 and -0.019. The interaction effect turns out negative for both 
subsistence definitions (-0.018 and -0.024) but insignificant, likely due to high correlation 
(0.99 and 0.97) with non-interacted farmland. However, in a Wald test (not shown), 
farmland and the interaction term are jointly significant at the 10 (colum 2) and 5 (column 
4) percent level. Assuming that the mean effect is consistently estimated there would be 
both an average effect of disaster affected farmland and an effect that depends on the 
structure of farm holdings in the district. If every farm in the district is less than 10 
hectares in size, the aggregate effect on grade completion is -0.033, for all farms having 
less than 5 hectares it is -0.043. In case of 100 percent subsistence farmland, the aggregate 
effect is thus such that 29 or 23 hectares of farmland devastation would cause one 
schoolchild to fail the grade. 
Columns 3 and 6 of Table 4-7 confirm that there is a stronger negative effect of 
disasters if more farmland is held by smallholders, assuming that there is no average effect 
but only one that is dependent on local farmland structure. Column 3 shows a significant 
negative effect of -0.055 of the interaction term between affected farmland and the share 
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of farms smaller than 10 hectares. According to RE, one child is induced to fail the grade 
for every 18 hectares of damage if farmland is completely held by agricultural units of less 
than 10 hectares. Column 6 reveals an even bigger significant effect of -0.076 such that 
one child is induced to fail the grade for every 13 hectares if farmland is completely used 
by agricultural units of less than 5 hectares. 
Table 4-8 shows the results for random effects estimations similar to the one 
before only with the share of students not promoted and the share of students 
withdrawing from school before the end of the school year as separate dependent 
variables. These two categories constitute the aggregate of students failing the grade, i.e., 
100 percent minus the completion share.40 While we are ultimately interested in the share 
of those failing the grade due to the disaster for whatever reason an analysis of these 
categories separately may still be useful to learn more about the consequences of disasters. 
  












Farmland affected / rural schoolchild 0.0078 0.0164* -0.0154* 0.0314** -0.0067 0.0255**
(0.0071) (0.0099) (0.0093) (0.0158) (0.0047) (0.0126)
Share of subsistence farmland 0.0425*** 0.004 0.0523*** 0.0033
(0.0086) (0.0067) (0.0131) (0.0099)
Farmland affected / rural schoolchild 0.0703* -0.0512* 0.0907** -0.0649*
      x Share of subsistence farmland (0.0383) (0.0280) (0.0439) (0.0333)
Constant 0.1076*** 0.0952*** 0.1060*** 0.0950*** 0.1064*** 0.0951***
(0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R^2 0.006 0.009 0.022 0.010 0.019 0.010
Chi2 62.06 97.57 91.03 98.77 84.10 99.17






Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. Significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
The point estimates for farmland affected by disaster per rural student indicate 
that about two thirds of those students who fail the grade because of a disaster shock do 
so because of withdrawal from school while about one third remains in school but is not 
promoted at the end of the year. Yet, the error bounds are too large to distinguish the 
                                                 
40 A marginal difference between the sum of non-promotion and withdrawal share compared to 100 percent 
minus the promotion share can arise from students deceasing throughout the year who do not belong to either 
category. 
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effect sizes with certainty. When looking at the middle and right panels with a subsistence 
farmland effect plus its interaction, a different pattern emerges: it seems as if subsistence 
farming is much more associated with non-promotion than with withdrawal. The share of 
subsistence farmland is in both cases strongly associated with higher non-promotion but 
not higher withdrawal shares (second row). The average effect of damaged farmland is 
negative on the non-promotion share and positive on the withdrawal share (first row). In 
contrast, the interaction effect expresses that, compared to the average effect, a disaster in 
subsistence farmland areas drives up the non-promotion share and decreases the 
withdrawal share (third row). It is, however, unclear if the effects can be distinguished 
statistically. One possible reason for this pattern is that the rules for failing students due 
to insufficient attendance may be more relaxed in areas where many children frequently 
have to work in the fields. Another possibility is that workers in poorer subsistence farm 
areas may be more inclined to leave their children in school without intention to 
complete, e.g., for the benefit of free school meals. 
Table 4-9 shows the results from random effects estimation on the sub-samples of 
boys and girls with the completion share of students as the dependent variable. In both 
cases, there is a negative effect of disaster affected farmland on the within-gender 
promotion share. This effect is only significant for boys, and the point estimate for boys 
(-0.030) is stronger than for girls (-0.020). Similarly, the disaster effect is stronger for boys 
than girls for the interaction with the share of subsistence farmland. However, the error 
bounds of these estimates are large such that equal effects for boys and girls cannot be 
rejected.  
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Table 4-9. Disaster Impact on Grade Completion for Boys and Girls from Random Effects 
Estimation 
 
Dep. Variable: Share Completed [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Farmland affected / rural schoolchild -0.0299*** -0.0212*** -0.0200 -0.0214
(0.0075) (0.0080) (0.0146) (0.0197)
Share of subsistence farmland (<5 has) -0.0476*** -0.0448** -0.0437** -0.0665*** -0.0669*** -0.0659***
(0.0179) (0.0178) (0.0178) (0.0187) (0.0190) (0.0190)
Farmland affected / rural schoolchild -0.0618 -0.1195* 0.0102 -0.0480
   x Share of subsistence farmland (<5 has) (0.0768) (0.0620) (0.0536) (0.0300)
Constant 0.7980*** 0.7979*** 0.7978*** 0.7984*** 0.7984*** 0.7983***
(0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R^2 0.014 0.015 0.014 0.016 0.016 0.016
Chi2 117.50 126.90 107.50 137.70 138.80 140.20
Observations 4218 4218 4218 4221 4221 4221
Boys Girls
 
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. Significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
Table 4-10 displays the results from random effects estimation on the share of 
non-promotion and withdrawal for boys and girls, for farmland affected and separately 
for affected farmland interacted with the two shares of smallholdings. For boys, all 
estimates suggest that the majority of grade failure due to disaster damage comes from 
non-promotion, not withdrawal. For girls, the picture is more ambiguous: the estimate for 
average affected farmland suggests that the effect for girls comes through withdrawal. 
When including the interaction effect, however, the pattern is the same as before: disaster 
shocks on subsistence farmland increase non-promotion, not withdrawal. 
  












A. Farmland affected / rural schoolchild 0.0216 0.0084 -0.0027 0.0226**
(0.0132) (0.0118) (0.0088) (0.0114)
B. Farmland affected / rural schoolchild 0.0091 0.0118 -0.0159* 0.0370***
(0.0160) (0.0158) (0.0091) (0.0133)
     Farmland affected / rural schoolchild 0.0897 -0.0241 0.0939** -0.1026**
     x Share of subsistence farmland (<5ha) (0.0640) (0.0408) (0.0394) (0.0410)
Observations 4218 4218 4221 4221
Boys Girls
 
Note: Results from random effects regression including the share of subsistence farmland and year dummies. 
Robust standard errors in brackets. 
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Overall, the results suggest that withdrawal from school, and possibly child labor, 
is not the only channel through which economic shocks hinder the school progression of 
rural children. Especially in areas characterized by subsistence farmland, disasters do not 
drive children out of school but lead to higher non-promotion shares. One possible 
explanation is that disasters induce a shift of time allocation from learning and homework 
to actual work in the labor market or tasks in the household which prevent sufficient 
learning achievement for grade promotion. As a result, the main counteracting policy 
could be both financial relief for households to deter child work but also improvements 
in the curriculum to transmit the learning materials more effectively in the available time. 
4.6  Conclusion 
This essay is one of the first to address the detrimental effects of climate change 
on human capital formation by estimating the effect of natural hazard damage in hectares 
of farmland on grade completion rates in rural Peru. I find that there is a significant 
detrimental impact of natural disasters on school progression. On average, 42 hectares of 
affected farmland are predicted to cause on student not to complete the grade. The 
estimate thus accounts for a mean prediction of about 1500 failing students in three years. 
The frequency and severity of climatic events is predicted to increase in the future thus 
creating more damage to human capital formation.  
The focus of this paper is narrow as it only considers grade completion effects of 
farmland which is destroyed by catastrophic events. We can imagine many more channels 
of climatic events to affect the supply and demand of education, especially preventing 
children to constantly attend school and thus disrupting learning. Examples are the 
destruction of transportation and schooling infrastructure or health effects on teachers 
and students. Economic effects do not only stem from disaster damage. Maybe more 
importantly, temperature changes affect the productivity of farmland.  Also, climate 
change is predicted to spur migration movements in developing countries which will 
certainly also reduce the amount of schooling attainable for children. Certainly, there is 
much more to learn about these effects to design appropriate coping strategies and 
prevent the loss of human capital which is so crucial for developing countries. 
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5  Connecting the Unobserved Dots: A 
Decomposition Analysis of 
Earnings Inequality Changes in 
Urban Argentina, 1980-2002 
 
5.1  Introduction 
Earnings inequality in Argentina decreased during the 1980s and then rose during 
the 1990s.41  During the 1990s, the rise in inequality was partially driven by increases in 
the returns to education. Candidate explanations for the increase in the returns to 
education include trade-related changes in production, changes in institutions like the 
minimum wage and union membership, and skill-biased technical change (SBTC). 
Available evidence suggests that the first two candidate explanations do not appear to 
have driven changes in returns to education, leaving skill-biased technical change as the 
most likely cause. We examine the Argentina case for changes in the returns to 
unobserved skill by decomposing the variance of earnings over time. The decomposition 
shows that the residual wage variance increased in Argentina in the 1990s. Under plausible 
assumptions, this implies that the returns to unobserved skill have risen. Following on 
similar analysis done for the United States, we interpret the increase in the returns to 
unobserved skill as evidence for skill-biased technical change. 
                                                 
41 This chapter is based on Demombynes and Metzler (2008). Chapter 5: A Decomposition Analysis of Earnings Inequality Changes in Urban Argentina 
To decompose changes in the variance of earnings, we employ Lemieux’s (2002) 
semi-parametric re-weighting technique.  The method accounts for a change in the 
composition of observable workers’ characteristics over time, allowing us to estimate a 
counterfactual wage distribution which holds initial population characteristics constant 
over time. The change in the overall variance of wages can be decomposed into changes 
due to changes in observed skills, changes in the returns to observed skills, and changes in 
the returns to unobserved skill.  
The change in the returns to unobserved skill also has the potential to explain a 
puzzle regarding informal labor in Argentina. Argentina has seen a long-run shift from 
formal to informal wage employment. During the 1990s rates of informal salaried 
employment increased while at the same the wages of informal workers, relative to formal 
workers fell. The growing gap in wages between formal and informal workers is not 
explained by the rising returns to education.  The growing gap may be driven, however, 
by changes in the demand for unobserved skills driven by SBTC. If employers observe 
these skills, there will be less demand for workers without them. Skilled workers may thus 
be hired into formal jobs, which would consistently explain the increase in informality as 
well as the increasing informal-formal wage gap.  
We find that the returns to unobserved skill have increased particularly between 
the median and the bottom of the distribution, where informal salaried workers are 
concentrated. This is compatible with the idea that an increase in the returns to 
unobserved skill has been responsible for the increased gap between formal and informal 
wages.  
5.2  Background 
5.2.1  Earnings Inequality and the Distribution and Remuneration of 
Skills in Argentina 
Argentina has seen pronounced economic cycles in recent decades. The 1980s 
were characterized by mostly weak economic performance in Argentina. An economic 
crisis in 1981-82 was followed by a short recovery, and then a new crisis in 1985. In the 
late 1980s, Argentina was again marked by an economic crisis and then hyperinflation. A 
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new stabilization plan was initiated and a fixed exchange rate was implemented in April 
1991. The currency board was paired with a strategy of trade liberalization, deregulation 
and privatization, resulting in a stable economy for most of the 1990s. Signs of renewed 
crisis were felt by the end of the 1990s when the Argentina’s public debt had mounted to 
unsustainable heights. International financial markets put huge pressure onto the 
Argentine currency, culminating in the abolishment of the currency board in January 
2002. Since 2003, the Argentine economy has been recovering. 
 















Note: Considered are hourly wages for full-time workers above age 15 with one occupation. 
 
The 1980s and the 1990s show very different patterns of earnings inequality 
changes (see Figure 5-1).  The first half of the 1980s in Argentina was characterized by 
falling earnings inequality. Between 1980 and 1986 the ratio of the 90th to the 10th 
percentile of the earnings distribution fell from 5.5 to 5.2 for men and from 5.1 to 4.5 for 
women. Following the late 80s period of high inflation, during which measured wage 
inequality jumped temporarily due to increased measurement error, wage inequality in 
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1992 was slightly lower than in 1986. Then, between 1992 and 2002, wage inequality 
increased sharply; the 90:10 ratio jumped from 5.0 to 7.9 for men and from 4.1 to 7.4 for 
women.  
The changes in earnings inequality are in part driven by changes in the levels and 
skills and their returns.42 As Table 5-1 shows, the returns to higher education decreased 
during the 1980s and increased in the 1990s.43 The returns of completed high school 
education compared to primary education for men were 0.64 in 1980, dropping 0.45 in 
1992, and rising to 0.56 in 2002. For women, the marginal returns of high school 
education were 0.59 in 1980, 0.37 in 1992, and 0.72 in 2002.  
 
Table 5-1. Marginal Returns to Education Levels 
 









1980 0.64 0.59 0.59 0.53
1986 0.52 0.70 0.54 0.45
1992 0.45 0.66 0.37 0.38
1998 0.47 0.98 0.66 0.69




Note: Marginal returns to education are estimated by specifying standard Mincer wage regressions, 
in which the dependent variable is log hourly wages from principal occupations for adult full-time 
workers with one single job. Regressors include a quadratic in potential labor market experience 
and dummies for 6 six educational categories: incomplete and complete primary, high school and 
college education. The marginal returns to a completed college education are calculated compared 
to a completed high school education, and the marginal returns to a high school education, are 
calculated compared to completed primary education. 
 
The returns to college fell for women and grew slightly for men during the 1980s 
and then increased strongly in the 1990s. The returns to a completed college education 
                                                 
42 We use the terms “return to education” and “educational wage premium” as synonyms in this essay. The 
coefficients of educational variables estimated in standard Mincer wage regressions are potentially biased due to 
omitted human capital variables, such as ability, which may be correlated with education. While the causality 
from education to earnings in undebated, one must thus be cautious about strong inferences about the 
magnitude of effect, i.e., the actual return. Still, it has become common to refer to the education coefficient in 
any statistical earnings model as the "(Mincer) returns to education" (Card 1999). An extended discussion on the 
causality of education on earnings is beyond the scope of this paper. For a more detailed analysis of changes in 
the returns to education in Argentina, see Giovagnoli, Fiszbein, Patrinos (2005) and Margot (2001). 
43  Marginal returns to education are estimated by specifying standard Mincer wage regressions, where the 
dependent variable is log hourly wages from principal occupations for adult full-time workers. Regressors 
include educational dummies and potential labor market experience calculated as age minus years of education 
minus 6. 
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compared to a completed high school education were 0.59 for men in 1980, 0.66 in 1992, 
and 1.03 in 2002. For women the returns of college education were 0.53 in 1980, falling to 
0.38 in 1992 and rising to 0.79 in 2002. 
The distribution of educational attainment in the labor force has also changed,. 
Overall, there was a steady educational upgrading in the population, as shown in Table 
5-2.  Between 1980 and 2002, the fraction of full-time workers with a high school or 
college degree of each gender doubled, going from 23 to 48 percent for men and from 34 
to 66 percent for women.  
 















1980 19.7 37.7 19.3 11.1 6.8 5.4 100.0
1986 15.3 33.3 21.1 13.8 7.9 8.5 100.0
1992 9.1 33.4 21.8 17.8 8.6 9.4 100.0
1998 6.9 28.5 24.1 18.6 12.2 9.7 100.0














1980 16.0 32.7 17.5 18.7 7.4 7.7 100.0
1986 13.8 28.5 18.0 21.6 8.2 9.8 100.0
1992 6.6 28.1 17.3 24.9 9.7 13.5 100.0
1998 5.4 20.7 17.4 24.1 15.8 16.6 100.0
2002 3.7 18.5 12.4 28.1 17.6 19.8 100.0
 
Note: Population considered are single-job workers age 15 and above, working 30 and more hours weekly. 
 
The returns to labor market experience have also evolved, but with diverging 
patterns for men and women. As Table 5-3 shows, the returns to experience fell for men 
between 1980 and 1992, and then rose back to 1980 levels by 2002. The return to 
experience evaluated at 20 years was 0.77 in 1980, fell to 0.69 in 1992 and rose back to 
0.77 in 2002. In contrast, returns to experience grew constantly for women over the two 
decades. Evaluated at 20 years, returns increased from 0.53 in 1980 to 0.61 in 1992 and 
0.73 in 2002.44
 
                                                 
44 It is recognized that “potential labor market experience” measured as age minus years of education minus school 
entry age most likely overstates actual labor market experience more for women than for men due to child bearing 
and the traditional division of labor in the family. This results in estimated returns which are biased downwards. 
See e.g. Blau and Kahn (1997). 
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10 Years 20 Years 30 Years
1980 0.039 -0.00055358 0.384 0.769 1.153
MEN 1992 0.035 -0.00049999 0.345 0.690 1.035
2002 0.039 -0.00046859 0.385 0.771 1.156
1980 0.027 -0.00045122 0.265 0.531 0.796
WOMEN 1992 0.031 -0.00052025 0.305 0.610 0.914
2002 0.037 -0.0004366 0.366 0.731 1.097
Coefficient on Return to Experience Evaluated at
 
Note: Returns to experience are estimated in standard Mincer wage regressions, in which the dependent variable is 
log hourly wages from principal occupations for adult full-time workers with one single job. Regressors include a 
quadratic in potential labor market experience and dummies for 6 six educational categories: incomplete and 
complete primary, high school and college education.  
 
Table 5-4 depicts changes in the distribution of labor market experience among 
full-time workers. While Argentina experiences a gradual ageing of the population, the 
distribution of labor market experience remains roughly constant between 1980 and 2002. 
This fact may be due to longer periods of education.  
 
Table 5-4. Shares of Workers by Groups of Years of Experience (in Percent) 
 
MEN [ 0 - 10 ) [ 10 - 20 ) [ 20 - 30 ) ≥ 30 All
1980 18.5 23.1 21.6 36.8 100.0
1986 17.4 25.2 22.9 34.6 100.0
1992 22.4 23.9 21.1 32.7 100.0
1998 21.7 23.4 22.3 32.6 100.0
2002 18.9 24.1 24.0 33.0 100.0
WOMEN [ 0 - 10 ) [ 10 - 20 ) [ 20 - 30 ) ≥ 30 All
1980 30.6 23.1 18.9 27.4 100.0
1986 27.2 23.6 18.9 30.3 100.0
1992 29.9 19.0 23.7 27.5 100.0
1998 30.7 21.5 19.5 28.3 100.0
2002 28.2 23.7 20.9 27.1 100.0  
 
Note: Population considered are single-job workers age 15 and above, working 30 and more 
hours weekly 
 
5.2.2  Potential Explanations for Changes in Earnings Inequality 
There are several possible explanations for the rise in inequality that has taken 
place in Argentina in the 1990s, in particular the increase in the returns to education. 
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Candidate explanations include institutional changes, such as changes in the minimum 
wage and union membership, trade-related changes in production, and skill-biased 
technological change (SBTC). We briefly consider whether institutional changes or trade 
may be responsible and then describe the evidence for SBTC in more detail. 
A. Institutional Changes 
Some have argued that the increase in wage inequality observed in the 1980s in the 
United States was driven largely by dramatic declines in unionization rates and the real 
value of the minimum wage (see, for example, Dinardo, Fortin, and Lemieux 1996). 
Although effects of unions and the minimum wage on employment could go in either 
direction, it is generally expected that unions and the minimum wage reduce wage 
inequality among the employed by boosting the wages of those in the lower part of the 
wage distribution. 
While data on unionization rates in Argentina is not collected consistently, 
estimates from household surveys show that union membership among non-agricultural 
salaried workers in Greater Buenos Aires increased only slightly from 45 percent in the 
beginning of the 1980s to 49 percent in 1990. Over the next decade, it fell to 42 percent 
in 2001 (Marshall 2005). The relationship between union membership, policies, and labor 
market outcomes is complex, particularly in a country like Argentina where unions have a 
strong voice in political decisions. But narrowly examined, the fairly small drop in union 
membership is not large enough to explain the increases in wage inequality that took place 
in the 1990s.  
Changes in minimum wage also have the potential to influence wage inequality. 
The real value of the minimum wage greatly eroded during the period of hyperinflation of 
the late 1980s and early 1990s. Because it dropped to a point below the wages of 
essentially all workers, the minimum wage cannot have contributed to changes in 
inequality between the early and late 1980s. However, it is conceivable that the minimum 
wage during the 1990s did have some effect. The nominal wage was increased from 97 
pesos to 200 pesos in 1993 and remained there until 2003. Between 1992 and the end of 
the fixed exchange rate in December 2001, the minimum wage remained essentially 
unchanged in real terms.  
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As a first order effect, the increase in the minimum wage that took place in 1992 
would be expected to decrease wage inequality, at least among formal salaried workers. As 
Maloney and Mendez (2003) point out, the minimum wage can have complex effects on 
the wage distribution, beyond those on formal salaried workers near the minimum wage. 
In many countries, the minimum wage has both “numeraire” and “lighthouse” effects 
that spill over to the informal sector. The numeraire effect is the bunching of wages at 
round multiples of the minimum wage, due to the fact that the statutory minimum wage is 
often used as the numeraire for wage negotiations. The lighthouse effect refers to the 
concentration of informal workers (for whom the minimum wage is not enforced) at the 
minimum. Using 1998 EPH data, Maloney and Mendez find strong evidence of both 
effects in Argentina. Likewise, Khamis (2007) examines the effects of changes in the 
minimum wage 1993 and 2004 on wages and finds positive effects on both formal and 
informal wages, with a larger effect for informal wages.  
Given these effects, it is difficult to determine with certainty what the wage 
distribution would have looked like with a lower minimum wage. Overall, however, it 
seems likely that both the direct effect of the minimum wage increase and the numeraire 
and lighthouse effects tended to raise the wages of those in the lower part of the 
distribution, reducing inequality even while overall wage inequality increased. 
B. Trade 
Time trends at first glance suggest that widening inequality may be due to the trade 
liberalization that took place over the course of the 1990s, and a wide international 
literature has considered the possible effects of trade opening on wage inequality and the 
returns to skill. Theory suggests that liberalization towards countries with large numbers 
of unskilled workers may increase the gap between wages of the skilled and unskilled. 
Porto (2003) shows evidence that a substantial portion of Argentine imports are 
substantially unskilled labor-intensive, which lends some credibility to the hypothesis that 
trade is behind the increase in returns to skill. Using a Computable General Equilibrium 
approach, Cicowiez (2003) finds that declining import tariffs increased the gap between 
skilled and unskilled workers only to a negligible amount, explaining between 0 and 6 
percent of the change, depending on model and assumptions. A more direct test of the 
hypothesis is carried out by Galiani and Sanguinetti (2003) by testing whether sectors 
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where import penetration deepened are also the sectors where a higher increase in wage 
inequality is observed. They find some evidence that this is the case but conclude that 
trade deepening can only explain a small portion of the observed rise in wage inequality. 
C. Technological Change 
Skill-biased technological change denotes the phenomenon by which relative 
wages may change in a country due to the adoption of new technologies. If such 
technologies are complementary to skills, then workers with these skills will benefit from 
increased productivity of these skills and consequently increased returns or compensation 
of these skills. The wage distribution will spread as the workers without the 
complementary skills are less in demand and their relative wages will fall, resulting in 
increased wage inequality.45
A line of literature for the U.S. starting with Katz and Murphy (1992) looks at 
SBTC in a supply and demand framework. The approach in these studies is to divide 
employment into various cells, e.g. by age-gender-education, and examine the relationship 
between changes in wages and employment by cell over time, applying assumptions about 
the elasticity of substitution between workers in different groups. The SBTC literature has 
been criticized on a number of grounds (see for example Card and Dinardo, 2005). The 
most substantial critique is that the effect of SBTC is always a residual out of a model-
based estimation, and the estimates tend to be highly sensitive to the particular 
assumptions that go into the model. This is because the “facts” to be explained by the 
analysis are the changes in the cell means. The presence of technological change is 
inferred by a failure of the model to rationalize the co-movements of wages and 
employment for different groups over the sample period.  
Other studies apply a variance decomposition analysis over time. The objective is 
to split up the variance over time into its components, the variance within and between 
groups of the same education and experience. Changes in the returns to observed skills, 
such as education, change the distance between the mean wages of different population 
sub-groups. An increase in the returns to higher education will drive the sub-group means 
further away from each other, thus increasing earnings dispersion. SBTC might be the 
                                                 
45 For an extended discussion on this, see Acemoglu (2002). 
  111Chapter 5: A Decomposition Analysis of Earnings Inequality Changes in Urban Argentina 
reason for such an increase in returns to education. Since very few individual skills are 
observed in the data, individuals with heterogeneous unobserved skills will look alike to 
the econometrician. If the returns to some unobserved skill change, this will be noted as 
changes in the earnings dispersion within sub-groups, the residual variance. With certain 
assumptions in the decomposition process one can infer changes in the returns to 
unobserved skills. People who argue for SBTC have also claimed that SBTC may also 
change unobserved skill returns, and that changes in these returns may be taken as 
indications for SBTC.  
Lemieux (2006) points out the role that changes in the composition of the 
workforce have for the residual variance. Taking composition effects appropriately into 
account, he finds that an increase in returns to unobserved skill may have occurred in the 
United States in the 1980s but did not in the 1990s when technological progress is widely 
believed to have taken place. The fact that the returns to unobserved skill increase only in 
the 1990s is also incongruent with the consistent increase in the returns to education over 
both the 1980s and 1990s. Overall, Lemieux concludes that the pattern of changes in the 
returns to unobserved skill in the United States does not lend support to the SBTC 
hypothesis. 
In the literature in the U.S. and other countries, the lack of evidence for other 
explanations is interpreted to imply that SBTC may be behind increases in the returns to 
education. The same holds true for Argentina. Several reviews suggest that changes in 
technology are the proximate cause of changes in returns to education in Argentina. 
Giovagnoli, Fiszbein, and Patrinos (2005) suggest that increased demand for skills may 
have driven the increasing returns to education observed in the 1990s. Analysis in World 
Bank (2003) also shows that the patterns observed for that decade are consistent with 
skill-biased technical change. Acosta and Gasparini (2007) show that the wage premium 
for a college education increased more in manufacturing industries with higher rates of 
physical investment. They also find that this premium grew more in sectors which faced 
strong import competition. 
In an extensive analysis of labor market data from Gran Buenos Aires, Gasparini 
(2003) presents many pieces of evidence in favor of SBTC as an explanation for the 
increase in inequality which Argentina experienced in the 1990s. He especially contrasts 
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the economically frustrating experience of import substitution industrialization until the 
end of the 1980s with the significant productivity increase experienced in the 1990s 
through reforms and international market integration. Measures of technological progress 
are hard to obtain, but increases in private investment as a proportion of GDP, a fall in 
the average age of the capital stock, and a strong increase in the imports of capital goods 
are indirect evidence of the incorporation of new technologies in the Argentine economy 
after 1991. Given the parallelism of reforms and the immediate nature of liberalization 
and opening of the economy to international competition, this might be regarded a “true 
technological shock” to Argentina.  
In this context, trade and technological change may clearly be connected. Trade 
opening enables the import and adoption of technology-intensive foreign capital and 
goods. However, when comparing the two direct channels, import penetration of 
abundant-skill intensive goods and technological change, several studies, including for 
Argentina, underline the dominance of the technology channel (see Gasparini 2003; 
Acosta and Gasparini 2004). 
5.3  Theoretical Framework for Earnings Inequality and 
Returns to Skill 
This section presents the theoretical fundamentals of the analysis of changes in the 
distribution of wages, incorporating the role of changes in the distribution and 
remuneration of skills, such as education and experience. We follow the methodology 
employed by Lemieux (2006) for the United States. The approach can be considered a 
generalization of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of means to the case of an entire 
distribution. 
In his seminal work, Mincer (1974) laid the foundation for a vast strand of 
research on human capital earnings. He specified the earnings function  
(1)  it t it t it X w ε β α + + = log  
where   is the hourly wage rate of individual i  at time t,  it w t α  is a constant,   is 
a vector of observed personal characteristics, 
it X
t β  is a coefficient vector, and  it ε  is the 
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standard regression residual. Personal characteristics usually include a person’s education, 
either in years of schooling or in a vector of dummies for educational attainment, and a 
quadratic of age or alternatively potential labor market experience.   can be understood 
as a distribution of human capital and 
it X
t β  as its price.  it ε  contains the unexplained 
portion of the wage, which is usually quite large due to the vast amount of personal 
characteristics that a researcher cannot observe in the data. In the literature on returns to 
unobserved skills, the residual is interpreted as the true residual (including measurement 
error)  μit plus the product of the return p to unobserved skills at time t with the 
unobserved skill vector e of individual i: 
(2)   it it t it e p μ ε + =  
The variance, as a standard measure of dispersion, of wages is thus  




t t t x t t V σ β β + Ω =
where   is the variance-covariance matrix of  , and   is the variance of the 
error term. Changes in the variance over time can thus be caused by several factors: (a) 
changes in the distribution of observed characteristics  , (b) changes in the returns to 
observed skills, (c) changes in the distribution of unobserved characteristics  , (d) 
changes in the returns to unobserved skills, or (e) changes in measurement error.  





For equation (2) to have some empirical content, it is necessary to impose some 
assumption on the distribution of skills. Since both unobserved skill and the returns to 
unobserved skill are “unobserved,” some assumption is needed. The usual assumption is 
that the distribution of unobserved skills among workers with the same observed skills is 
stable over time.46 In other words, the conditional distribution function does not vary over 
time: 
                                                 
46 This assumption is used in Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993), Chay and Lee (2000), and Lemieux (2006). 
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(3)    for all time periods t. ) | ( ) | ( it it t it it t X e F X e F = 47
Note that the stronger assumption sometimes implicitly used in the literature, 
which is that the unconditional distribution of unobserved skills is stable over time, is clearly 
incorrect. It is well established in both the theoretical and empirical literature that 
heteroskedasticity is pervasive in wage regressions, and wage dispersion increases with 
both education and experience. Consequently, changes in the composition of the 
workforce, i.e. in the relative size of education-experience groups, will change the 
unconditional distribution of unobserved skills, even with no change in the return to 
unobserved skills.48
Although the issue is sometimes ignored, it is crucial to control for composition 
effects when considering the changes over time in the returns to unobserved skill. The 
role of composition effects is illustrated by considering the variance of wages. Consider 
the case where observed skills,  , are divided up into j cells. Then, the unconditional 
variance of unobserved skills is the weighted sum of the conditional variances for the j 
subgroups. The weights are simply the shares, 
it X
jt θ  , of workers in experience-education 
group j at time t: 
(4)   .  ) | ( ) ( j e Var e Var it j jt it ∑ = θ
Give the assumption that the conditional variances are stable over time, this 
equation can be written as follows: 
(5)  , 
2 ) ( j j jt it e Var σ θ ∑ =
where   for all t. 
2 ) | ( j it j e Var σ =
                                                 
47 As pointed out by Lemieux (2006), this assumption may be problematic e.g. if there are cohort effects: 
younger cohorts could have a different distribution of unobserved skills conditional on education, e.g. due to 
change in school quality or educational content. 
48 This point was raised by Lemieux (2004) and is also explained by Card and Dinardo (2005). 
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Note that because the conditional variances,  , are different for every skill 
group, changes over time in the shares in each group (e.g. increased education levels or 




The residual variance of wages, which is what can be estimated in wage 
regressions, is given by taking variances of equation (2) – ignoring measurement error – 
and substituting in equation (5): 
(6) 
2 2 ) ( * ) ( ) ( ) ( j j jt t it t it t it p e Var p Var e p Var Var σ θ ε ∑ = = = . 
What we are interested in is how the price of unobserved skills, , may have 
changed over time. A change in the residual variance of wages can only be interpreted as a 
change in the price of unobserved skills if the skill shares in the workforce, 
t p
jt θ , are held 
constant over time. Note again that the actual skill shares tend to change over time, as 
education levels increase and the workforce ages. 
Some empirical papers ignore this problem, and treat changes in the residual 
variance of wages as being equivalent to changes in the price of unobserved skills. There 
are, however, multiple ways to correct for the problem. One way is to calculate the 
residual variance at counterfactual values of the shares   that are held constant over 
time. We can rearrange (6) as follows: 
*
j θ
(7)    ∑ =
j j t jt it p Var ) ( ) (
2 2σ θ ε
If we hold the shares constant, the variance becomes the following: 
(8)    ∑ =
j j t j it p Var ) ( ) (
2 2 * * σ θ ε
The within-group variances,  , can be computed for each skill group j, if the 
number of skills groups is small enough relative to the sample size that there are 
substantial numbers of observations in each skill group. The overall variance at the 
2 2
j t p σ
                                                 
49 This is illustrated in Card and Dinardo (2005) for the simplest case, with just two skill groups. 
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counterfactual shares can then be calculated, using shares either in the initial year, the final 
year, or the average of the two. The variance can be calculated using all three methods as 
a sensitivity test. Changes in this “counterfactual” variance provide an estimate of changes 
in the returns to unobserved skill. 
A more convenient way to correct for composition changes is to re-weight the 
data for the purposes of calculating the residual variance so that the distribution and 
prices of observable skills at time t+1 is identical to the distribution and price of skills at 
time t. The re-weighting procedure is in the spirit of Dinardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) 
and is described in Lemieux (2002) and Lemieux (2004).  The advantages to the re-
weighting procedure are two-fold. First, it can be applied even when the data is divided 
into fine experience-education cells. Second, it provides a whole counterfactual wage 
distribution and thus makes it possible to compute measures of residual wage dispersion 
other than the variance, e.g. the ratios between different percentiles of the residual 
distribution.  
It should further be noted that measurement error is an additional factor which 
may, if its extent changes over time, introduce a change in residual variance which is 
unrelated to unobserved skills or returns. We already mentioned the case of 
hyperinflation, where measurement error most likely renders any analysis useless. Our 
solution to this problem is to consider years for comparison which are less affected by 
inflation. This is most relevant for the 1980s, where we consider 1980 and 1986 the most 
appropriate base years. Apart from that we have no means of analyzing if and how 
measurement error has changed over time in the EPH and thus assume it constant.  
5.4  Data and Estimation Issues 
The data used for this analysis is the household survey Encuesta Permanente de 
Hogares (EPH) of Argentina which has been carried out by Argentina’s statistical office 
(INDEC) since 1972 and is used as the primary source of generating official 
unemployment rates. The survey includes comparable labor market information from 
1980 through 2003 for the province of Gran Buenos Aires (GBA). The GBA sample 
encompasses the capital city of Buenos Aires and the surrounding Province of Buenos 
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Aires. According to the Argentine Census, 46 percent of the Argentinean population lived 
in this area. As Argentina is mostly urban, trends observed in Buenos Aires are often 
considered representative for Argentina as a whole. 
More urban centers of Argentina were later added to the sample over time, 
totaling 28 major provincial cities in the most recent incarnations of the survey. There is 
data with comparable coverage since 1992 for 16 main urban conglomerates in Argentina 
(henceforth ARG16). Until 2003, the survey was conducted on a semi-annual basis (May 
and October) before the questionnaire and methodology changed substantially. 
We investigate the time series for GBA from 1980-2002, always using the October 
round of the survey50. For the wage analysis we focus on real hourly wages of workers 
with one single job only as reported in the EPH questionnaire51. To convert nominal 
wages into real wages we use INDEC’s historic general consumer price index (IPC) for 
Gran Buenos Aires and deflate all values to constant October 2000 Pesos.  
To underline the explanatory power of the results from the smaller GBA sample, 
the decomposition analysis is also carried out using the ARG16 sample from 1992-2002 
as a robustness check. For the analysis, the sample of urban centers is not continuously 
expanded to 28 cities as survey coverage increases over time. This is because changes in 
the survey’s coverage can have substantial effects on the residual variance induced by 
geographical differences, which we cannot observe. This may be the case even if there are 
no important changes in the observable means. Regional variation in the ARG16 sample 
is accounted for by adjusting all incomes to the level of GBA, using a one-time 
comparison of price levels in 2001. This method effectively incorporates the assumption 
that relative regional price differences have not changed over time. However, due to the 
convertibility regime from 1991 to 2001 and the according price stability this assumption 
may be justified for most years of the ARG16 sample, yet arguable for later years. 
                                                 
50 The May round of 2003 could be used to expand the data by another half a year, however in an analysis of 
variance this might be rather misleading due to seasonality effects on employment a n d  w a g e s .  D a t a  f r o m  
INDEC clearly shows that there is considerably higher economic activity in May than in October.  
51 To avoid effects stemming from changes in the incidence of multiple-job holders this paper focuses on wages 
from the principal occupation, only. In order to do that one has to discard workers with more than one 
occupation in order to establish consistency of the data series over time. Before 1995, hourly wage data is only 
available for those workers with one single job. Even though this may be a minor point, to our knowledge this 
adjustment to guarantee consistency has not been done yet in any empirical research using EPH data.  
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Data inspection reveals a strong spike in all wage dispersion figures centered 
around 1989, the worst year of hyperinflation in Argentina (see Figure 5-6 and Figure 5-7, 
appendix). Prices soared up to nearly 4000 percent annually, which led to the introduction 
of the Argentine currency board in April 1991. Measurement error is likely to be higher in 
times of high inflation, if people have to recall their earnings in an environment of 
constantly changing prices and wages. Second, during hyperinflation, prices and wages 
change monthly, weekly or even daily. Since surveys cannot be carried out at the same 
point in time for the whole sample, sequenced interviewing will introduce an upward bias 
to the wage variance in times of high price volatility and wage contract turnover 
Thus, the figures for the 1980s must be analyzed with caution. Using a base year 
with a bloated wage variance might lead to wrong conclusions of variance changes over 
time. What matters for the data quality from periods of high inflation is not only the 
yearly inflation but also the inflation figures from the month of interviewing. We use 1980 
as base years, as there was moderate inflation during both the whole year and in the 
survey month of October. 
We apply the reweighing methodology to analyze changes in the residual variance 
over time against a base year by re-weighting the observations of the more recent year. 
The educational and demographic distribution of the Argentine labor force has changed 
noticeably since the 1980s. In particular, the overall improvement in educational 
attainment may have increased wage dispersion over time.  
The decomposition is carried out stepwise, following Lemieux (2002): first, a 
counterfactual wage distribution is generated, using the later year’s observable skill 
distribution and the base year’s estimated coefficients on observed skills. The difference 
between the inequality indicators of the final year and those of the counterfactual 
distribution can be attributed to changes in the returns to observed skills. In a second 
step, the counterfactual distribution is re-weighted as detailed above. The difference 
between inequality indicators of the two distributions is ascribed to changes in the skill 
distribution in the population. Finally, the difference between the distributional indicators 
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of the base year and the counterfactual distribution using both, base year weights and 
returns, is the effect of changing returns to unobserved skills.52  
5.5  Analysis of Earnings Inequality in Gran Buenos Aires 
Table 5-5 and Table  5-6 present variance decomposition results for men and 
women, for the periods 1980-1992 and 1992-2002 which we focus on separately since 
they correspond to two different economic policy regimes.53 Four measures of wage 
dispersion are depicted: the variance of log hourly wages, and the 90:10, 50:10 and 90:50 
percentile ratios. The first three rows of each table show values in the base year and the 
final year, and the absolute changes. Rows four to six split up the change into three 
components and show how much of the overall change was caused by changes in each of 
the components: the returns to observed skills, the composition of observed skills in the 
workforce, and the returns to unobserved skills.  
5.5.1  Period 1980-1992 
Between 1980 and 1992, wage dispersion decreased for both men and women (see 
Table 5-5). For men, the variance of log wages dropped from 0.48 to 0.45 and the 90:10 
ratio from 5.5 to 5.0. Improvements in the education level of the workforce tended to 
increase the overall variance of wages, due to the fact that groups of workers with higher 
education have higher within-group wage dispersion. On the other hand, decreases in the 
returns to observed skills tended to decrease in the overall variance. The overall effect of 
falling returns to high school education and falling returns to experience dominates the 
inequality-increasing effect of rising returns to college education, which only improves the 
wages of the college-educated minority of the population. The results show that at the 
same time inequality among men was lowered due to decreasing returns to unobserved 
skill. 
                                                 
52 Decomposition results switching the order of the first two steps are qualitatively similar to the base case and 
can be obtained from the authors upon request. 
53 Decomposition results for the whole period 1980-2002 are presented in Table 5-14 of the appendix. 
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Table 5-5. Decomposition Results, 1980-1992 
Panel A. Men 
Var logwage 90/10 50/10 90/50
1992 0.449 5.036 1.892 2.662
1980 0.481 5.488 2.091 2.625
Change -0.032 -0.452 -0.199 0.037
Components of change:
Δ Returns to Observed Skills -0.040 -0.496 -0.084 -0.138
Δ Composition of Observed Skills 0.063 0.724 0.114 0.217
Δ Returns to Unobserved Skills -0.055 -0.681 -0.229 -0.043  
Panel B. Women 
Var logwage 90/10 50/10 90/50
1992 0.338 4.102 1.820 2.253
1980 0.465 5.065 2.101 2.411
Change -0.127 -0.963 -0.281 -0.157
Components of change:
Δ Returns to Observed Skills -0.094 -1.150 -0.180 -0.372
Δ Composition of Observed Skills 0.090 1.115 0.184 0.348
Δ Returns to Unobserved Skills -0.123 -0.929 -0.285 -0.133  
 
 
Note: Estimations for single-job workers age 15 or above working 30 or more hours weekly 
 
 
Figure 5-2 depicts the change in overall variance for men and women, and to what 
extent the change is a result of changes in the composition-adjusted residual variance. 
 
Figure 5-2. Change in Variance and Residual Variance, 1980-1992, Men and Women 























Change in Variance due to composition-adjusted residual























Change in Variance due to composition-adjusted residual
Simple Change in Variance
 
 
Note: Population considered are single-job workers age 15 and above, working 30 and more hours weekly 
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In 1980, the male wage distribution showed a higher 50:10 than 90:50 ratio. This 
imbalance is increased in the 1980s as the 50:10 ratio falls (from 2.1 to 1.9) while the 
90:50 ratio rises slightly (2.6 to 2.7). Composition effects, i.e., the increase in educated 
workers, increased inequality in the upper half. Changing returns to observed skills 
decrease inequality more in the upper half, mostly due to falling returns to experience. In 
contrast, the changes in the residual distribution decrease the 50:10 ratio more strongly, 
i.e., returns to unobserved skills affect the lower part of the distribution more.  
For women, the variance fell from 0.47 to 0.34 and the 90:10 ratio from 5.1 to 4.1. 
The drivers of the decrease are the same as for men: composition effects contributed to 
an increase in wage variance which was counteracted by falling returns to observed skill, 
where lowered returns to higher education dominate the effect of rising returns to 
experience. At the same time, decreasing returns to unobserved skill also lowered 
inequality among women. 
As for men, the changes of the 1980s increased the imbalance of the female 
distribution which has a higher inequality in the upper half: the 90:50 ratio fell less (2.4 to 
2.3) than the 50:10 ratio (2.1 to 1.8). The reason is the stronger decrease in returns to 
unobserved skill in the lower half of the distribution. Composition effects increased the 
90:50 more but changing returns to observed skills counteracted this effect: women in the 
labor market are on average more educated than male workers (see Table 5-2) but have 
less experience (Table 5-4), so they are overall more hurt by falling returns to education 
than helped by increasing returns to experience. 
To sum up, the patterns of the 1980s are similar for men and women: between 
1980 and 1992, a combination of falling or stagnant returns to higher education and 
changing returns to experience caused the between-group variance to decrease as the 
means of different education-experience groups moved closer together. Composition 
effects via educational upgrading of the workforce increased inequality as higher 
educational groups tend to have higher within-group wage variances. The results also 
suggest that the returns to unobserved skill decreased in the 1980s in Argentina, in line 
with returns to observed skills.  
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5.5.2  Period 1992-2002 
The 1990s show a substantially different picture from the 1980s (see Table 5-6). 
Male wage variance increased strongly, from 0.45 to 0.68, and the 90:10 ratio jumped 
from 5.0 to 7.9. The strongest drivers of this increase were changes in the returns to 
observed skills. To a smaller degree, composition effects and changing returns to 
unobserved skill also contributed to the increase. Figure 5-3 shows to what extent changes 
in the variance can be explained by changes in the composition-adjusted residual. 
 
Table 5-6. Decomposition Results, 1992-2002 
Panel A. Men 
Var logwage 90/10 50/10 90/50
2002 0.684 7.882 2.361 3.338
1992 0.449 5.036 1.892 2.662
Change 0.235 2.846 0.469 0.676
Components of change:
Δ Returns to Observed Skills 0.139 1.919 0.059 0.748
Δ Composition of Observed Skills 0.036 0.557 0.050 0.190
Δ Returns to Unobserved Skills 0.060 0.370 0.361 -0.262  
Panel B. Women 
Var logwage 90/10 50/10 90/50
2002 0.649 7.361 2.577 2.856
1992 0.338 4.102 1.820 2.253
Change 0.311 3.259 0.757 0.603
Components of change:
Δ Returns to Observed Skills 0.175 2.328 -0.070 0.955
Δ Composition of Observed Skills -0.002 -0.229 -0.156 0.024
Δ Returns to Unobserved Skills 0.137 1.161 0.983 -0.376  
 
Note: Population considered are single-job workers age 15 and above, working 30 and 
more hours weekly 
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Figure 5-3. Change in Variance and Residual Variance, 1992-2002, Men and Women 
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Change in Variance due to composition-adjusted residual
Simple Change in Variance
 
Note: Population considered are single-job workers age 15 and above, working 30 and more hours weekly 
 
For men, the 1990s also saw widening earnings inequality, measured both in terms 
of the 90:50 and 50:10 ratios. For changes to the 90:50 ratio, most of the inequality 
increase was due to changing returns to observed skill. The returns to university education 
grew much more than returns to secondary education, and the mean wage of the highly-
educated is strongly shifted upwards. Also, returns to experience increased, favoring more 
experienced workers who already have a higher within-group variance. Composition 
effects played a much smaller role, and returns to unobserved skills decreased in the 
upper distribution half. On the contrary, in the lower half of the distribution, the changing 
returns to education explain only about 13 percent of the inequality increase. However, 
increasing returns to unobserved skills explain almost 80 percent of the increase in the 
50:10 ratio. The contribution of the returns to unobserved skills to explain changes in the 
upper and lower half of the distribution are depicted in Figure 5-4. 
For women, the variance of wages also increased between 1992 and 2002: from 
0.34 to 0.65. The 90:10 ratio grew from 4.1 to 7.4. Composition effects played an almost 
negligible role for women, and were even slightly negative for the 90:10 ratio. Most of the 
variance growth was driven by increases in the returns to observed skills, followed by 
increases in the returns to unobserved skills.  
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Figure 5-4. Change in 90:50 and 50:10-ratio, 1992-2002, Men 

































Change in 90/50 due to composition-adjusted residual
































Change in 50/10 due to composition-adjusted residual
Simple Change in 50/10
 
Note: Population considered are single-job workers age 15 and above, working 30 and more hours weekly 
 
Figure 5-5. Change in 90:50 and 50:10-ratio, 1992-2002, Women 


































Change in 90/50 due to composition-adjusted residual

































Change in 50/10 due to composition-adjusted residual
Simple Change in 50/10
 
Note: Population considered are single-job workers age 15 and above, working 30 and more hours weekly 
 
The trends of the female wage distribution in the 1990s is very similar to that of 
men: inequality grew in both parts of the distribution, with the 50:10 ratio increasing from 
1.8 to 2.6 while the 90:50 ratio grew from just 2.3 to 2.9. Increasing returns to higher 
education and experience played the main role in spreading the upper half of the 
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distribution but no role in the lower half. Growing returns to unobserved skills strongly 
raised the lower half of the distribution but had a negative effect on the upper half, as in 
the case of men. The contribution of the returns to unobserved skill to explain changes in 
the upper and lower half of the distribution are shown in Figure 5-5. As for the case of 
men, the graphical series underlines the considerable difference in both parts of the 
distribution. 
The fact that composition effects of observed skills played only a small or partly 
even negative role is due to the fact that the within-group variances of experience-
education groups (especially educational groups) converged considerably in the 1990s, 
mitigating the effect of skill-upgrading on the variance. As Table 5-7 shows, the variance 
between 1992 and 2002 increased within each experience group for men and women. 
Since the size of experience groups does not change drastically (Table 5-4), the 
composition effect with respect to these groups is small. On the other hand, the sizes of 
educational groups change much more over the course of the 1990s (Table 5-2). Here, the 
within-educational group variance increases strongly for workers with complete or 
incomplete primary education (Table 5-8). This effect is especially strong within the 
female workforce. As these groups are shrinking in the population, the composition 
effects work towards decreasing the variance. 
   
Table 5-7. Variance of Log Wages by Experience Group 
 
MEN [ 0 - 10 ) [ 10 - 20 ) [ 20 - 30 ) ≥ 30 Overall
1980 0.368 0.458 0.509 0.523 0.481
1992 0.345 0.518 0.480 0.424 0.449
2002 0.637 0.643 0.799 0.649 0.684
WOMEN [ 0 - 10 ) [ 10 - 20 ) [ 20 - 30 ) ≥ 30 Overall
1980 0.380 0.519 0.509 0.461 0.465
1992 0.267 0.323 0.451 0.317 0.338
2002 0.389 0.682 0.799 0.719 0.649  
 
Note: Population considered are single-job workers age 15 and above, working 30 and more hours 
weekly 
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1980 0.350 0.342 0.400 0.448 0.369 0.598 0.481
1992 0.284 0.272 0.331 0.396 0.413 0.550 0.449














1980 0.338 0.311 0.404 0.289 0.336 0.596 0.465
1992 0.123 0.248 0.217 0.302 0.280 0.471 0.338
2002 0.275 0.617 0.457 0.364 0.279 0.460 0.649
 
Note: Population considered are single-job workers age 15 and above, working 30 and more hours weekly 
 
5.5.3  Summary  
The decomposition shows that 1980s and 1990s, returns to education and to 
unobserved skills move in tandem. It thus seems plausible that both phenomena might be 
driven by the same underlying processes in the case of Argentina.  
In line with the analysis, the changes observed for Argentina in the 1980s may 
have occurred via the technology channel. It is not likely that a form of ‘negative 
technological change’ was at work, the explanation may rather lie in the level of 
technology present, and the supply of and demand for skills: the 1980s were characterized 
by constant waves of crises and instability. Average GDP growth 1980-1990 was around 
minus one percent. Over the same period, capital formation was reduced by 50 percent in 
real terms.54 There was certainly no positive technology shock during this period – most 
likely, the technological level was stable, if not decreasing due to lack of replacement and 
maintenance in times of crises. If, in line with educational upgrading, “technological 
skills” were improved in the population55 and the stock of technology to operate 
deteriorated, we would expect increasing supply of, and falling demand for those skills 
and consequently falling returns. 
The SBTC hypothesis predicts that technology shocks will spread the earnings 
distribution by increasing the returns to skills that are complementary with the 
                                                 
54 Own calculations based on World Development Indicators. 
55 Remember that we assume a stable distribution of unobserved skills, conditional on observed skills, in order to 
interpret changes in the residual as changes in the returns to unobserved skills.  
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technology. These skills should partly be reflected in educational attainment.56 The 
relevant skills which are uncorrelated with education will also experience an increase in 
demand and in their returns. In the 1990s, the returns to both observed skills, especially 
university education, and unobserved skills worked strongly towards increasing the wage 
variance. As noted earlier in this paper, the literature on the United States shows that the 
returns to observed and unobserved skill have not grown at the same time, casting doubt 
on the hypothesis that SBTC is behind both changes. In Argentina, however, the two 
have evolved together. This is compatible with the hypothesis that SBTC is behind both 
sets of changes.  
In the male and female wage distribution, increases in the variance occurred in 
both the upper and lower halves of the earnings distribution. The drivers, however, are 
fundamentally different. The increase in the 90:50 ratio is mostly caused by increasing 
returns to observed skills, especially college education, as college-educated individuals are 
concentrated in the highest deciles of the wage distribution. On the other hand, the 
returns to high school education did not increase strongly. As mostly workers with lower 
to middle education populate the lower half of the wage distribution, the effect of returns 
to education is weak in this part. Instead, the growth of the 50:10 can almost fully be 
explained by changes in the residual variance. This means that increasing returns to 
unobserved skills are the driver of the growth in dispersion between the median and the 
1st decile. In other words, workers at the bottom and in the middle of the wage 
distribution must differ with respect to their unobserved skills in a way in which the 
middle does not differ from the top of the distribution.57
5.6  Analysis of the Informal-Formal Wage Gap 
This section considers what relevance the findings for the return to unobserved 
skill may have for the earnings gap between formal and informal salaried workers.58 One 
                                                 
56 This also means that they may be partially correlated with educational attainment. This will introduce a bias to 
the estimated coefficients to education which will partly reflect returns to unobserved skills.  
57 The same patterns with very similar magnitudes of change hold for the much bigger sample of 16 Argentinean 
urban conglomerates between 1992 and 2002. The results are shown in Table 5-15 of the appendix. 
58 The paper uses a three-way classification of employment: formal employees, informal employees, and 
independent workers. Independents are defined as the self-employed and those who are owners of micro-
enterprises with 5 or fewer employees. Formality is defined in terms of worker benefits, specifically having the 
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of the puzzles in Argentina is the long-term transformation of its workforce. In Gran 
Buenos Aires between 1980 and 2002, the fraction of all workers who are informal 
salaried workers more than doubled, from 15 to 32 percent, while the share of self-
employed workers remained roughly constant at around 26 percent. The shift from 
formal to informal employment happened steadily over the whole period. Table 5-9 
documents how this increase divides up between full-time and part-time workers. Even 
though most of the increase happens among part-time workers, it is also substantial 
among full-time workers, which are the object of analysis in this paper. 
 















1980 27.3 11.5 61.2 36.4 19.4 44.2
1986 27.0 13.1 59.9 41.9 19.4 38.6
1992 28.4 18.6 53.0 35.1 32.4 32.5
1998 23.0 24.7 52.4 41.0 37.2 21.8
2002 26.8 23.3 49.8 38.6 42.8 18.5
WOMEN
1980 20.0 16.8 63.2 35.8 27.5 36.7
1986 20.7 19.6 59.7 29.0 35.5 35.5
1992 21.9 24.2 53.9 31.0 33.0 36.0
1998 21.4 25.0 53.6 24.2 43.3 32.5
2002 19.1 24.1 56.7 20.8 50.7 28.6
Full-time Workers Part-time Workers
 
Note: Population considered are single-job workers age 15 and above. Full-time workers are those working 30 
and more hours weekly. 
 
World Bank (2008) documents the evolution of informal employment in 
Argentina, exploring  possible explanations for the steady increase in rates of informal 
employment over time. Possible causes include macroeconomic policy and privatization, 
economic structure and demographic change, trade and technological change, labor 
regulations and institutions, as well as tax evasion, enforcement and weak public 
confidence. In a simply supply and demand framework, decreasing wages in light of 
increasing demand for informal workers could be a natural result of large increases in the 
supply of informal workers. The most likely candidate explanation for such changes in 
                                                                                                                                                   
right to receive a pension, which has been shown to be highly correlated with registration in the social security 
system (World Bank 2008).  
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supply would be changes to the labor market induced by structural or demographic 
changes, such as an augmented entering of women into the labor force. However, in 
separate analyses, Gasparini (2002) and World Bank (2008) find that structural and 
demographic changes cannot explain the increase in levels of informal employment.   
World Bank (2008) also shows that changes in the minimum wage and unionization are 
very unlikely candidates to explain the decreasing informal-formal wage gap. Additionally, 
changes in trade patterns since 1980 can explain only a small portion of increases in the 
size of informal salaried employment (Goni and Maloney, 2007).  
 


















Men 0.77 0.56 0.58 10.1%
Women 0.77 0.51 0.62 40.7%
Men 1.15 0.86 0.85 -2.1%






Note: Column four denotes to which degree the change in the relative wage gap can be explained by changes 
in the returns to education. In order to do that, we simulate a counterfactual wage distribution for the year 
2001 by replacing the true returns to education (estimated coefficients on education dummies) that year with 
the returns in 1992. The Mincer equations that are used to estimate the returns and generate the simulated 
wage distributions include only education dummies and a quadratic in experience. 
 
Several hypotheses imply that high levels of informal employment are 
fundamentally driven by increased demand for informal work arrangements. Such an 
explanation would be paired most naturally with increased relative wages in the informal 
compared to the formal sector. However the wages of informal and self-employed 
workers relative to formal workers have not increased consistently. Between 1980 and 
1992, relative wages of informals were indeed rising. However, Table 5-10 shows that in 
the 1990s, the relative wages of informal workers fell substantially, by approximately 21 
percentage points for men and 26 percentage points for women. It is puzzling why 
relative informal wages fell at the same time that informal employment was stable or even 
expanding at high levels. 
  130Chapter 5: A Decomposition Analysis of Earnings Inequality Changes in Urban Argentina 
One possibility is that the growing gap between formal and informal salaried 
wages was driven by increased returns to education, given that formal workers on average 
are more educated. Table 5-11 and Table  5-12 show the educational structure of the 
employed population in Gran Buenos Aires and its evolution between 1980 and 2002. 
Formal workers have higher levels of completed secondary or higher education, 
compared to informal workers:  e.g., in 1992 the comparison is 41 compared to 20 
percent for men, and 61 to 29 percent for women.   
 















1980 19.5% 36.9% 20.4% 8.7% 6.9% 7.5%
1986 13.2% 32.2% 23.3% 15.2% 5.9% 10.2%
1992 7.5% 36.7% 21.3% 17.6% 8.7% 8.3%
1998 8.5% 24.3% 23.7% 20.8% 9.4% 13.4%















1980 26.4% 41.1% 20.0% 8.1% 2.5% 1.9%
1986 22.4% 37.6% 24.5% 8.8% 4.5% 2.1%
1992 13.3% 38.5% 28.5% 11.2% 6.0% 2.5%
1998 10.0% 35.6% 28.5% 15.1% 7.2% 3.7%















1980 19.2% 37.8% 18.9% 12.3% 7.2% 4.7%
1986 15.2% 33.5% 19.6% 13.8% 9.2% 8.7%
1992 8.8% 30.3% 20.5% 19.4% 9.2% 11.9%
1998 5.2% 27.6% 22.9% 19.1% 15.3% 10.0%















1980 20.1% 37.9% 19.5% 10.8% 6.6% 5.2%
1986 15.6% 33.7% 21.2% 13.5% 7.7% 8.3%
1992 9.2% 33.6% 22.2% 17.4% 8.5% 9.1%
1998 7.1% 28.8% 24.4% 18.5% 11.9% 9.2%
2002 6.4% 23.9% 23.1% 19.4% 13.1% 14.1%
 
Note: Population considered are single-job workers age 15 and above, working 30 and more hours weekly 
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1980 27.1% 36.3% 9.8% 14.6% 7.7% 4.4%
1986 23.5% 33.0% 13.8% 17.1% 3.7% 9.0%
1992 10.1% 35.9% 16.0% 23.1% 4.4% 10.5%
1998 11.0% 29.6% 21.2% 16.5% 7.2% 14.5%















1980 27.0% 44.3% 14.1% 7.9% 2.8% 3.8%
1986 21.1% 40.1% 22.7% 8.0% 5.6% 2.6%
1992 10.7% 36.7% 24.0% 17.9% 7.0% 3.7%
1998 8.5% 29.3% 19.1% 23.5% 11.4% 8.3%















1980 9.8% 28.4% 20.9% 22.7% 8.4% 9.7%
1986 8.2% 23.4% 18.0% 27.7% 10.5% 12.2%
1992 3.5% 21.1% 14.9% 28.7% 12.7% 19.2%
1998 1.9% 13.5% 15.3% 27.6% 20.9% 20.9%















1980 16.2% 32.6% 17.5% 18.6% 7.3% 7.7%
1986 13.9% 28.7% 18.1% 21.6% 8.1% 9.6%
1992 6.7% 28.1% 17.3% 24.9% 9.5% 13.5%
1998 5.5% 20.9% 17.5% 24.2% 15.6% 16.4%
2002 3.7% 18.5% 12.2% 28.2% 17.7% 19.7%
 
Note: Population considered are single-job workers age 15 and above, working 30 and more hours weekly 
 
As the group of formal and informal workers differs in their educational 
composition, and returns to education shifted over time, the combination of these 
phenomena might largely explain the changes in relative wages between the groups. We 
examine the degree to which the change in the relative wage gap can be explained by 
changes in the returns to education. In order to do that, we simulate a counterfactual 
wage distributions for 2001 by replacing the true returns to education (estimated 
coefficients on education dummies) that year with the returns in 1992. The Mincer 
equations that are used to estimate the returns and generate the simulated wage 
distributions include only education dummies and a quadratic in experience. We use the 
year 2001 as the final year in order to abstract from the short-term drop in returns to 
education that occurred during the economic crisis in 2002. The counterfactual wage 
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distribution for 2001 using returns from 1992 shows that changes in the returns to 
education only explain 10 percent of the drop in relative wages for men (Table 5-10). For 
women, changes in the returns play a bigger role and explain 41.5 percent of the drop in 
relative informal wages.  
The decline in the relative wages of informal workers may be linked to the decline 
in the returns to unobserved skill. The analysis presented in the previous section shows 
that changes in the returns to unobserved skill affected chiefly earnings inequality below 
median wages, i.e. the 50:10 ratio. Table 5-13 shows that in both 1992 and 2002, informal 
workers were concentrated at the bottom of the wage distribution. Consequently, changes 
in the returns to unobserved skill are likely to have had a substantial effect on the gap 
between informal and formal wages. 
 
Table 5-13. Deciles of the Wage Distribution By Occupational Category, 1992 and 2002 
 
MEN 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th All
1992 Self-Employed 7.9 6.2 4.4 7.1 8.8 9.1 9.6 14.3 13.4 19.3 100.0
Informal Salaried 15.4 12.6 14.2 11.1 9.9 10.0 10.3 5.0 5.6 5.9 100.0
Formal Salaried 9.1 10.7 11.0 10.9 10.6 10.4 10.1 9.9 10.1 7.3 100.0
2002 Self-Employed 16.3 7.6 9.0 8.9 6.5 13.3 7.3 7.7 9.1 14.2 100.0
Informal Salaried 19.2 20.3 16.3 11.3 7.8 5.7 6.0 3.9 4.2 5.3 100.0
Formal Salaried 2.4 6.2 7.4 10.0 12.8 10.4 13.3 14.1 13.2 10.1 100.0
Share of Workers in Decile
 
WOMEN 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th All
1992 Self-Employed 15.9 6.2 8.8 7.6 5.1 9.5 10.2 8.9 5.3 22.3 100.0
Informal Salaried 13.4 10.6 10.3 14.9 11.2 11.2 8.8 6.5 5.7 7.4 100.0
Formal Salaried 6.8 11.0 10.2 8.8 11.1 9.7 10.4 11.7 13.2 7.1 100.0
2002 Self-Employed 31.2 15.0 6.3 9.2 4.7 3.7 4.7 8.3 3.9 13.0 100.0
Informal Salaried 13.5 18.3 9.4 15.4 9.9 12.1 12.0 3.1 3.5 2.7 100.0
Formal Salaried 1.8 4.8 11.4 7.9 11.7 11.1 10.8 13.5 14.7 12.2 100.0
 
Note: Population considered are single-job workers age 15 and above, working 30 and more hours weekly 
 
Unfortunately, it is not possible to quantify the precise effect of changes in the 
returns to unobserved skill on the formal-informal wage gap, due to the fact that the 
distribution of unobserved skill between formals and informal workers is unknown and 
may have changed over time. This is particularly likely given the large expansion in 
informal work over time. Note that the returns to unobserved skill analysis presented in 
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the previous section relies on the plausible assumption that within skill (education and 
experience) groups, the distribution of unobserved skill has not changed over time. 
Because of the potential for workers to move between formal and informal jobs, a similar 
assumption for formal and informal worker groups would not be tenable. 
If, as these results suggest, the growing informal-formal gap has been driven by 
increases in the returns to unobserved skill, technical change may be the ultimate cause of 
some of the informal-formal dynamics. Changes in technology employed in formal 
salaried jobs may have increased the demand for workers with complementary skills. If 
these skills are unobserved in survey data (but observed by potential employers), those 
with unobserved skill may have been sorted into formal sector jobs, expanding the gap 
between informal and formal jobs, even while the share of informal employment has 
increased.  
5.7  Conclusion 
The variance decomposition analysis presented in this paper shows that that the 
returns to unobserved skill decreased in Argentina in the 1980s and then increased during 
the 1990s, during the same period that the returns to education increased. The changes in 
the 1980s are compatible with a stagnation of the level of technology in Argentina during 
the decade, paired with educational upgrading of the workforce. In other words, the drop 
in returns may reflect an increasing supply of those skills, combined with falling demand. 
We interpret the simultaneous timing of the increase in the returns to unobserved 
skill and education in the 1990s as circumstantial evidence that skill-biased technical 
change may be driving both phenomena. Demand for relevant skills outpaced the parallel 
increase in supply of those skills in the workforce with improved education. 
The variance decomposition also demonstrated that in the 1990s the growth in the 
inequality of the upper half of the earnings distribution was mainly caused by rising 
returns to college education. In contrast, the growth in the inequality of the lower half of 
the distribution can mainly be explained by increasing returns to unobserved skills. This 
finding offers a possible explanation for the growth in the wage gap between informal and 
formal salaried workers in the 1990s. Competing explanations to SBTC do not seem to be 
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able to explain these phenomena. Also, changing returns to education do not account for 
the changes in relative wages. As the increase in the returns to unobserved skill has taken 
place largely between the median and the lower end of the distribution, where informal 
workers are concentrated, this could be interpreted as evidence that changes in the returns 
to unobserved skill have driven the relative drop in the wages of informal workers. 
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 Appendix 5 
Appendix 5.1 Inflation in Argentina 
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Appendix 5.2 Extended Decomposition Results 
 
Table 5-14. Decomposition Results, 1980-2002 
 
Panel A. Men 
Var logwage 90/10 50/10 90/50
2002 0.684 7.882 2.361 3.338
1980 0.481 5.488 2.091 2.625
Change 0.203 2.394 0.271 0.713
Components of change:
Δ Returns to Observed Skills 0.099 1.201 0.071 0.421
Δ Composition of Observed Skills 0.053 1.101 -0.095 0.578
Δ Returns to Unobserved Skills 0.051 0.092 0.295 -0.286  
Panel B. Women 
Var logwage 90/10 50/10 90/50
2002 0.649 7.361 2.577 2.856
1980 0.465 5.065 2.101 2.411
Change 0.183 2.296 0.476 0.445
Components of change:
Δ Returns to Observed Skills 0.082 1.710 0.058 0.613
Δ Composition of Observed Skills 0.049 -0.181 -0.349 0.209
Δ Returns to Unobserved Skills 0.052 0.768 0.767 -0.377  
 
Note: Estimations for single-job workers age 15 or above working 30 or more hours weekly 
 
 
Table 5-15. Decomposition Results, 1992-2002, ARG16 Sample 
 
Panel A. Men 
Var logwage 90/10 50/10 90/50
2002 0.661 7.598 2.495 3.045
1992 0.457 5.224 1.983 2.635
Change 0.204 2.374 0.513 0.410
Components of change:
Δ Returns to Observed Skills 0.092 1.248 0.092 0.402
Δ Composition of Observed Skills 0.024 0.482 0.057 0.141
Δ Returns to Unobserved Skills 0.088 0.644 0.364 -0.134  
Panel B. Women 
Var logwage 90/10 50/10 90/50
2002 0.658 7.576 2.840 2.668
1992 0.374 4.436 1.940 2.286
Change 0.284 3.141 0.900 0.382
Components of change:
Δ Returns to Observed Skills 0.136 1.799 0.139 0.529
Δ Composition of Observed Skills 0.007 -0.115 -0.070 0.012
Δ Returns to Unobserved Skills 0.141 1.456 0.830 -0.159  
 
Note: Estimations for single-job workers age 15 or above working 30 or more hours weekly 
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